A Thinker's Note Book

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BHIKKHU ÑĀṆAMOLI
(Osbert Moore)

BUDDHIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY
Kandy Sri Lanka

FIRST EDITION: 1971

(Forest Hermitage, Kandy)

SECOND EDITION: 1980

(Buddhist Publication Society)

EDITOR'S PREFACE

"I shall never be able to compose my biography; but let no one else have the presumption to do so; for this would amount to theft.— Don't worry, no one will think of it."

NOTE BOOKS § 268

THUS a Bubdhist monk, the late venerable Ñāṇamoli, the author of the following pages, wrote in one of his note books. And in deference to his wish, only a few bare facts of his life will be given here, just for 'identifying' him. Even for such bare identification he would hardly have cared: "It is my ambition to attain to obscurity" (§75; see also §339). Those who knew him are aware that these words were neither 'false modesty' nor any other posturing.

Though the present publication seems to go counter to his 'ambition', he might not have minded a circulation of his ideas after his death as this left him uninvolved and unencumbered. Hence the Editor, a Brother-in-Order of the author, felt that the rich store of thought seeds and thought fruits found in these pages, should be made accessible to some appreciative readers, at least within the modest range of a private publication.

Osbert Moore (as the author was known in lay life) was born on the 25th of June, 1905 in England. He graduated at Exeter College, Oxford, and during the Second World War he served as an army staff-officer in Italy. It was at that time, by reading an Italian book on Buddhism, that his interest in that Teaching was roused. This book — The Doctrine of Awakening by Evola — was later translated into English by a friend and fellow officer, Harold Musson, who in 1948 accompanied Osbert Moore to Sri Lanka. In 1949 both received Novice Ordination as Buddhist monks, at the Island Hermitage, Dodanduwa; and in 1950 the Higher Ordination as Bhikkhus, at the Vajirarama monastery, Colombo. Osbert Moore, our author, received the monastic name of *Ñāṇamoli*, and his friend that of Ñāṇavīra. Both returned soon to the Island Hermitage (an island monastery situated in a lagoon of South Sri Lanka), where the venerable Ñāṇamoli spent almost his entire monk life of 11 years. Only very rarely he left the quietude of the Island Hermitage, and it was on one of these rare occasions, on a walking tour undertaken with the senior monk of the Hermitage, that he suddenly passed away on 8th March 1960, through heart failure (coronary thrombosis). He had not yet completed his 55th year. His death took place at a lonely little village, Veheragama near Maho. Though he seemed to be in vigorous health, his end will not have come unexpected to him as his Note Books show (§ 209), and, without doubt, it found him inwardly prepared (§§ 555, 556).

Personal reminiscences of his lay life have been published by Maurice Cardiff, in a short article **Osbert Moore. A Character Sketch** (in **Visakha Puja**, 1968; publ. by The Buddhist Association of Thailand, Bangkok). A slender memorial pamphlet was issued in 1960 by the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, Sri Lanka.

The author's own scanty contribution to his biography is contained in a single note in this book (§267).

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What was known of the monk life of the venerable Ñāṇamoli to a wider public in Sri Lanka and abroad, was his outstanding scholarly work in translating from the original Pali into lucid English some of the most difficult texts of Theravāda Buddhism. These translations, listed at the end of this volume, were remarkable achievements in quantity as well as in quality. Some more unfinished work of that nature was found among his papers, and he might have completed it in years to come. His translations showed the highest standard of careful and critical scholarship and a keen and subtle mind, philosophically trained. His work in this field is a lasting contribution to Buddhist studies.

It was characteristic of him that he had limited his publications to that scholarly field, so that his "public image" was that of an able scholar and an exemplary monk, which left him enough of his cherished 'obscurity'.

Very few knew, or even suspected, those other facets of his rich and profound mind, which in the present volume appear in such an astonishing variety. And even the contents of these pages do not exhaust the entire range of his knowledge, his interests and his capacities.

Yet, there were still other 'layers' of his mind (and still not the deepest), without which the picture of his personality as presented by this book and in his scholarly work would be incomplete and even misleading. These other features of his character, however, manifested themselves only in his way of life and in his human relationships. From his

unrelentingly realistic world-view as appearing in his Note Books — undeceived by the deceptions and self-deceptions of life and of our own minds — a reader could possibly gain the impression of a harsh if not cynic character with a rather contemptuous view of mankind. But this would be very far from the deep humanity and friendly composure of his nature, which made his self-effacing reticence still more unobtrusive. He had a natural affinity with the Buddha's detachment as well as with His compassionate outlook. In his detachment and reticence he was not "forbiddingly aloof", but quite relaxed and natural. His friendliness and compassion was unsentimental and undemonstrative, but of a simple human warmth. His quiet and friendly smile will be unforgettable to his companions. Though not of an 'out-going' nature, he was always willing to help when approached, and he was also quite skilful in practical tasks. Though he rarely took the initiative in conversation and discussions, he was quite willing to speak and discuss at length when spoken to in a worthwhile manner; and whenever asked he gave to the younger monks help and guidance in their studies. The simplicity and frugality of a Buddhist monk's life came quite natural to him. As he himself wrote to a friend, he had found great happiness in his new life as a monk (see Maurice Cardiff, l.c.). In the Buddha's Teaching on reality and man's situation in it, he found ever-fresh inspiration for his own thought, and the Buddha's practical path to deliverance being the solution of the human predicament, was the guiding and directing force in his inner life.

* * *

When after the death of the venerable Ñāṇamoli the Editor looked through the posthumous papers, he found two little note books, the contents of which fill the bulk of the

present volume. As one of these note books was badly bound and near disintegration and pencil writings in it would have become illegible soon, a type-written copy of almost the entire contents of the two books was made by the Editor, first for the sake of preservation and for perusal by a few friends. Matters rested at that for some years when inquiries made from knowledgeable friends abroad made it improbable that a publisher could be found for a book of that nature. But finally the Editor decided to prepare the book for printing as a private publication, and he added other representative material taken from the posthumous papers.

It hardly needs mentioning that the title of this volume was not given to it by the author who probably did not think of having these note books published as they were, but perhaps of using some of the ideas in other writings. The numbering of the aphorisms and other pieces was done by the Editor for facilitating reference. Personal circumstances, however, did not allow the Editor to add an Index to the book.

Nyanaponika
Buddhist Monk

The Forest Hermitage,
Kandy, Sri Lanka.
April 1971.

CONTENTS

A THINKER'S NOTE BOOK

THE FIRST NOTE BOOK

1. Civilisation is the art of living in contact with other persons with the minimum of discomfort. (1945)

2. A thought for this Damocletian Age: the trouble with justice is it just isn't it? (1946)

3. For every man killed by man for the sake of facts, twenty or more are so killed for the sake of opinion. (1946)

4. Worms look out of the eyes of the very rich and all the platitudes about them are true. (1946)

(Later addition:) And the poor — how poor they are!

5. I was the future and shall be the past — I am a timeless, everlasting Now, so short I have no end, so long I have no duration.

6. If I insist on having only beauty before me I know only horror will be behind me, therefore I shall not dare to turn round. (1947)

7. Madness is sometimes said to be divine — can the same ever be said of sanity? (1947)

8. The five senses offer us five different ways of shutting out reality. What is intuition and what does it perceive? (1947)

9. As electricity is made up of positive and negative current — so is human life a system of attraction and repulsion. — Turn off the current if you want quiet. — Yes, but where is the switch?

10. Present-day politics rely for their power largely on an efficient battery of quick-firing slogans. (Mar. 54)

11. An unsuccessful lie conflicts with truth, but a successful one subverts and seduces it. (Mar. 54)

12. Sing as loud as you will, there is nothing that does not eventually fall into the cavernous lap of ruinous Old Age, the procureuse of death. (1947)

13. Let him who climbs the spiritual ladder make sure he has a sound head before he looks down into the past. (1949)

14. How is it I have the strength to carry my own weakness? (1948)

15. It is in the company of others that one can be really lonely, for then one's personality is forced openly to try to express what its separate individuality is. (1949)

16. If one could continue the calming process after everything has fallen calm one might enter the looking glass world. (1949)

17. Among the inhabitants of Naples there are those who are inclined to cultivate ulcers and deformities on their bodies which they display while begging, in order to induce others to give them money. Among the inhabitants of a much wider area there are those who cultivate ulcers and deformities of the mind which they display, in company, in order to induce others to give them attention. (Sep. 1949)

18. The so-called seven colours of the spectrum together go to make up what is known as light — what, in other words, the scientists say is no more than a mere fractional band in the whole range of electro-magnetic waves — the only section of the wave-range which the visual sense can directly grasp. Indeed each colour is experienced as a particular limitation of light; light itself appears to be a particular limitation of the electro-magnetic wave-range. So would the five senses seem to be five specific limitations of the infinite — five exclusive ways of screening off, of shutting out the rest. In fact, the "outer world", as known through the senses, seems to be conditioned by — shall one say our knowledge of it depends on — the limiting and sifting qualities of our five senses. By means of sifting and excluding, form could be said to be created from Chaos and thus our five senses are at the same time five creators and five ways of being partially blind. We live, as it were, in a cathedral with stained windows whose, to us, magnificent colour patterns let in a little of the light which the sun sheds indiscriminately outside. (1947)

> (Later addition:) But the "sun" would then stand for Chaos in our simile and how would that be wrong?

19. If I had a child what could I say to him? "My child," I could say, "you are here in this world because of my own pleasure and incontinence. I can offer you nothing better than become another 'little man' like myself whom it is the present fashion for politicians and the like to idolize en masse and exploit and ignore as an individual. If you succeed in 'improving' your position this can only be at the expense of others and will increase its instability. If your position deteriorates it will be at your own expense. In a few years time you will, no doubt, be repeating these very words." (1949)

20. Heaven is where (it is supposed) we may enjoy what other people consider we ought to enjoy. (1948 Ap.)

21. History is bones daubed and plumped out with the clay of opinion. (1949)

22. The waves that die on the shore — where are they born? (Amalfi - Sep. 1945)

23. For a long time — over many years indeed — the atmosphere continued to echo the clanging of evil times as multitudes fell upon them.

24. Some say "Jones has gone up in the world." Others say "the world is upside down." What has happened to Jones? (1949)

25. Virtue is perhaps covertly disliked as much as it is because it entails refusing frequently what other people want one to do. (1948)

26. One is, as it were, on the 20th storey of a burning house, and from the window there is a narrow plank leading across the street to the balcony of an — apparently — safe building opposite. (The Building Opposite whose blinds are always down, whose chimneys never smoke, whose doors never open, where no light is seen at night, about which there has been one's frequent yet always inconclusive speculation.) To stay is to be burned for certain. By attempting the plank one will probably fall — still one knows one will have to walk that plank or burn. (1948, Nov.)

27. The journey through life is fingered by sign posts indicating routes whose bridges are found, on exploration, to have been breached by floods or wars. (1949)

(Later addition:) The new "autostrassen" have no sign posts.

28. It is spring, as the sun comes back north again, and, obediently, out come the bright leaves. In summer they will weary and darken under his rays; in autumn, as he retreats south, he abandons them to themselves; worn out they will die and fall to the ground. Observing her own peculiar disciplines the moon watches monotonously throughout the seasons; waxing and waning she is occupied with herself — only when she is full do her three expressions reveal three phases of the boundless ennui she must feel watching all this for so long.

* * *

28a. The restless river slides by day and night intent only upon the sea. (Turin by the Po, May 1948)

29. A function of art — of contemporary art — is to explore, to send scouts ever further into the wilderness of unclaimed discord. The advance-guard is in continuous touch with the enemy, fighting the unnamed, capturing the formless. Sometimes patrols fall into enemy hands: then, from their prison camps where madness rules, they send back reports, some of which seem half intelligible. (1947)

30. Art is a reminder and, to some degree, illuminates. In my prison cell it serves as a screened window — which lets in a little light from which I infer the existence of the bright outside world. Were I to go and live out there, art, the screened window, would no longer serve any purpose at all. (1947)

> (Later addition:) But how do I know there is anything to live on out there?

31. To say "The politicians have failed, the philosophers have failed, religion has failed or is out of date, science has

failed and is not what it was thought to be", and so on — are not these all ways of saying that we, ourselves, have failed? The Govt. Treasury has no revenue unless the people work and are taxed (how taxes are levied and revenue spent is another question). Unless we put something in our bank account it remains empty. And so with religion — its helpfulness depends upon what we put into it and continue to put into it. We may spend wisely or foolishly thereafter. After all, does not each community get the Govt. it deserves or the religion it deserves, and so on?

(Jan. 1950)

32. Certain water creatures delight in adorning their shells with other shells, pebbles, leaves: often they will stick on another living creature without regard to its preferences or to the position it dislikes.

In the building of systems of relationships among humans, one may often see someone build into his scheme of things — his psychological house, or shelter, as it were — the personality of another. That other personality may, on occasion, scream and kick against finding himself used as a brick to build another's house, a tile to keep out the rain from another's room, a bronze ornament on another's chimney piece, more especially if he has been stuck on upside down out of disregards for his feelings, or to please the aesthetic sense of the first named. That you are a brick in my house, or that I am one in yours is largely a matter of view point, once the building process has set in. (1947)

33. Philosophies are to experience as maps are to the countries they represent. They should help one to find one's way about, but even in this respect each is no more than symbolic. Philosophies have an ornamental value, too, just as maps have; and the latter are often elegant when

framed and hung on the walls of rooms — used thus they serve quite another purpose. The prettiest are mostly those drawn to fancy on the basis of hearsay and those which are out of date. (1946)

34. A party was once given to which Charity was invited as a guest of honour. However as she had only the rags of humility to wear and came to the front door on foot, she was turned away by the footman when she asked to be admitted. Nobody noticed she was not there. (May 1950)

35. When "duty" (as with "objective good and evil" and other such concepts) are brought into a discussion, beware! Mostly it is a means of getting you to work for some one else's benefit without re-paying you for it. "Jones is not doing his duty by society," usually means: "I think if Jones were to do so and so instead of what he is doing, I should benefit. If you help me to persuade him we shall both benefit." (April 1950)

36. The food rotting in my guts provides me with the energy to play the harpsichord.

37. The humanitarian needs an oppressed proletariat. The ministering angel lives by suffering. Meekness only shines forth when abused by the angry. (Mar. 50)

38. What person or place or thing has benefited rather than suffered by commerce and relations with me? But has anyone in their senses ever asked such a question? It can only be conducive to depression or complacency — and there is no conclusive answer. (undated; 1950?)

39. What does one say to one who has lost all he ever valued — to a cripple — to one who knows he must die within a brief period? (1950)

40. Wandering in deserted places there are found many traces and tracks from which we deduce the movements of heroes and gods and so we weave history. Yet were our vision to become a little clearer we might discover that all these tracks are merely made by ourselves during our own earlier wanderings. (Mar. 1950)

41. One can judge people's nature more reliably by the way they treat their immediate associates than by the feelings they voice towards humanity in general. (Aug. 50)

42. For someone who would like to get on* but cannot, the next best thing is to teach others how to do so.

*(The foll. insertion has been cancelled:) or make spiritual progress. (Aug. 50)

43. It is impossible to please everybody, they say. And so that is perhaps why Saints who should be, one supposes, good enough to please everybody, are always dead. For then only the skeleton is left and everyone is free to make of them what he, in person, likes, and the Saints do not appear to confute such opinion. (Aug. 50)

44. The recognition of a saint (and not only of a saint) requires two things: that the saint should be held to behave within certain prescribed limits of behaviour, and that people should have the will and capacity to recognize such behaviour. (Aug. 50)

45. If you owe one a debt of gratitude, as in the case of any other kind of debt, it is better to a avoid him until you can pay it off. (1950)

46. Those who set themselves a final goal secretly—may be unconsciously—dread the attainment of it.

(Aug. 50)

47. Much of what is asserted as true is so asserted, not as a declaration of what the speaker knows but rather as a defence against doubt in the hope that the opposite proposition may be thereby excluded. (Nov. 50)

48. You will never meet with a saint by walking round the world looking for one; but you may do so if you sit in one place and consider the matter. (Nov. 50)

49. One may suspect that people whom one sometimes meets on their trapsings from continent to continent, "looking for truth" are really like the man who searches his house for his spectacles which are all the time on his nose. But if he takes them off to look at them, he cannot see them for shortsightedness. (Nov. 50)

50. Suppose boredom is a backstairs to liberation — insignificant, and so often overlooked. No one who has not known its higher degrees can claim to have lived. Not the Relative Boredom of long waiting at junctions for railway connections on the way to visit friends — or the rashly accepted week-end with acquaintances—the reviewing of a dull book. In such Relative Boredom the "wasting-of-time"-feeling only heightens the enjoyment of the coming escape, the anticipation of which sustains us meanwhile.

Absolute Boredom is rather the pain of nausea, it is the loss of one's livelihood as for the pianist who loses his hands, the unsatiable desire for what we know makes us sick, it is the Great Drought, the "Carnal physic for the sick soul", the Dark Night of the Soul after the climbing of Mount Carmel, it is the pillar of salt, the exile from the land which is no more, the Sin against the Holy Ghost, the break-up of patterns, the horror that waits alone in the

night, the entry into the desert where Death mocks by serving one one's daily food and one cannot bear but to keep the darkness of one's own shadow before one for the very brightness of the light that reveals the universal emptiness. Do not try to turn back now — here in the desert perhaps there are doors open — in the cool woods they are overgrown, and in the busy cities they have built over them. (Mar. 50)

51. **Palliatives.** Such thoughts about death as: 'The end of it all', 'Those whom the gods love die young', 'a merciful release' etc.; then such small dividends from the bankrupt estate as: work (I am always busy, you see), helping others (before learning how to help oneself or them), art ("it helps"), collections, Fitzrovia, Mont Martre and Parnasse, Via Margutta, Bloomsbury and the Pheasantry, drink, travel, kindness to all except the human animals, kindness to humans one does not know personally, politics, utopias, teaching what one would like to, but cannot, practise. (1950)

52. In the long run mostly one is not measured (either by others or by oneself) so much by one's best actions or by one's worst (though the latter are the more likely of the two to be remembered). It is rather the average level of all one has done and one's general tenor and tendencies and ways of reacting, the compass of one's moods and the emotional, moral, ethical, aesthetical and productive range that count, that censor all one's thoughts and acts. One can always try to leap to greater heights (and thereby risk coming down to earth more heavily). But what desperate work it is to try and displace in any direction the dead-weight of one's average conduct. (1950)

53. Sometimes it is more difficult to sin than to be virtuous; though ability to do either does not ensure greatness, inability to do either is one of the signs of mediocrity. (Dec. 50)

54. From the 18th to the 20th Century it was the boast that human thought had at least come out of the dark woods of medieval superstition, credulity and obscurantism, into the sunshine of clear thinking where the dry breezes of scepticism blow unhindered. 'Fell the trees and level the hills that still obscure the view; let the winds drive off the mist'—they said. But now that much of this work has been accomplished it is beginning to be felt that there is no shade in all these flat plains of perpetual parching wind and sunshine, and through this desert no flooding Nile flows. There are those who, secretly, would like, if they could, to reconstruct the dim, wet, haunted woods before they die of thirst. (Mar. 50)

55. When people relate their symptoms to me I think of trees and of the cows that unscab their itchy backs on the bark of those trees.

56. Maturity seems to be merely a name for the door way that leads out of adolescence into old age. (Jan. 51)

57. We have apparently to drink the wine of pleasure out of the cup of pain—and the cup remains. (Dec. 50)

58. Religion is the organization of hope. (Oct. 51)

59. Hope is killed by attainment. (Jan. 53)

60. The world is like a zoo where there are no spectators, only animals in cages—some can move their own cages from inside and sometimes they play at being spectators. (Oct. 51)

61. People are often aggressively assertive in proportion to their inward doubts about the truth of their hopes. Here fear lends strength to rally to the defence of the hopes suspected to be illusory. (Oct. 51)

62. Wandering across a city — walking often quite alone, down dark alleys, through unfrequented districts and debouching suddenly onto main thoroughfares where for a spell one follows the main stream, is adopted by a group "he has come where we come from, wants to go where we want to go". For a while it is true but the side streets are there. Pause in one of them for a moment, and the stream has moved on. So, as there is no catching up with the group, there is no more reason to return to the main street than to wander away from it .....more alleys..... more thoroughfares......Where shall we be sleeping tonight?...... And those odd encounters of eyes in lonely alleys......

(May 51)

63. When one brings out one of one's favourite paradoxes with the cliché, "I can never understand why.. ...", it is disconcerting when someone knows the solution and one is made to understand it, for a mental prop has been removed, a domestic mystery debunked, a painted window shown to be a mere piece of wall in the rational jail. When one asks (not wanting an answer) in some strange suburb, "I wonder what is round the bend?", it seems possible that there might be a forgotten palace or a volcano there, or the back stairs to hell, yet people are mostly only too anxious to show you how homogeneous and respectable the suburb is. (May 51)

64. Let us define religion as the organization of hope in suchwise that all hopes are arranged as lesser hopes subordinated to one supreme hope which is of such a nature

that, while it seems realizable, it cannot be realized now. In communism the "fading away of the state", and in the old religions "heaven" and "the life to come" are like a rainbow (it has a treasure hidden at its base), clearly visible, but moves away as you approach. In fact the very essence is unrealizability now. As far as the average man is concerned, the realization of the final aim means existence without hope which is shunned as futile despair and a horrible living death. Yet scarcely any one asks himself why he drags his heavy load of hope around. (Oct. 51)

65. Like the drop of ink in the glass of water and the drop of water in the glass of ink. An evil doer does not purify his reputation with one good act, but the virtuous man ruins his reputation by one bad action. So evil would seem more effective than good. Odd that the world is not worse than it is. (Apr. 51)

66. A man went to a theatre, but when he thought it was time to leave he found that the real audience was elsewhere and he was part of a show containing the piece he had come to see. (Nov. 50)

67. Charity and a party of other virtues went for a trip to heaven. They got hungry and were served in a café with ambrosia and nectar. Now the virtues live on special diets. Charity looked at her plate and said: "I must be served with poverty or I shall starve. But there is none here". Love said he needed separation. Hope wanted privation. Patience wanted adversity. Humility abuse, etc., etc. "Come," said Charity, "We shall all starve here as we can't get our special diets". The others agreed and they returned to earth where there was a plentiful supply of special food for each. (Nov. 50)

68. Pursuit of the "fascinating" difference of people leads to the discovery of the "appalling" sameness of people. "Fascinating" because one always hopes to meet the marvellous person who will be "radically different", and eventually one's search establishes the fact that people are but slight variations on the same human theme and it is "appalling" to find that the search was simply a flight from the monotony. (Nov. 51)

69. So much can be done by teachers for others — but what can others do for teachers? (Apr. 52)

70. Greek and Roman pagan thought is like the dry light of noon between dark nights. Early Christian thought is like a burning(?) fire in a vast moonless night. The Roman Catholic Church today is like a gas-lit street at mid-winter dusk in a foggy city. (Oct. 51)

71. Funny how many claim to have the key to unlock the secrets of the universe — but where are those who will show, by example, where is the keyhole for their key? (Dec. 51)

72. Europe has been kissed by history with a sore upon her lips. (May 51)

73. The average man's compulsive urges mostly pay him enough wages to live on. (May 52)

74. Intellect is like the dry land — by itself, without the rain drawn from the sea, it is like a barren desert. Feeling or emotion, is like the ocean — by itself also a desert of waves. They may cooperate as where Western Europe meets the Atlantic, or they may remain aloof and indifferent as on the shores of the Sahara. (51)

75. It is my ambition to attain to obscurity. (Jan. 52)

76. All these things one gets attached to are continually letting one down by changing or dying or getting destroyed, or if it seems not, it is because one has oneself let them down by oneself changing or falling sick or dying. (Mar. 52)

76a. What does one get from company? Two things apparently, firstly more stable and certain conditions of living than man as constituted can get by himself (mostly man dies by starvation or something if entirely isolated), and secondly a certain shake-up of ideas which is brought about by signs coming to one from "outside" (other people) in a different order than one is able to think up for oneself. That would seem to be all. But one has to pay through the nose for these. (May 52)

77. The beauty of the world sometimes seems to hang about it like the shapes fancied in the pale coils of vapour exhaled by a midden on a still autumn evening. (May 52)

78. There was never any time when the mortality of physical infants was as low as now,—yet with present-day enthusiasm for throwing away bath water, the mortality among metaphorical babies was probably never so high. (May 52)

79. If one has not attained any superiority over the average it looks silly to run down average people—and if one does obtain superiority there is no need to do so. Carping is the last desperate attempt at self-justification. (Apr. 52)

80. It has been discovered that the flowering and fruiting of plants depends upon the right proportional length of

night to day — and so too one might say that for a man's personality to flower and fruit there is needed the right proportion between the daylight of reason and the night of emotion. (Apr. 52)

81. Though we are often willingly exhorted by moral biologists to despise the parasitism of cuckoos aud mistletoe and tapeworms, the unprogressive and reactionary outlook of king-crabs, lamp shells and club moss, the antisocial venomenousness of snakes and nettles, the contemptuous and hostile seclusion of euphorbiae and cacti, yet it would seem that nature, with all her ruthlessness, is more tolerant here than they. (Apr. 52)

82. A dead dog washed up on the lake shore; a large water lizard (the kind whose skin is made into handbags and shoes) puts its head into the mouth, between the teeth like jasmin buds, pulls out the soft tongue and gulps it down. It squeezes up to the shoulders through rents in the throat and gorges itself on the rotting guts inside. White fragrant flowers fall from the shore trees above.
(Ap. 52)

83. I should like to be sure that there was someone I had met or had known, who was, on balance, better off for the acquaintance. But how to know this?

84. I should like to be reasonably confident of dying quietly without remorse for what was done badly or wrong, regarding it as the result of honest mistakes; and without regret for anything at all left behind. (Mar. 52)

84a. Will the Behaviourist view of the mind one day seem as quaint as Cosmas' description of the world seems to us? (July 52)

85. Nobody, I think, has actually said "The Kingdom of hell is within you" — perhaps because it is so obviously true that it does not need saying. The only new factor the idea of hell (the Christian one anyway) adds to the horrors that from time to time make their appearance in the world, is that of everlastingness — which shows nothing but man's vindictiveness. (1951)

86. Under the bushes in the dusk a land rail — not fugitive nor unfriendly. Neatly dressed in sober sub (dued colours) as usual with its kind; this one in dark grey with russet head and striped pants; oversized shanks and toes. Prudent, grave and judicious; middle-class, unafraid, skilfully avoiding the inappropriate and the exaggerated, — the simple, quaker-like humility a little studied? No use for "art" — see the huge, shapeless but so serviceable nest, and the complacent delight in its "song" which so nearly resembles the cries of a dying pig. (Mar. 50)

87. Are not these tropical bookworms that drill through the pages from cover to cover wiser than we, — better off in knowing only how to eat books than we who know only how to read them? We read and mark — they inwardly digest. (May 52)

88. When all one's associates go away for a holiday and leave one behind, one has a holiday oneself without the bother of travelling. (Ap. 52)

88a. The two opposed theories of the course of mankind — the past fall from grace, the present downward drive to the sordid end among the worms in slime and darkness and entropy, — or the upward development from the insipid simplicity of grubs with triumphal progress up through the hopeful present to the golden wonders of the future superman (or) superdivine.

If a man believes the first he can die like he who gets his ship and cargo into port before the winter gales set in. If he believes the second he can die like a man who is sent to a concentration camp and sees his bride carried off the day before his wedding. (May 52)

89. Let us say I have come from Camden Town. I am in Oxford St for half an hour looking for a shop to buy a toy and then I have to go on to a room in Lambeth. What has it to do with me if Oxford St traces its beginnings in the Bucks and Oxon countryside and if its progress eastwards leads on to the blank walls of the Bank of England?

What actual value or bearing has the progress of the race through future centuries — even if it were true — to a mortal with a hundred years' life span? Is this what they offer for sale now as immortality? (May 52)

90. When we are young the noise of general conversation seems much the most fun. When we grow up we discover the possibilities of the tete-a-tete. In maturity the monologue habit sets is. But now at last there is the chance to investigate the rich depth of the silence when the monologue is suspended. (May 52)

91. If I must believe in something, let me beleive in the next world — not in this death's antechamber. For if this world is good and true then death must be horrible — and it is the only thing that is certain. (1948)

92. Man has got bored with prostrating himself before god, so he now indulges his need for self-prostration by doing so to the state or to the material world of the five senses, worshipping them, according to his new creed, as his omnipotent master. Men like to worship a master

because this gives them authority to exercise power over others in the Master's name. (Aug. 52)

93. The sweetest words are those not spoken. (Aug. 52)

94. The past is full of people who have made portentous and menacing utterances for which they have claimed the authority of god. They do the same now but claim the authority of the people and the state. (Sep. 52)

94a. "That is mere escapism" they say — but if they were suddenly to believe there really was an escape, are we to suppose they would not take it? (Sep. 52)

95. The bars of one's prison are the people around one — and I, too, am a bar in each of their prisons. Much of the 'help' we give each other is just cement to fix the bars more firmly. (Sep. 52)

96. I cannot see

why it is better that there are more people in the world at a given time (is Belsen full better than Tristan da Cuñha?);

that the trend of evolution needs must coincide with the direction I or any one would like it to be taking, nor that its goal (if any) is mine or theirs.

97. What should a compassionate man do who sees a savage tiger about to eat poisoned meat? (Oct. 52)

Or who when walking beside a deep and dangerous river, and unable to swim, sees a man drowning in the middle of the swift current? Ought one to walk beside such rivers?

98. The voices of jungle birds — like concert flutes in the hands of idiot children. (Oct. 52)

99. Worship of an anthropomorphic god is merely a form of narcissism and worship of the state is the same only more of a close-up. (Oct. 52)

100. Autumn hush in an English August. Transparency, loneliness, small distant sounds, stillness of (departing) summer, not-yet-ness of (coming) winter. (Nov. 52)

101. When I have to make up my mind, I am forced, like Mark Twain, to think I must have a great deal of mind for it to take so long to make it up. But when I give someone even a little piece of my mind, I seem to have not enough left for myself. (Jan. 53)

102. The potentialities of any situation are, as it were, its womb full of litter. When we say "a choice has been made", we are indeed stating that these offspring having matured, one of them has overcome the others and, in order to be able to express itself in the stream of actuality, to get chosen, it has had to kill them and devour their substance. For if once one choice has been made all other potential choices are irretrievably lost. But to suspend choice would be to suspend the flow of becoming. And so this cannibalism seems essential to becoming. (Jan. 53)

103. What bores me is that whenever I look at anything I am precluded for just that amount of time from looking at anything else. (Jan. 53)

104. The invading platitudes that advance like sand dunes in the desert and bury the oases. (Jan. 53)

105. One's physical body lives inside the protection of its skin; and one's mental body, as it were, lives inside the protection of its skin of fixed concepts. Just as one's physical body heaves earth about with a spade, grows

vegetables and cooks itself meals of physical food, so one's mental body heaves ideas around, grows notions and cooks itself mental meals of definitions, purposes snd aims which keep it going. (Jan. 53) Then there is the lavatory side of the simile.

106. Eternity is a finite concept which is perhaps why Blake said that "eternity is in love with the productions of time". These oppositions live on the borders, as it were, half beyond the horizon of one's experience and they depend of the fact that I am I, and have an horizon to my field of experience, and that there has to be a beyond to it. (Jan. 53)

107. This age is the age of spring cleaning......spring after spring, and the furniture gets shabbier and shabbier and has to be replaced, and the walls get filthy and have to be repainted, and the tiles fall off and have to be put back, and the owners grow old and are succeeded by their heirs, and the house falls down and has to be rebuilt, and the state collapses and has to be reformed, and the world economic system gets out of date and has to be remodelled, and the world sources of supply dry up and new ones have to be found, and the sun cools down and the solar system gets deranged......It is the "progress" which keeps you where you are; and the whole thing is kept going by hope and fear, dangling their carrots and cracking their whips. (Jan. 53)

108. Life and the world and oneself are nothing but a vast tautology. (Jan. 53)

109. There are three ways of feeling low, or levels of fatigue (and they can all happen at once): physical, for which one takes rest and tonics; mental, for which one

changes one's environment and habits; and spiritual (which is perhaps comparable to what the last surviving inhabitant of an oasis being blotted out by sand — in modern parlance, a "displaced person" — might feel), for which one takes time. In all three cases one hopes the remedy will be effective. (Jan. 53)

110. Three kinds of people: Those who seem nicer when absent than when present, the opposite kind, and those who are equal present or absent. (Jan. 53)

111. Dogmas are like stays to sustain a sagging understanding. But as they hold one up so too they hold one back. (Jan. 53)

112. One may distinguish at least five layers in the mental ocean: (1) the public stratum of communicated reasoning and as much of the emotions as is communicable or convenient to communicate, (2) the bedroom layer, private to couples, (3) the evident personally private layer, private to oneself because incommunicable or inconvenient to communicate, (4) the lower personal layer half glimpsed, half inferred, incommunicable, (5) the supposed "unconscious depths" postulated in order to explain inconsistencies, — like phlogiston?

On the surface of it all reason floats like the unsupported layer of plankton. The great Philosophical Systems, the great Religions and Political Civilizations grow like organized mats of sargasso, heaving and drifting with the swell and the currents of the lower layers dissolving-away. On the plankton reasoning birds walk, feed and so on. (Jan. 53)

113. One's life is like a jaunt in a car running without brakes down a long hill towards a chasm. It makes little

difference who drives it, for in any attempt to turn it round up hill its own momentum will overturn it and send it rolling down towards the same abyss. Skilful driving only averts the overturn. (Jan. 53)

114. A man's life is like a day's journey travelled westwards and facing always the way one has come. In the morning the field of experience is bright, simple and dazzling. Shadows are thrown by the sun from things already past and known and they need no interpreting -- and there is nothing to hinder fancying the future. But after midday the sun gets ahead and there begin to fall into the field of vision shadows of things before they are seen, some of which can be recognized as similar to things already known, but others not. And now the future journey depends on how these shadows are interpreted before the things which cast them are encountered. And as the day draws on the shadows get longer and more intricate. And meanwhile, as when looking back from a car travelling down a long avenue of trees that are slipping by, the trees appear to get rapidly smaller as they recede, but distant hills behind in the background, though receding too, seem, by contrast with the shrinking trees, to be getting larger and larger. (Jan. 53)

115. If people's lives were adequate there would be no need for them to go hunting outside themselves and their surroundings by reading novels, going to cinemas, football matches and other forms of hero worship and vicarious life. At different times self-discontented people have admired kings and aristocracy, man in the street and workers, farmers, govt. officials, the rich, the poor, the good old times, the good time to come, saints, foreigners, travel, mountains, the sea, the country, the city, this world,

the other world, the West End, the East End, round the corner, humanism, satanism, solitude, company — but never what a man is himself now. (Apr. 51 - Jan. 53)

116. Why are the rich rich? Because society as it constitutes itself, by consenting to their status, is in fact paying them wages for the qualities it recognizes (the wisdom or folly of society of so doing is not at issue here). But this being so the rich then claim intrinsic worth not based on the society on which their status depends, and they fancy they have independent ownership of their wealth. Forgetting their position is supported by society they bully it. For a while society seems to like it but later it turns and rends them. But in so doing it seems to be punishing them for its own stupidity and deficiencies — after which it pays others to be rich, and so this process goes on. (Feb. 52)

117. What moved unicellular amoebas to amalgamate themselves into multicellular units like hydra and volvox? And multicellular units into societies of units like the Portuguese man of war? Was it boredom? And in the transitional stage did they live in loose societies like sponges or like termites or like us? And came to sell themselves to that association for their livelihood? And did they evolve a means of communication by which they exchanged experiences, built up a body of knowledge, and dominated each other, thus excreting a psychological glue in which they got trapped into new emergent complex units from which there was no longer an escape, except by the death of the unit which, as simple cells they had no necessity to know? An amoeba's death is an accident, not a necessity, but to a complex unit death comes both as an accident and as a necessity. Are we heading towards new

emergent complexities which will produce a new emergent kind of death? Up to now it has been an instantaneous affair but might we not invent a kind which lasts — a real "living death"? (Oct. 52)

118. What is the matter with edifying poems (Tagore's *Upagupta* for instance)? Does it fail on the highest level because it assumes the necessity (the "rightness") of suffering without which the virtue, say, of unselfish service, collapses for want of anything to serve? No one need deny that suffering will be lessened if the sick are helped, and if prisoners help each other (though a study of man's behaviour indicates this solution is less simple than it appears on the surface), but are we to adopt as the ultimate principle that the disease ought to be maintained so that there may be sick to serve — that all people ought to be kept in prison that they may need each others' help; or, on the contrary, are we to adopt the principle that while it is good to help it is better to cure the disease and remove the necessity for prisons, so that help will no longer be necessary. Advocates of the former principle against the latter are in fact arguing that all physicians and surgeons should stop their work and become nurses instead. (Jan. 52)

119. There are those who like distant pen-friends whom they haven't met better than neighbours whom they have. (Jan. 53)

120. Just as one can arrange bits of iron, etc., into a hermetically sealed box which imprisons other pieces of matter, so one can arrange thoughts into a box too, which effectively imprisons other thoughts. (Jan. 53)

121. There seem to be three main kinds of intoxicants or "opiates". The physical ones, and religion, and politics.

The former kind is just as popular as ever, but the last seems to be ousting the second (philosophy and works, precept and practice, etc. are subsumed under one of the latter two mostly). The ordinary man absolutely needs one of the three to screen from him the vision of the futility of life and the world. (Jan. 53)

122. It is rather more usual in these times for men to be betrayed by their countries than for them to betray their countries, which is why there are so many 'displaced persons'. (April 53)

123. In their high chilly palaces in heaven they need the fires of hell to warm them.

If there were no heaven for its whole weight to press down on hell, the fires of hell would expand and cool down, and its inhabitants would have nothing to hate and envy any more. The wardens of hell would be out of job, displaced persons, — and the inhabitants of hell would have none to look after them. (May 53)

124. The past is the cesspit of the eaten, digested and excreted future. Like trees well-rooted in their own decayed leaves, we fruit best when deeply rooted in our own past. (May 53)

125. Little boats of thought go fishing from time to time on the waves of the emotions. (Jan. 53)

126. In all the hells that all the religions have described, this sameness and lack of originality is the most striking thing. (Jan. 53)

127. Interpretative thoughts settle on a bare sensory perception like a swarm of blue-bottles on an open wound. (Jan. 53)

128. There is no need to wear one's deeds like medals. One can be just as much mentally nouveau-riche as financially. (Jan. 53)

129. One of the most remarkable facts of this age is the negligible direct personal power which scientists have in the control of the world's affairs. The marvellous means they so successfully produce are always used by non-scientists against whom the scientists themselves seem to be powerless and even purposeless. What clever sheep they are. (July 53)

130. It is not memory that is the 'positive' achievement but 'forgetting'. It is not strange that we remember so many things — what is strange is that we can forget anything: it is strange and it is an achievement. The moments of happiness in this world are achieved by (consciously or not) blotting out the disagreeable impressions and memories when agreeable ones are present. (Aug. 53)

131. The world as a mass of lies all struggling with each other to become true. (Oct. 53)

132. How much better to be neglected than championed or abused by the wrong people. (Nov. 53)

133. While Continental European Thought favours great philosophical systems built up according to a plan and founded on a central purpose, English thought has favoured the practical, the empirical — bodies of partially coordinated techniques for living and thinking, leaving the central purpose of life unstated — as something almost indecent to inquire into. That purpose has been half instinctively referred (when necessity arose) to the Church and the

Divine Right of Kings, the individual conscience of a man (the inner voice), the course of nature (progress and natural selection), public opinion, the statistical average, the Great Mathematician, genes — actually these are no more than painted panels on a sealed cassone for which there are many keys, but which has no lock. (Nov. 53)

134. The world of what is there, is perpetually haunted by what is not there — what is not, but might be, there; what could not, but ought to be, there. (Nov. 53)

(*Pencil note:* — What is there? No answer.)

135. Truth is like the black background behind the stars (because it is ungraspable). Beauty is like the beam that goes out from a search light — because it goes out from the subject and illuminates some objects, leaving others in darkness — and it has no effect on the black background behind the stars. (Nov. 53)

136. Curious that I seem to feel most at home when abroad. (Nov. 53)

137. I have a working principle — which sometimes paralyzes many of my impulses to action — that it is wrong (i. *e.* will lead only to failure to attain what one expects) — to take any action that is inspired or suggested by or has as its principal motive, opposition to (that is desire to snub or provoke or impress) someone else, (or even in its most general sense perhaps) one of the elements needed to avoid disappointment seems to be action taken for reasons which are "at right angles" to personal agreement or disagreement. (Nov. 53)

Pencil note: (In brief; don't act out of spite? — I suppose so.)

THE SECOND NOTE BOOK

138. Harmony illuminated by consciousness casts a shadow of disharmony. Power illuminated by consciousness casts a shadow of impotence. Non-being illuminated by consciousness casts a shadow of being..... (Nov. 53)

139. Some time this century, I was told, the Houses of Parliament, as the dominant governing body of the Church of England, enacted that Anglicans need not believe in Hell. I have often wondered what happened in the Anglican Heaven after that. Have the heavenly palaces (or clouds), which had till then been conveniently warmed by central heating—they are so high up—from the eternal fires of Hell now put out by man, been growing gradually cold (like London in the early months of 1947 when there was a blizzard and no coal)? And so the Anglican Heaven must now be frozen quite stiff, and no one can get into or out of it. And all the bad people, like the good, have to be reborn on earth again as men—after all they must be reborn somewhere, and if there is no Hell or Heaven any more, where else? And that will then obviously go on for ever and ever....Unless perhaps the British Parliament reestablishes belief in Hell. (Dec. 53)

140. Religion according to Marx is an opiate for the masses; but Marx being more up to date than the old religions gives them morphia instead. (Jan. 54)

141. Facts are the one thing I do not believe in (any way there is no need). I have, admittedly, to "deal with facts" (so has a lunatic with his hallucinations): but that is no reason at all that I should believe in them (like the lunatic). A. N. Whitehead, the great mathematician (who, I feel, was a Protestant Archbishop *manqué*), often appeals to "stubborn facts" as the last authority, with a sort of unctuous worship. In this he exemplifies, I think, a disease of the modern mind, the tendency to indulge in masochistic orgies of prostration before the whip of its own contradictory sense experience — another kind of flight from oneself. (Dec. 53)

142. I met a daddy-long-legs today, but not quite the kind one is used to. Though its body and wings were the ordinary size and shape, its legs were a full 3" long, thin as 100 cotton, with a baroque curve, and clothed in black-and-white-banded football stockings. It was like one of those creatures in Dali's Temptation of St. Anthony. A product of natural selection? Nonsense. Made by a Creator then? But why not the third possibility, that its family had always been interested in being different, and had worked it all out themselves? "Let us show them" I can hear them saying. "Now, darling, you must do like this always, and get your children to, too......" (Jan. 54)

143. The sun sees no shadows. (Jan. 54)
The shadow sees no sun. (Feb. 57)
I see the shadow and the sun - who sees me?
(June 58)

144. If I say in the morning 'I believe in God' and in the evening 'I do not believe in God', I am untrue to my belief and renounce my consistency, but preserve my freedom. If I keep to one assertion, I am true to my

belief and preserve my consistency, but renounce my freedom. To be free is to be 'untrue'. (Jan. 54)

145. A half-truth is more effective — more deadly, says the moralist — than a lie, because the element of truth convinces and with the help of that conviction the false element goes deeper. (Jan. 54)

(Later addition:) What is a half-truth? What is Truth?

146. In the 19th century there were the interdependent 3 coordinates of 3-dimensional space, and there was time, and there were conscious observers. In the 20th century there are the interdependent 4 coordinates of the space-time continuum, and there are the conscious observers. Will it one day be seen that there are only the interdependent 5 coordinates of the space-time-continuum-observed-by-some-consciousness, and no unrelated extras lying around? It seems unarguable that any event necessitates a position in 3-dimensional space, at a moment in time, from an affective-volitional conscious standpoint. The five must go together, and failing any one of the 5 there is (bar of artificial abstraction) nothing to talk about at all.

'Ah', they say, 'but what about records taken of events which nobody was watching? That proves that thing happen independently of an observer'. Actually it proves nothing of the kind. It only raises a fundamental aspect of conscious experience: that any given experience consists of two elements — what is actually sensed, let us say, and what is "interpreted from" that 'basic sensum'. If I see a tree, shut my eyes and do not see the tree, and open my eyes and see the tree, I say that the tree 'was there' when my eyes were shut, but it 'was there unobserved'. If other people with eyes open or with cameras,

tell me it was there, or produce a photograph of it, at the time my eyes were shut, this is simply a new experience which, by inference, I relate to the eyes-open experience of the tree, and which I build into the 'eyes-shut-tree-still-there' concept. A tree that 'is there' unobserved cannot inherently be known other than by inferential knowledge, and that is ipso facto on a different level to the knowledge of the direct experience of 'eyes-open-tree-observed' experience. No amount of witnesses or records of a mechanical nature effect this principle at all. They are simply further 'direct-eyes-open-observed' experiences which the mind makes use of to strengthen its inferential (transcendental in the existentialist sense, perhaps) concept. (Feb. 54)

147. What is one going to do if the scientists produce a 'new' and 'superior' species of man? — superior in whose opinion? — And (which is really frightening) if they find the means to avoid the inevitability of death? (Feb. 54)

148. How much of what I think or say or do arises out of agreement with, or opposition to, what other people say or do, and is not spontaneous? (Feb. 54)

149. If you are not master of the facts they will beat you down with opinions. If you are not master of the void they will beat you down with facts. (Feb. 54)

150. One is constantly encountering the limitedness of universal principles, also the secondariness of first principles. (Feb. 54)

151. There is no creation — only conversion of matter over which the mind dances a new dance. (March 54)

152. Just as a flock of geese is led by a gander, so, it would seem, it is a flock of proper geese that is led by propaganda. (March 54)

153. There are two reasons for disliking people (wanting to get away from their society): because they behave objectionably, and because they make one behave objectionably oneself. The opposite holds good too. But there is no 'behaviour' when one is alone. (May 54)

154 It is not, it seems to me, possible to draw a distinction between what is "absolutely new" and what is "absolutely forgotten (and revived again)". Then what is utterly forgotten and has left no trace, never has been? Of course, because it is a contradiction anyway. (May 54)

155. Cats and dogs throw some light on one's relation to others. They are both essentially conscious of others and their behaviour is all influenced by that. They both value others' opinion desperately though probably they would not admit it. But there is an essential difference between them. A dog assumes that its welfare depends on others' good opinion of it, so it seeks to find out what that opinion is, it becomes domesticated by trying to sell itself, to serve, and so it is essentially guided and hampered by the concept of duty. Its fundamental anxiety is that it will have failed to interpret what others want of it and that they may consequently abandon it as useless. A dog's sense of dignity is quite secondary. A dog often apologizes. The "good" clever dog is conscientious and earnest. The "bad" stupid dog is resentful and clumsily savage. Dogs do not mind being vulgar by day. Dogs are jolly. I suspect Pekineses know all this, which may be a reason why they are not like other dogs.

A cat assumes that its welfare can be bettered by others' good opinion. It studies how that good opinion can be created and exploited. It pretends to become domesticated by buying one's opinion with systematic

flattery. Yet while it actually serves no one but itself and knows it, it puts across a very successful line of make-believe about service in catching mice, etc. But no cat will trade or barter or apologize. It is guided by expediency. But it is always concerned about whether the impression it wants to create has been put across successfully and so it is constantly conscious of its own appearance and often anxious about it. It is haunted by the fear of being seen, not as a fraud, which it is not, but in some light which would be incompatible with its own good opinion of itself and undermine its carefully maintained self-confidence and composure. Being ignominously chased is for it much worse than being killed, and dignity is valued higher than life. The "good" clever cat is skilful and elegant. The "bad" stupid cat is clumsy and dirty. Cats are only vulgar (and how!) at night. Perhaps Siamese cats know all this too, which may be a reason why they are a sort of feline Pekinese. Cats are cosy but aloof. To refer to dogs as "he" and to cats as "she" is very misleading. And cats are not "catty" about each other.

There is another point of difference: a dog is not only concerned to discover its human patron's opinion of it and to "serve" that; but it is also interested that other dogs should know about this, and it is also interested in other dogs' behaviour and personalities: "Smell me and I will smell you". To a cat, on the other hand, other cats are altogether an accidental feature of its world ("love" apart — by day, at least), and unless actively in the way, they form absolutely no part of its life. So a dog may go about as one of a group or a pack either as leader or led; but not so a cat. (June 54)

156. Can one wonder at the picture of confusion man presents. He choses as his herald of peace the dove, a singularly quarrelsome and disagreeably selfish and greedy bird, as anyone who has kept turtles will know. He takes the bee's honey, mocks them for being "busy", and praises ants, mindless, mechanical, vitriol-throwing, hag-ridden ants, as his ideal of thrift. (June 54)

157. I find puns more important than facts. The Catholic Church, says Joyce, was founded upon a pun (the Rock of Peter). But that apart, there is hardly anything we do or think that has not a double meaning. (June 54)

158. It is our eyes that blind us and our ears that deafen us. (June 54)

159. Let us define suicide as a "half-death" — the death of the object while the subject lives, or vice-versa: an extreme choice, the result of the extremity of conflict.

Intellectualism or rationalism kills the object by cutting it up with analysis, and so, in the extreme, what is left is perfect vision and perfect darkness. Nothing can escape the eye and there is nothing left for it to see — "the living death of the subject."

Faith kills the subject by refusal to take account of the generality of experience and its trends and contradictions. The light of faith is focussed on one aspect only, whatever it may be, till the eye is burnt out and blinded. Nothing is left unilluminated in that object but there is no eye left to see it — "the living death of the object."

Actually both extremes imply a self-contradiction. But they are not equal. For if we take the two tendencies short of their extremes — the eye that has outgrown its

object and the object that has outgrown its eye — the first eye-object relation gives us hunger and the second nausea.

(June 54)

160. It is certainly wrong to say pain and pleasure are equal and opposite. For suppose I am sitting feeling neither, I can always (so long as 'the nerves are functioning') be sure of causing pain by sticking a pin into myself. But the same does not apply to pleasure at all.

Suppose we distinguish (*a*) mental unpleasure and (*b*) mental pleasure as (provisionally) more or less opposites, and (*c*) physical pain and (*d*) physical......yes, what?...... Well, certain kinds of excitement arising from touch (very provisional). The usual combinations (the obvious ones) are (*a*) (*c*) and (*b*) (*d*), the other two (*a*) (*d*) and (*b*) (*c*) also occur (unnoticed) as say guilt and sadism-masochism. The combinations (*a* present) (*a* past) and (*b* present) (*b* past) are obvious. The combinations (*a* present) (*b* past), another form of guilt and (*b* present) (*a* past)......etc. etc. The point is that this analysis which is not carried far enough and is not accurate, is enough to show that the pleasure-pain situation is not at all the simple matter it is supposed to be. (July 54)

161. Hallucination I take to be meaningless, unless applied to "five-sense" experience. And on that basis I accept (pro tem) Whately Carington's description of 'hallucination' and 'genuine experience' as given in "Matter Mind and Meaning" — i. e. a 'genuine experience' is not distinguishable, if analysed, from a 'completely organized hallucination'. To mental images the term 'hallucination' is inapplicable: it can only signify five-sense experience that is not properly organized. (July 54)

162. He lives in a room hung with luminous curtains by whose luminosity he is able to see: he sees his immediate surroundings, and he sees the curtains themselves moving and agitated, as though by the impact of bodies behind them — but with the raising of the curtains there is nothing but darkness. (July 54)

163. Classical tragedy (according to Aristotle) is played upon the feelings strung between the opposites of pity and terror. Existentialism seems to use the axis choice — nausea (with the premise that a man is forced to choose, to exercise his freedom).

164. If any 'progress' is to be made, it is by continuous vigilance over acts and by continuous re-examination of facts. (Sept. 54)

165. All governments are a symptom of a universal disease, the need to be governed; all governments are bad, and some are very bad. (Sept. 54)

166. With the spreading of the NE Asian prison and the American madhouse in this century's 2nd half there will soon be no third choice left. Then there will be the question to decide (the decision perhaps not in one's own hands altogether) whether it is better to be an inmate or a warder — An inmate in America? A warder in Asia? or vice versa? (Oct. 54)

167. As to faith: to make a principle work, that is, to prove it by results — say to swim out of one's depth for the first time — requires absolute faith that the practice learned will preserve one from drowning. (Oct. 54) Then I can only preserve my faith by not learning to swim. (June 55)

168. The extending of knowledge tends to show that it is not possible to say of any principle 'This is always right' or of any generalization 'This is always true'— though one can say 'mostly' or 'virtually every time.' (Oct. 54)

169. When I pursue the concept of God, the symbol with which the theological systems interpret the Mystic Experience, I feel as if I were pursuing a rainbow. I see, as it were, the beckoning rainbow inviting the mind to obtain the tangible experience of touching something. But when I walk towards it through the rain, unlike flowering tree, it recedes and then vanishes. Now for a rainbow I must have the sun behind and the rain in front. If I pursue the rainbow I shall go on getting wet. If I turn round no rainbow is visible. (11-12-54)

170. Overtly wanting to be of use to others seems scarcely distinguishable from covertly wanting others to suffer and need one's help.

171. Heaven must be rather like a museum where our past love's and hope's fantasies are frozen and stored away behind glass, untouchable, in an air parched of the dampness of the suffering and change that lent them the illusion of life and reality. Everything we create for ourselves in this world we mentally kill and store away in heaven. (Dec. 54)

172. We survive in a narrow shifting territory between the dullness of order that drives the mind on towards the nauseating safety of absolute fixity, and on the other hand the excitement of disorder that sucks it towards the vertiginous thrill of being smothered by entropy. (Dec. 54)

173. The sort of person who provides unquestionable answers to unanswerable questions. (Nov. 54)

174. I am not so much interested in arguments that one ought to believe this or that, or to disbelieve it—but rather in the fact that one is forced by the nature of experience to believe or disbelieve (which is only a mode of belief). The octopus' sucker must stick to something. (Dec. 54)

175. While every inference still smacks of fact, there is no fact not infected with inference. (Dec. 54)

176. A little chaos in the materialist order is like a drop of oil in a machine. (Dec. 54)

177. Though vision so much dominates our world, we nevertheless do not quite trust it and always seek to confirm it by touch; but when we touch something we look to see what it "is". (Dec. 54)

178. "The five senses are notoriously unreliable" they say; but they always put theory to experimental test.

179. Today's trite thought—so many people have said that the world is a prison, but I can never find out for certain who is supposed to be inside and who outside. (Dec. 54)

180. Any assertion that can be made can be contradicted. It is only by an appeal made to the empirical world (of probability, of things and events) that one side can be established against the other. All syllogistic proof rests on initial assumptions from empirical observation or arbitrary assertion. Where no appeal to empiricism is possible (as in metaphysics) it is impossible to establish one side of a contradiction against the other (unless one

counts establishment to be exercise of force and violence and physical elimination of physical opponents). (July 60)

181. It is a mistake to compromise with the Devil and not with man. The alternative is an angry man with compromised principles. (Jan. 55)

182. Just as the word "floating" signifies at its simplest a complex — at least a liquid volume with a surface against a gaseous volume and a solid (or oily) entity to float on the surface between the two volumes: so experience always, even at its simplest, implies a complex — a manifold subjectively organized in or against a manifold objectively organized with a surface dividing them, the surface being indescribable in terms of either manifold except as 'not' or 'nothing'. (Jan. 55)

183. Doing one's duty consists in doing as the majority are supposed to do. (Feb. 55)

184. Faith seems to be the subjective counterpart of Truth, which is objective. Speaking in terms of 'things' they describe 'the same thing' from opposite sides; but I take 'things' to be mental constructs out of the welter of the 5-sense data. (March 55)

185. Absolute Truth would be incompatible with life as absolute light would be with vision. (March 55)

186. The philosopher's function seems to be to substitute for the experiential 'almost' and 'mostly' the words 'entirely' and 'always', upon which the fiction of the 'absolute' grows. (Jan. 55)

187. Marvelously at variance — the two basic doctrines of today: Evolution and Equality of Man. If man is

evolving how can all men be simultaneously equal? (Worship of progress and of the average). (March 55)

188. Poverty looks bright through rich glasses, and *vice versa*. (Aug. 54)

189. I have always felt doubtful about those people who try to get one to give up one's own bunkum and accept their debunkum instead. (March 55)

190. The subject is ultimately at the mercy of the objective world: others can kill me without any possibility of my being sure of preventing them; but I cannot ever kill all others however much I might want to, supposing that I did. I exist therefore because others do not bother to blot me out, but the converse cannot be said of others. (March 55)

191. The conventional attitude of 'serious' people to puns (the Utraquistic Device) is hostility: how irrational (it is) has been shown by James Joyce. Perhaps when the psychology of Western philosophy has been worked out a little more it may show why there is this hostility. For the pun reveals an inherent duplicity in the workings of consciousness which the conventional Western moralist is loth to admit. (March 55)

192. It is usual to regard thought and action as having two basic modes: reason and impulse (or emotion or feeling). There is also a tendency to set one against the other and to argue on the lines of 'he who is not with us is against us' in this dualism. But there are at least three such basic modes: reason, impulse and observation. The overlooking of observation (which is the basic motive of the true scientist who has no theoretical or moral axe to grind) is,

it seems to me, an absolute block in the way of behaving fairly or neutrally or seeing clearly. For there is nothing so unreasonable as rationalism carried to extremes, and impulse gets bogged down in slush. But how can a bad observer ever hope to get what he wants or even begin to know what he wants? The double conception of rationality/emotionality gives rise to cruel confusions[?] None is ever quite pure or quite absent, but one usually dominates and exploits the other.

The word 'Truth' has a different referent for these three types: consistency for the rationalist, correspondence of idea and the observed for the observer, and perhaps certainty or beauty for the emotionalist. The first tends to 'inject' the objective into the subject and the last to 'project' the subjective onto the object. (March 55)

193. Exercise: Put every statement in this book into the form 'if....then'; if not already so stated. Where the 'if' is not explicit, find it.—But how difficult!—But how necessary! (June 55)

194. Theistic contemplation seems to be inseparable from disguised narcissism. Advaita Vedanta tries to escape from that by postulating absolute unity and absolute loss of the individual in the whole. But in order to lose personal identity and at the same time save the whole that opposes it, the Advaita Vedanta cheats. Both Christian and other theism and Advaita Vedanta are haunted by the spectre of Nothingness which they cannot cope with.

(June 55)

195. Important to be clear and ruthless in one's categories and types, but to remember that no living person is ever a type; for that is impossible from the very fact that he is living, and so both inconstant and with infinite

qualities. So no compromise with types, but always compromise at some level with individual persons. (July 55) We said this of the Devil above; but types are the Devil.

196. Science's dislike of faith is obscene to religion. Miracles are obscene to scientists.

It is an error to confound the obscene with the merely sexually indecent. The former includes the latter, but the latter is usually allowed to obscure the profounder and more alarming regions of obscenity that threaten to undermine being. (June 55)

197. The morning weeps tears of dew for the descent of evening. (June 55)

198. At sunset another day bleeds to death. (July 55)

199. While the materialists shout progress the physicists say that the sun will cool down sometime and the earth will become uninhabitable through cold and dark. (June 55)

200. The better I can tell what you do the less I can tell what you are; for by your doing you change and so are no more what you were. (June 55)

201. He is sometimes insincere for God's sake. (June 55)

202. *Love:* The desparateness of separation.
Hate: The desparateness of association.

But I do not see any exact opposites in the world: there is always some little corner of common neutral ground where the spies and traitors can come and go and do their fecund work. (July 55)

203. The essence of conversing mostly consists in throwing disguises to your opposite number and trying to get him to put them on, and vice versa. (June 55)

204. O poverty that blights *the corn / for making bread to feed the hand / that writes the cheque to pay the tax / that funds the cost of all the fees for adolescent education / wars and doles (that keep adults from starving). June 55)

**Superscribed in pencil:* sows? reaps?

205. Pascal provides an example of an intellectual boat constructed in which to sail out on the sea of fever and pain in order to look for a port on a fancied further shore. Pascal's boat was a boat for one; but his plan has served the adherents of the great systems as an inspiration to gang up and build prison ships. We think we have actually seen many boats wrecked, far more vanish, but none reach the other shore. (June 56)

206. If I declare on my authority alone I stand small chance of convincing them — why should they choose to be my mental slaves? If I declare on your authority alone or you on mine, or we on ours together, there is likewise not much chance of convincing them. But if I or you or we declare on his authority the situation is quite altered; for it is an invitation to them to be like me or you or us and for all of us equally to be his mental slaves and so each others' slaves. It is the same whether "he" is the expounder of a religion a political dogmatist for "us", or whether for him "he" is God or nature or the state. The structure is essentially the same. (July 55)

207. Pleasure and pain seem to be opposites in the sense that crocusses and a steam roller are opposites. (July 55)

208. Social reformers always speak in Universals — and universals are false because all our lives are particular. (July 55)

209. I might die in (the first half of) 1957. (Aug. 55) That hunch was wrong. (1958)

210. It is most difficult to be natural. It is most unnatural to be normal.

211. Authoritative people bore me; but what bores me even more are those swarms of little people who love authority and in virtue of whom the authority of the authoritative can be exercised. (Aug. 55)

212. One shares some public preferences with an acquaintance. One shares many public and some private prides and preferences with a friend. One shares these and some private hates and shames with an intimate. (Aug. 55)

213. Those who lead public religious lives honestly can have no intimates. (Aug. 55)

214. The Indian mind being brought up in an atmosphere of tropical amorphous jungle, expresses itself in patterns, which repeat. The European mind, being brought up in an atmosphere of open, orderly-patterned vistas, experiences itself in things, regarded as individuals. (Aug. 55)

215. When I laugh shall I think of all the people in the world shuddering at that moment in death? When I am dying shall I think of all the people in the world shuddering at that moment in laughter? (Aug. 55)

216. Which is more 'real'? a bare ploughed field? a field with cultivated crops? or a field full of weeds? (Sep. 55)

217. At present, the two opposite interpretations of history are: first the classical, which describes events in terms of the deeds of men (kings, generals, etc.), and the Marxian-Hegelian, which describes events in terms of streams and currents, in which individual men are straws without personal influence. There have been some attempts to rejuvenate the old theory (*e.g.* de Couvey's 'Searchlight on Europe') by describing events as the deeds of races and countries; but the result is merely a variety of (1) and no new principle comparable to that in (2) is involved. In (1) the principles are secondary to the man and it is this (which stems from Greek philosophy) which has produced the humanism of Europe, of which the Christian Church has done its best to claim the authorship, falsely enough. In (2) men are subordinated to principles. In (1) the following is possible (the up-to-standard test): individual men can be assessed by application of the principle which is secondary to the individual, and all those who pass the test are all right, no matter what the number. In (2) the opposite is possible (the 'who-will-stand-the-pressure' test): the screw can be put on till the number falls to so many and the weakest must fall out, no matter what the level of their standard. (1) is the basis of security; (2) the basis of revolution. (Sep. 55)

218. Religions as several, small, discrete (or partly discrete), mutually largely incompatible and wholly antagonistic creedal nebulae of rules held together by metaphysics, which float in an indefinite caustic void of hungry and hostile critical anarchy—a sort of angry magma in whose mass the religious knots condense and on which they surreptitiously feed and excrete. (Sep. 55)

219. Qualified people deserve qualified admiration. (Oct. 55)

220. 'Things' are not 'single' like draughts, but 'twofold' (at least) like dominoes — they have (at least) two values or aspects or components always, even if (as in a 'double') the twofoldness is the same; and then they have backs. (Oct. 55)

221. Whatever is will be was. (Oct. 55)

222. In the end you will always get what you want, though you may have to wait very long; but time is very long. And if you are in a hurry, you may have forgotten that you wanted it when it comes; and if you want what is contradictory, you will still get it, but you will be unhappy and unsatisfied. And it is the very hardest thing in the world to discover something uncontradictory to want. (Oct. 55)

223. The virtues can only be distinguished from nothing (or negation) against a background of the respective vices. And so they are only relative and only a means — and the converse is just as valid. (Oct. 55)

224. People tend to fall into two main types: those dominated by feeling and those dominated by intellect. (It is a common notion that women belong to the former and men to the latter). The former being guided by feeling, use intellect as a subordinate means to justify the impulsive feeling, and so tend to be inconsistent logically, self-contradictory and adaptable. Those dominated by intellect tend to use the subordinated feeling as a means to justify choice guided by logical formalism, and so they tend to be ambivalent to things and persons, being more interested in principles than in things. Just as the former try and convince others and themselves that their impulsive choice is right by isolated logical argument, so do the latter

by trying to force what their line of argument had led to upon others and themselves. (Oct. 55)

225. Logical exercise: Suppose we agree that it is morally wrong for you to rob me. And we shall probably agree that right is the opposite of wrong. Then since my robbing you is the opposite of your robbing me, it must be morally right for me to rob you. (Oct. 55)

226. Philosophy in this period seems most afraid of solipsism. Just through that fear, coupled with an unwitting acceptance of an 'either-or' situation, it has embraced unreservedly misautic solalterism, of which the American behaviourists are the most extreme example. But the one is just as much a 'heresy' as the other. (Dec. 55)

227. When I cosider "other people" I am driven to the conclusion that in these visible bodies, these visible and audible words of theirs, their material acts, I am merely seeing, as it were, a reflection of part of myself not normally visible to me. I can't see my face without a looking-glass — similarly I can't see certain sides — the perceptive apparatus — of my character unless reflected on the "reflecting material surface" which "another person" presents. The polished surface of a looking-glass reflects my otherwise invisible face: another person's body or speach or acts reflects (serves as a projecting screen for) parts of my personality otherwise invisible to me. What other people's personalities "really are" I have absolutely no way of knowing anymore than a scientist has of knowing what matter "really is". (Jan. 56)

228. The process of life offers two principal divergent aims: (1) involves acceptance of (and placing foremost of) "this world" (including Heaven and Hell, which are

only phases of it), and (2) renunciation of it. (1) offers multiplicity and intensity of (sensory) experience as the highest in theory with choice in practice. Survival involves compromise: compromise between is resort to war to protect the choice made or to get rid of responsibility for it by a surrender to a slave-master situation. Intervals of greater or less anarchy supervene. (Jan. 55)

229. The lowest level of conscious life is like clay, and clay often sticks. Man must enter in creatively to enjoy. His first level of creative enjoyment is nature (sunsets and all that). Then creative friendships on the level of acquaintance. Much higher comes creative or plastic art, then the discovery of how to make friends. Abstracts (mathematics and such music as Bach or Bartok) and last of all nothing. Nothing is the summit — the meaning — of conscious life. (Undated)

230. There is nothing in thought, they say, not ultimately derived from the five senses. So too, one might add in that case, there is nothing in architecture not ultimately derived from mud.

231. A man acts on the (tacit) assumption that his acts will have effects in certain spheres and not in others; that their results will later be evaluated in some lights but not others. Example: a thief discounts the evaluation of his act in the court and an adulterer that of his act in the presence of the spouse — so with rebirth. (Jan. 55)

232. The better I can tell what you do the less I can tell what you are; for by your doing you have changed and are no more what you were.

Now if I describe what you are, when that is done, what you are not but were that. From what you were

to what you are is gained by doing. By doing you deny the present and are not what you were. You are what you will be described (in virtue of your doing, not what you will be or were). (Jan. 55)

233. One tends to have a double standard: (1) what I choose, and (2) what I estimate to be public choice (average choice). Both are essential in the conduct of affairs, but excessive emphasis of the latter gives a vulgar (common-place, quelquonque) tone to all one's thoughts and doings. (Jan. 55)

234. Both hell and love are symbolized by fire — the 'fires of hell', etc., and St. John of the Cross' 'living flame of Love', for example. (Jan. 56)

235. 1. I desire — I don't know what = *Angst*

2. I desire that (not here, not now) = an ideal

3. I desire this (here, now) = a realized ideal

4. Now there seem to be only two ways of treating a loved thing when confronted with it: either one can unite with it, say, eat it (in which case one has annihilated it, and so lost it) or one can contemplate it and so maintain one's love unsatisfied, in which case the outlook is perpetual unsatisfiedness (through separation) or supervening boredom (due to change in oneself or the object) turning may be to hate or to forgetting. (Jan. 56)

"Eternal love" and "selfless love" are both equivocations, and utraquisms — that an unstable state can remain unchanged eternally or that self can be eliminated and love retained. (I can set myself before or after yourself, but that is not to say that I preserve or annihilate myself before the world.) (Jan. 56)

236. Concealment is concealment from others; forgetting is concealment from oneself. (Feb. 56)

237. Definition of a PERSON as a fully-organized continuous focal disturbance in the objective field of another person; thus a person is always objective of necessity (my 'person' being 'I' objectivized). (On reading F. W. Myers' *Human Personality*, vol. ii, p. 457f) (Feb. 56)

238. Three characteristics of any experience (however simple, or simplified): it is complex and incomplete and ambivalent. (Feb. 56)

239. I do not believe in facts. (The past a factus).

It is axiomatic that to be conscious is to believe in something, though one may not be actually aware of what (I believe in the next future moment).

Only fictions can be believed in (the future is not a fact).

Fictions produce either good or bad: some fictions contradict facts and produce bad. Some fictions transcend facts and produce good. (vice versa)

240. A man's body is structurally simply a hollow ring. A hollow ring elongated into a hollow cylinder, with the inner potion further lengthened and coiled; and above the upper orifice there bulges a head and between the upper and lower orifices the limbs stick out. The world passes in small portions through the ring, helped in by spoon and gulping and out by pressure and paper. (March 56)

241. If it is agreed by a thiest that God has a will and what He wills is absolutely good, that he cannot will evil, and if it is claimed that God made man with free will,

then it must follow that man's freedom of will is freedom to differ from the will of God (otherwise he has no freedom). in which case it means simply that he has been given by God the ability to choose evil. In such a picture man appears like a child left shut up alone in a house with a box of matches and some gun powder by his father. (April 56)

242. Where would I be (and what would happen to me), if I could see all round me and above and below at once? (June 56)

243. Mataphysic is stamped on the physical world with the seal of death. That is a reason why no materialist will deal with it. And the biologist escapes by the verbal trick of identifying 'survival of the (metaphysical) race' with the 'survival of the (existing) individual'. (June 56)

244. Inability to be general or ambivalent when generality or ambivalence is needed is every bit as bad as inability to be precise where prescision is needed. (March 56)

245. Only too often I seem to see myself as a joke at a funeral. (June 56)

246. Knowledge inherently denies knowledge both of the knower ('the eye cannot see itself') and of the known ('appearaces known suggest the transcendent thing-in-itself'). (June 56)

247. One is like a sieve: the holes (cleavages in one's "unconscious" are, as it were, what one is not and either lets in or keeps out what one is aware of (through the cleavage — either by admiring or condemning). One is the wires (that one never notices at all), and they constitute one's behaviour towards the things sieved. The world as sieved by me is transformed by that sieving. (June 56)

248. Bare acts linger on after their justifications have been forgotten or discredited. Motives are just mental acts. (June 56)

249. God made in man's image is anthropomorphic. To treat animals as men is to regard them anthropomorphically. But who treats men anthropomorphically? (Aug. 56)

250. God pays the devil his keep as a good landlord pays his bailiff to grind his tenants, or perhaps as Mussolini is said to have secretly paid the anti-fascist exiles in Paris in order to justify the OVRA. (Sep. 56)

251. If God really made man in his own image, what a revelation of the divine nature! (Sep. 56)

252. It is in order to justify the world that Alyosha has to be made to live happily ever after and Ivan has to be made mad; for if it were the other way round, the whole farce of the world would be shown up for the farce it is. Mitya is an exaggeratedly ordinary man, blind and opinionated. Father Zossima worshipped human suffering in him as Raskolnikoff worshipped it in the prostitute Sonia, who is an axaggeratedly ordinary woman in some ways: blind and sentimental. (Sep. 56)

253. No thing has a monopoly of any one quality. Nothing that is describable has a monopoly of any of the terms by which it is described. Only names are sometimes monopolies of things. (Sep. 56)

254. Sometime after apes had produced men (if that is so), men at an early stage in their evolution evolved language. But grammarians seem to be so recent as to be actually only historical. However, that has not prevented them from appropriating what they did not invent,

and laying down their laws for other apes' offspring to obey. (Sep. 56.)

255. The chirping honey-sunbirds sipping syrup flirting through the crimson whiskers of the bright hybiscuses. (Sep. 56)

256. To have seen everything to the end of the world and in oneself with one's cravings still intact and to have forgotten how to forget—that would adequately describe hell, no doubt. (Sep. 56)

257. Remember how to do things, but forget what has happened. (Sep. 56)

258. No standpoint whatever is safe against a rebellion against it. Any rebellion to be successful, must destroy the standpoint against which it is rebelling, and as soon as that happens, it must either disintegrate or become itself a standpoint. (Sep. 56)

258a. Science is properly a state of enquiring, recording and explanation. Materialism is properly a state of faith in the external claiming to be gnosis either actual or imminent or 'real but unachievable'. (Sep. 56)

259. What we are not at all interested in may be what we are. (Sep. 56)

259a. Reason has its heart, which is inaccessible to the heart (with acknowledgements to Pascal). (Sep. 56)

260. The middle class:or the social sergeants' mess. (Sep. 56)

261. Matter is a myth invented to satisfy the emotional needs of the materialist. Myth is a matter invented to satisfy the rational needs of the spiritualist. (Sep. 56)

262. The more one reflects on the question 'What is this?', the more absurd it seems: but yet never so absurd as the satisfaction provided by any of the possible answers. (Sep. 56)

263. — Is good ultimately more powerful than Evil? Will Good ultimately triumph over Evil?

— Yes. Otherwise one falls into the dualism of Manichaeism.

— Then is doing evil justifiable if a greater good can be expected to result?

— Yes. Otherwise it would be impossible to justify any good action; for it is not possible in this imperfect world to act in a way that is entirely free from any evil at all.

— Then, in principle, since good is ultimately greater than evil, the greatest evil in this world is justified if it is done in the name of the greatest good? If that principle holds good, then there is nothing so wicked, horrible and unspeakable that I am not justified in doing 'for the sake of the good'? (Oct. 56)

264. — Is the world, the universe, finite or infinite?

— Some scientists say it is finite.

— Well so it is; for a scientist's eye is the hole in the end of the universe through which he looks and observes it. Can he see through the hole the other way? (Oct. 56)

265. Up till the 19th century medicine was such that those in need of medical treatment had, in effect, *(as we see it now)* only a choice of different grades of quacks to

treat them: and now, similarly, those in need of political treatment have, in effect (as perhaps may be seen later), only a choice of different grades of quacks to treat them. (Oct. 56)

266. Most philosophy offers metaphysico-logical stays for bulging emotions. (Nov. 56)

267. I seem to have lived my life in three modes: up till the outbreak of war in 1939 I lived it in a very pleasant and mainly graceful rock-pool. The financial insecurity beginning in 1937 and the outbreak of war in 1939 silted the pool up. 1939-1948 was lived in the midst of History: Anti-aircraft volunteer gunner to G. S. O. III, I. B. in Caserta, and afterwards Assistant head of the B.B.C. Italian section at Bush House. From then on it has been lived as an observer, withdrawn and watching. (Nov. 56)

268. I shall never be able to compose my biography: but let no one else have the presumption to do so; for this would amount to theft.

Don't worry, no one will think of it. (Nov. 57)

269. — (1) What I abhor = what I might be.

(2) What I admire = what I am not.

(3) What I am unaware of = what I am.

— But aren't what-I-might-be and what-I-am-not the same?

— In one way, yes: the difference lies in me and my attitude. (see 276) (Nov. 56)

270. The tragedy of Europe is that it has valued Christ's crucifixion above his teaching. In acts Europe tends to the development of an earthly paradise, which the climate

and the geography favours. That has been realized under the Romans and in modern Europe though not recognized. Living as they do in their earthly paradise of material (pleasures). Europeans are fundamentally and hopelessly bored. Subsconsciously they long for the insecurity, the injustice, the blood, torture and killing of which their earthly paradise with its legality starves them. Hence the nostalgic yearning over the torture of the crucifixion, of martyrs, of blood sports, and so on. Universal love and liberalism remain remote intellectual ideals, but it is Marx with his doctrine based on violence and hate, who has gripped the 20th Century earthly paradise, just as the Church's presentation of Christ on the Cross (*i. e.* the crucifixion, not so much the teaching) gripped the imperial Roman earthly paradise. Christ taught not only love but said 'I bring not peace but a sword.....' Love is perhaps a good bowl to store hate in.

India much more nearly represents hell on earth or at best that part of hell called limbo. Suffocating heat, famines, overcrowding, poverty, corruption, disease, torture, anarchy and lawless injustice are all on hand — in short suffering and insecurity — are the background for the islands of civilization contained in it, as the jungle is to the village. (The opposite to the ordered European landscape background with its anarchic city slums). There is no need to yearn for hell in India. It is there to be seen before one's eyes. The general background of chaos provokes a tendency to idealize calm, unity, nothingness, law, equanimity and harmlessness: all those qualities that it is most difficult to come by. The Buddha lived a calm and uneventful life for 80 years and there are no Buddhist martyrs, and no Hindu martyrs, for the matter of that.....

(Dec. 56 ?)

271. Aggression, they say, has been outlawed; but whatever has been outlawed can be in-lawed again. (Jan. 57)

272. For those to whom cleanliness is next to godliness, soapiness should be next to saintliness. (Jan. 57)

273. Predetermination hangs on whether there are laws of mind (yet undiscovered but discoverable), or whether mind is the faculty of law unsubject to its laws. Psychology (under the influence of cybernetics) is likely to be absorbed into physics, which will have to create a special department for it; but how do the laws come to be? And how are they recognized? (July 57)

274. Winter England's sad unshining suns. (July 57)

275. All is holy for him who has it so. All is unholy for him who has it so. All is conflict for him who has it so. (March 57) — The have-nots seem wiser then the haves. (July 57)

276. "What I am unaware of is what I am": then to be fully aware is not to be. (March 57)

277. Whatever one is conscious of is *ipso facto* second best (cf. King Lear: 'The worst is not so long as we can say: this is the worst!). (March 57)

278. God's kitchen, where his devil cooks
Do fry the souls his Fisher nets. (March 57)

279. To be damned is to go on as I am, as long as I am damned. (March 57)

280. Logic lives in constant fear of puns.

The pun questions; when folk pun, they poke fun at the holiness of the syllogistsc IS. Socrates is a man.... But what if man is a pun? (April 57)

281. Mathematics (the higher kind) being entirely mental ('mathematicians do not know what they are talking about'), has purged itself of pun-haunting, and introduces them only voluntarily as in the Differential Calculus (a very rarified and abstruse pun — but nonetheless a pun that fuses the discrete with the continuous). (April 57)

282. A smug discourse snugly padded with justifications. (June 57)

283. The world has been governed by serious people for a long time, and what an advertisement it is for their methods! (June 57)

284. Suspect those who prize warmth in others' hearts — they probably have ice needles in their own. (June 57)

285. If the choice would lie between bunkum and debunkum, I would choose the former. (June 57) Debunkum is merely Devil's Bunkum. (May 59)

286. How they need the idea of backward races and peoples to swab their sore guilty consciences with! (July 57)

287. The need for miracles is a symptom of longing for the inexplicable and of fear of the totally explicable. Total explicability totally denies freedom. (July 57)

288. Really it would seem that the anti-nihilists do more to keep nihilism alive than the nihilists. (July 57)

289. The philosophical Absolute — in its various forms, Hegelian, Vedanta, Yogâcâra, etc., etc. — is logically only a tinted euphemism for nothingness, hence the inherent and veiled nihilism of all Absolutist systems. The difficulty

always lies in the fact that any attempt to show that the Absolute is not nothingness by adducing a category or quality, however metaphysical, destroys its absoluteness, and without such adducing there is no distinguishing the postulated Absolute from nothingness. Even the assertion that a postulated Absolute is positive robs it of its absoluteness. (Aug. 57)

290. If one elects for a positive value as the supreme choice one is necessarily committed to war to maintain that choice or to treachery to it; for no single value — grace, justice, equality, etc., etc. — is immune from threat of displacement by one or more of the others, and in themselves they are incompatible in proportion as they are each logically pursued and purified to their furthest extremes, so whichever I nail my banner to I am committed to defend that against all others and against nihilism — the attitude that says 'no' to all — when the pressure mounts and war conditions take over: or else there is treachery or forgetting.

What is the 'block in the unconcious' that makes the 'conscious' evaluate experience in terms of 'positive' and 'negative'? (Aug. 57)

291. The difference between sex and death — killing or being killed — seems to be one of degree and detail only. The sexual act is both a killing and being killed subjectively and objectively. But as a dying into a new life, its new life is incomplete to the extent that the sexual act as an act of dying is incomplete. It is a being reborn without loss of memory. The sense of liberation that follows is comparable to a brief shadow-back of the 'innocence' of the new childhood that follows after the profounder act of dying. The details in which these two modes of the same act differ should be tabulatable. (Aug. 57)

292. A. If I say, psychologically speaking, that a person is behaviour, that is in the most vaguely general sense. But more particularly—that person who is thus psychologically behaviour, is, ontologically, the behaviour that he is unaware of, he is haunted by the behaviour he disapproves of and he is not the behaviour that he approves of. Note the triple position.

B. But how can you say that? Of course he is the behaviour he approves of too, or some of it at least. When I do something I approve of, and I do sometimes, that is me, isn't it? When I say 'what I like about myself is this', if that isn't me, who is it? What is it?

A. No, it is not you precisely because you notice it by contrast, as it were, apparently by contrast with what you disapprove of, but actually by contrast with what you are unaware of. It is precisely because you notice it and actively approve of it, thereby objectifying it, that it is not you. (Aug. 57)

292a. Odd that "now here" is "nowhere". (Aug. 57)

293. The trouble with theists and atheists alike is that they are both tied to opposite sides of the same post. (Aug. 57)

294. How much more frightening flesh is than bones! Who would not prefer to be haunted by a skeleton than by boneless flesh? (Aug. 57)

295. Every act is an act of forgetting—forgetting some constituent state and composing some new one. (Aug. 57)

296. The most positive thing in the whole world is Pain—and they both begin with 'p'. (July 59)

297. The Philosophers of the Systems are like house maids: They sweep the untidiness of the world under the carpet and pretend it isn't there. (Aug. 57)

298. To get out of the puddle of muddle one has to learn to be precise. To get out of the prison of precision one has to learn to handle the suggestive, the non-committal, the general, without falling back into the puddle. (Aug. 57)

299. The necessity of food, and the inescapable arbitrariness of birth, ageing and death must never be forgotten: any philosophy that does so is only a fairy-tale. (Sep. 57)

300. Ignorance must never be lost sight of (as lack of knowledge, hiddenness in probability, or forgetting, or transcendence, or uncertainty à la Heisenberg). Any system that explains existence without it does not explain it. (Sep. 57)

301. I think what I instinctively so much dislike in so much of religious writing is — not its mixture of the rational and irrational; for that would be no more than true to life, but — its tendency to make the irrational respectable (which mostly it is not) and to present it as if it were rational: 'Indeed it is so because it must be so, how could it be otherwise' (which is the arbitrary 'must' palmed off as the reasonable 'because'). (Aug. 57)

301a. The free way between the lonely Ivory Tower on the one hand and the teeming Criminal Lunatic Asylum on the other is rather narrow, and much of that rather narrow free way is blocked by the Party Chiefs on the one side and the petty thieves on the other. (Aug. 57)

301b. It would be so nice and easy if there were a rule for everything and it only remained to learn all the rules and then just to decide whether to keep or break a rule — but so often there are none and so we have to act without and make new ones; and these are always slipping out of date. (Aug. 57)

302. How does the body come to be apprehended as a body? Why does it not fall apart into the seen and the heard, the smelt, the tasted and the touched? (Sep. 57)

303. Sometimes there is the impression that the world consists only of vomits and excrements, and what is in between. (Sep. 57)

304. The following example is perhaps typical of the arbitrariness of alternatives in the world in which one exists. It is an 'invariable rule' and characteristic of the world that size and distance are associated in a one-way direction: *i. e.* 'things' get smaller as the distance from me increases and larger as it diminishes (though this "appears" in "external logical" space only as "subtending of angles"). This is reinforced by the smaller-more-distant things "passing behind" and "being hidden by" the larger-nearer things. This is represented in pictures by the vanishing points of perspective. But there is no reason why the opposite should not be the case, why my world should not be inversely organized and "getting larger" be always associated with increasing distance and the smaller-nearer things hiding the larger-further ones. It just isn't so apparently. (Sep. 56)

In the purely subjective view nothing is nearer or further (which is a logic-spatial construct based on body-kinaesthesia) but only visually smaller or larger, aurally

fainter or louder, tangibly touchable with more or less kinaesthesia. (Sep. 57)

305. No description of existence is "complete". For a "complete" one will always have another (or more than one other) alternative description also "complete" which will in part coincide with the first and in part contradict it. Any system therefore is always lacking something (i.e. lacking "O"). (Sep. 57)

306. To exist (or to non-exist) is to be related; but the relation is not a simple duality, but a duality (or more) in the object against the subject. Basically "passive" change in this triple relation is what is called "change-in-the-object" (I am acted upon, but to be acted upon I resist, consequently the agent changes, whilst I do not). "Active change" in this triple relation is what is called "change-in-the-subject" (-in-me; I act upon and the acted-upon resists, consequently I change while the object does not). In existence, however, the reverse (or a combination of both) is what actually appears, since "I" see "my self" objectified: in the first instance as also "acted upon" and changed, and conversely in the second. (Sep. 57)

307. In the pure-logical-objective, there is infiniteness and infinite regress to nothing, with an infinite number of vanishing-points in the distance. In the pure-subjective view there is always an horizon (and no infiniteness), with only one vanishing-point, namely, myself. (Sep. 57)

308. When we are speaking of physics (especially of nuclear physics), it is important to remember that the terms "large-scale" and "small-scale" are, subjectively speaking, improper. For the so-called "small-scaled" of the atomic world is, in fact, in so far as it is perceived at all

(*i.e.* those of its manifestations that are not purely hypothetical) in being perceived: that they may be so with the aid of "enlarging" media such as physical microscopes or "logical-inferential microscopes" is a purely secondary complication, but does not mean that the observed happenings are smaller, only that they are observable with the aid of certain means. To take a simpler (merely microscopic) case: an animalcule, as seen with the aid of a microscope is, subjectively speaking, the size it is seen to be. That this may conflict with logical consistency is another matter, as also in the much-talked-of "unreliability of the senses" (-but where is physics if the senses are not employed at all?). (Sep. 57)

309. The objective world is determined absolutely at each instant that is conceived, but the determination at that or any other instant is only probable. (Sep. 57)

310. Existence is like a game of dominoes—each domino has two values and there is the player (who is not a domino, but appears in the domino-world as "I" and "my-opponent", *i.e.* "active-and-passive"). (Sep. 57)

311. Reality (Truth) is a subjective-objective mode (injected into me from the object).

Goodness is a subjective mode.

Beauty is a objective-subjective mode (projected by me on the object).

There remains, they say, that odd world of the "inherently unknowable objective". What is that? (Sep. 57)

312. The "unreliability of introspective data": scientists constantly complain about this, by which they include pain-pleasure, will, purpose and goal,...and perception (awkwardly

enough for them! since all percepts are ultimately private). But rather than complaining about this (which only reveals the scientists' subjective volitional attitude), should this fact not be recognized? Instead of rejecting introspective data because they are not quantitatively "measurable" (......?) in the way science demands of "public data", should they not be treated as one of their distinguishing characteristics, just as the Uncertainty Principle is now accepted as one of the characteristics on principle of atomic events? The description of why pain, for instance, while distinguishable in intensity, cannot be quantitatively measured (there is no Paris Metre for pain, and if anyone claims that electrical vibrations or tremor motions, which may correspond with pain, are pain, he is merely confusing the issue). The basis of physical measurement is "recorded dial reading" where two data are placed alongside and compared: the dial-pointer or the measurable tape and the Paris Metre. But where is this duality in pain? Our present pain tends to annihilate another by coalescence, and a remembered (or anticipated) pain is no more a measure for a present one than a remembered (or anticipated) metre-stick is for a present piece of tape. **Ergo**, pain, while distinguishable (by memory or anticipation) as differing in intensity, is not measurable by present confrontation. (Sep. 57)

313. What is said and thought is always reflexive (except perhaps the exclamation Oh! etc.). Without reflexion nothing and no action comes to light. The moment I say 'I am doing this, I am not doing that' I am reflecting (and no longer 'doing this, not doing that', but doing something else, namely, reflecting). But reflexion is also a 'doing', and action is never quite divorced from reflexion. (Sep. 57)

314. A description of a simultaneous scene recited in words is "temporalized space". A movement viewed (graphically) as simultaneous "trajectory" is spatialized time".

315. About the "unconscious" this might be said, namely, that, by developing and employing certain techniques (which are designed to screen off the more obvious and clamant patterns of behaviour in the observed) certain information about behaviour can be observed and gathered (which is otherwise hidden or smothered by the more obvious and clamant). This information can be (structurally) arranged in a pattern, which differs from the pattern offered by the obvious. If this disclosed and arranged pattern is then hypostatized by regarding the information as behaviour of a substance, that hypostatization is in fact the "unconscious". What is remarkable about Freud is his unparalleled acuteness of observation, his ingeniousness and his naivety in hypostatization (as particularly evidenced by his absurd mechanistic description of consciousness in 'The Interpretation of Dreams' — absurd, because it is pure fantasy). (Sep. 57)

316. Of anything relative only one description is necessary, and if well done, it can "represent the Truth" (*i. e.* as correspondence truth) adequately, sufficiently, accurately. This, however, cannot be extended to "existence as a whole", for which a plurality of "complete descriptions" will be necessary, which must both coincide and diverge (probably 2 is insufficient and 3 or more is the minimum). Something of this is shown forth in the "Complementary Principle" in descriptions of atomic events. But in a set of descriptions claiming to include the observer (both as observed and as functioning-unobserved), something more than this is needed. (Sep. 57)

317. Hegel's "Logik" is the supreme attempt to subject, once and for all, dialectic to logic, and so to have, in eternity at least, a tidy determined and judged All. This seems to be attempted by the introduction of "movement" into his Logik and the supplying of it with an absolute beginning. The "absolute beginning" (his most vulnerable point which cannot be established) abrogates the possibility of dialectic's being anterior to logic and his incorporation of the dialectic into his Logik as "movement" subordinates it absolutely. But — as Kierkegaard has it — his world fails to exist. In existence the dialectic, if subordinated to logic, is so by decision, which can be revoked, when the dialectic destroys the logical structure on and below the plane of revokation and projects a new one. Herein lies the awful possibility and constant threat of disorder, confusion and doubt. (Sep. 57)

318. Hegel's "mediation" is an euphemism for confounding or presuming and his "absolute" is a euphemism for confusion. (Oct. 57)

319. Pure existentialism (*i.e.* trying to "live" entirely in unreflective consciousness) is as much a forlorn hope as the pure "essentialism" of an ideal world of abstract generalities cut off from existence. The first leads logically beyond itself to the decorticated existence of the hero of Camus' *L'étranger* while the second leads to the absent-minded University Professor of Philosophy. (Oct. 57)

320. It is always claimed for mathematics that precision is their prime virtue; and it is often said disparagingly of introspectively obtained subjective data that they are "unsatisfactory" or even "worthless" for scientific use. Now that may well be so; in fact, it should never be disputed. But suppose we ask the question: What are we seeking?

In trying to gain control of objectivity (the "world", "nature", etc.) the more accurate the observations and measurements, the more precise the definitions and descriptions, the more perfect the exclusion of puns and ambiguities from the terminology, the more pleased we may be — for our aim is accurate prediction of outside happenings (with a secondary aesthetic admiration for the consistency and elegance of the method). But what about subjectivity? How to define the faculty of definition? How to *préciser* that ability to muddle and to clarify which waits on consciousness? How to describe whether the distinguishability of truth from untruth is true or untrue?...... (Oct. 57)

321. What a pity that the maxim **De omnibus dubitandum est** is subject to the Theory of Types! (Oct. 57)

322. There seems hardly anything more positive than the walls of a prison — with the warders who prevent escape, and the law, which justifies it all. (Oct. 57)

323. The positive thinker builds: he builds prisons, making stone walls of things, and bars and wardens of principles and people. The negative thinker tunnels and undermines—yet his burrowing implies the prison. (Oct. 57)

(*Postscript:*) But (as was asked before) who is inside and who outside?

324. If one consults, say, the 'Concise Oxford Dictionary', it soon becomes evident that, in ordinary usage (that is, the usage of the Dictionaries and of common speech), no real or clear differentiation is made at all between **existence, essence,** and **being** (to look up allied words is also revealing in this respect). The position is either that they are not differentiated, or, if they are at all, any

differentiation is only partial and is ambiguous and shifty. I take this fact to reflect a reality; and if that is so, then the philosophers' differentiation between existence and essence, whether as used by St. Anselm or by Kierkegaard or the modern existentialists, is consequently ambiguous or even false in part at least. Consequently, too, the alternatives: "existence precedes essence" and "essence precedes existence" are in fact no true alternatives at all, and what they appear to represent must be expressed otherwise, less misleadingly.

The "absolute certainty" of subjectivity (that too of Phenomenology) — as against the 'probability' of the objective world — is inseparable from 'absolute disagreement' between individuals. Why? Because it is the individual's absolute certainty (of his cogito) that, carried to its extreme, constitutes his individuality as distinct from every other: that makes him himself and not a statistical component of probability, however much defined with accuracy of probability.* Statistics are, in their probability measurable (i.e. quantitative): what distinguishes the individual (in the last analysis, "the unique I") is his absolute immeasurability: i.e. his being, his possibility....Agreement can only be obtained in the objective statistical world — and it will always be quantitative, just as disagreement, there can never be absolute agreement. (Oct. 57)

325. A. "I have greenness, I am green. I have my body, I am my body. I have a watch, I am not my watch".

B. "Dear me, how confusing!"

A. "I have my self, I am myself".

B. "Dear me, how confusing!" (Oct. 57)

*One can only agree on the probable and therefore uncertain.

326. "To have" can be abolished (it is non-existent in Sanskrit and Pali) by amalgamating some uses with "to be" and others with the genitive of with "to possess".

So we are left primarily with "to be" and "to do". Now the "copula verb" to be I regard as equivalent to the "auxiliary verb" (See C. O. D.) while the "substantive verb" to be = to exist. Now these two, "copula" (auxiliary) and "substantive" correspond to "state" and "action": "to be green" = presence of a state of greeness; while "to be" = "to be actively present by changing or resisting change" — but this last savours too much of a definiten. (Oct. 57)

327. The medieval distinction between essence and existence (=being) is probably one of the most misleading ideas we developed. (Oct. 57)

328. I take it (on the basis of normal English usage) that the word 'self' represents (symbolizes) a fundamental ambiguity in perception — not that it has consciously, rationalistically been intentionally made to represent this: just the reverse, namely, that its representation has come about thus *à notre insu*, without our suspecting what has happened at all, and the word has thus concealed the very ambiguity it represents. The ambiguity is this: it cannot be established whether a thing is the same as (identical with) itself — or I with myself — or separate and different from it. For instance: "I myself think......", "a thing is no other than itself" and conversely "When I am confronted with myself......", "I come to myself", "I sat by myself and myself it said unto me: 'Take care of thyself, think much of thyself, for there's nobody who cares for thee".

Accepting this, then, as a fundamental principal of existence, we can draw this conclusion provisionally.

It can be said that "a thing is (exists)" or that "I am (exist)" of any "situational point" at which it becomes impossible to distinguish between sameness and differences. Or differently expressed: "I am" where I can both differentiate and identify myself; "I am" where this ambiguity is certain in the subjective mode, and "it is" where this ambiguity is qualitatively certain (not quantitatively probable) in the objective mede. (Nov. 57)

329. The foregoing statement needs adding to: (1) for "subjectivity" better read "ambiguity" and for "objectivity" better read "uncertainty". Where there is a focus of uncertainty, there a thing is; where there is a focus of ambiguity there I am, but alwawys the thing is in relation to me, and I am in relation to the thing. I am "uncertain about myself" when I consider me objectively as though someone else. I am ambiguous about a thing when I consider it as mine/not mine. (Nov. 57)

330. A fool-proof system would surely be system of proofs for fools. (Nov. 57)

331. Stability is the dryness to be found in a bog. (Nov. 57)

332. Consistency seems to be the hall mark of incompleteness: if something (particularly a description of the Universe or a philosophical system) is found to be consistent, then that is a sign that something has been overlooked (vide principle of complementarity in atom physics). Einstein's complaint against the Quantum Theory that it makes the world incomplete seems the greatest recommendation of that theory. (Nov. 57)

333. How useful the gods are! — those looking-glass frames, those blank slates on which we scribble our clumsy

and self-contradictory ideals. (Dec. 57)

334. A mind strong in faith and weak in reasoning (understanding) steadies itself by means of slogans. One strong in reasoning (understanding) and weak in faith steadies itself by means of logic. Both are constantly in fear of dialectic, but die of suffocatian without it. (Dec. 57)

335. A "slogan" = any cliché or quotation or text or book clung to uncritically "because I like it". Dialectic asks "But why not some alternative?" to which faith can only reply by force or it dies. "Logic" = any structural, verbal and consistent system. Dialectic asks "But why not the opposite?" to which reasoning can only reply by breadth or it too dies. To force and breadth there is no end except through exhaustion. (Dec. 57)

336. The blinding darkness of light; the deafening silence of noise; the (.. ...?) insipidity of smell and taste; the numbing pain/pleasure of heat/cold's wounding caresses; the vertigenous accelarative immobility of motion; the swooning clarity of the unknown. (Dec. 57)

337. Nothing triumphs, finally, in this world but death: the Eternal Life is death, and to live for ever is to die for ever. The immortal is not born. (Dec. 57)

338. If ignorance is an essential component of existence (whether as the finite unknowing of the infinite, or as the basis of Dependent Arising, or as the Uncertainty Principle in Atomic Physics), then any theory that does not take account of and include ignorance cannot claim to represent existence or the world fully. The fact that a theory works in practice, by experience, proves that it does so take account, or it would not work. But to show openly or

incautiously such ignorance would be offensive, indecent, taboo, and so it is normally hidden, normally inadvertedly. (Dec. 57)

339. My existence is my presence now, or my present life (birth-to-death); my non-existence is my previous lives (before birth) and my future lives (after death). Both together compose me: I am composed of both together. The objective materialist who, as a solalterist, forgets himself, takes existence as an all-truth, subordinating "I-me". The religionist who believes in the permanence of the soul, takes the solipsistic "I-me" as an all-truth, subordinating existence. (Dec. 57)

340. One's dearest friend: he for whom one ought ethically to sacrifice (betray) even one's highest principle. One's highest principle: that for which one ought ethically to sacrifice (betray) one's dearest friend (one's closest loved one). What has justice to say here? What of liberty, equality, fraternity (where liberty can be liberty to enforce equality by any means whatever, equality can be equality in the brotherhood of those condemned to death which is freedom, and fraternity that of implacable (how the totalitarians love that luscious, lip-smacking, lascivious word!) fratricidal hate (each equally hating his brother in absolute freedom to do so)?

341. When I have a system, I use it quite unsystematically, and when I have none I systematically do not use it. (Jan. 58)

342. What is so wretched for the moralists about morals (or call them ethics) is that they never — however Procrustean the claim made for their absoluteness — quite detach themselves from expediency. (see 391) (Jan. 58)

343. "All the world's a stage, and all the men and women actors on it" says Shakespeare. But actually only the men and women in the public gaze are actors on it. I, for instance, whom — and this I hold one of my greatest blessings while it is so — the public does not gaze on, am not an actor, but only a scene-shifter: the stage is curtained when I and those like me move on it.

(*Addition*:) Or that is how I should like it to be always.
(Jan. 58)

344. Four kinds of principle: to do evil that evil may come, to do evil that good may come, to do good that evil may come, to do good that good may come. The first and last are very difficult: for it is almost as hard to be a devil as to be a saint. The second, surely, provides the intentions with which hell is said to be paved; but if that is so, then does not the third paint the frescoes on the ceilings of heaven? Far better is the third than the second; for in the second, the intended good for which the evil is done may never materialize, but the evil done remains; and, in the third, the intended evil for which the good is done may never materialize, but the good done remains. (Jan. 58)

345. Riven by triviality and unamenable to meaning. Driven by meanness from the amenities of liberality.
(Jan. 58)

346. When I look at a looking-glass, what do I see — the looking-glass, my face or me? When I look at the world, what do I see — the world, my perceptions or me? When I look at you, what do I see — you or a part of my unknown self? (Jan. 58)

347. A deep inward experience is shared and cannot be unshared. Desire to share — it comes, perhaps, from

intrusion into reflexion upon the separateness of self and others, which is dissolved in deep inward experience. Reflexion comes afterwards and is done from the standpoint of separateness. Separateness is unsharable. One might put it this way: such inward experiences cannot be unshared precisely because they are by their very nature inward sharing, but they cannot be directly communicated upon reflexion in separateness, and so a desire to 'share' them may arise in separateness, which desire arises from overlooking the fact that they are already shared by their very nature.

Bodies (mental or physical) are what separates (and with them words and spatial nearness); some feelings draw the separate together and partly dissolve it; consciousness unites in a-unity (? Ed.). Separateness implies unity; unity implies separateness; there is no final satisfaction or solution here as long as each craves for or dreads the other. (Jan. 58)

348. Consciousness is unity; being acts by separating; what diversity cognizes is one (or in itself undifferentiated infinite, indefinite): what it separates into (,is ?) many.* The verb is belongs to being in abstracto; the verb does sides with consciousness in abstracto. But in existence consciousness is and being does. In Philosophy consciousness is, being is, and it is not clear how doing is done; and traditional logic only recognizes the "copula, is". But "Man and logic are different categories". (Jan. 58)

**Unclear in MS.*

349. An effective way to kill a plant is to water it carefully and regularly for the first half of a drought and then to go away and leave it. But those who do that do not see the plant die: they go and water other plants in other dry places in the same way. (Jan. 58)

350. The existential pre-reflective choice is seen, on reflexion, as a preference. *Acted*: it is the freedom to which one is condemned. Reviewed: it expresses a preference or manifestation of free-will (but that is only on looking back — the looking back is itself a choice). (Jan. 58)

351. Optimism must be an "existential communication". not a direct one: it must be induced indirectly as a spontaneous creation by the listener in himself, not directly (like a cooking receipt or an army drill-book). The attempt to do it directly degenerates into the parson's synthetic 'joy' or the physical-training instructor's 'radiance' which may well generate pessimism as the hearer's spontaneous mental response. It always does in me: I feel that the optimist who talks to or at me, has taken from me all the good there is and left my world as bare as a locust-stricken field. (Jan. 58)

352. What the scientists are apt to forget: the difference between quantity and quality is one of quality, not of quantity. (Jan. 58)

353. Modern analogy: just as the bombardment by neutral mesons is needed to split the atom's nucleus which is held together by negative and positive charges, as we are told — so perhaps equanimity is the projectile with which to split the individual held together by the charges of hate and lust. (Jan. 58)

354. Some people are aggressively meek. (March 58)

355. "The purpose of oratory is to make people forget the need for evidence" it has been said. And, it may be added, the purpose of evidence is to make people forget

that all sense-data are private. (And perhaps the purpose of the privacy of evidence is to make people forget).
(March 58)

356. There are certain aspects of truth that one can only discover in oneself; if one is told of them, one will certainly, and in the very nature of existence itself, reject them absolutely. But perhaps they can be shared by those who have discovered them individually for themselves, and perhaps those who have not discovered them can be aided indirectly to discover them for themselves. (The use of the word "truth" here is in the sense of desirability of discovery). (March 58)

357. If existence were a riddle, its solution would be non-existence — but in what medium would it then have found solution? (March 58)

358. I used always to comfort myself with the belief that if physical pain became too violent it would be cut off by "loss of consciousness" — but why should this be always so? And what is "loss of consciousness" when described subjectively? (See No. 392) (April 58)

359. Religion without art, like sex without art, not very attractive. (April 58)

360. The unambiguous is non-existent. (April 58)

361. Objectively there are 3 spatial dimensions and one temporal one, all perpendicular to each other, which together are held to constitute the four-dimensional time-space continuum of the scientists. This is purely objective and as such an artificial abstract. For in it time becomes spatialized into parallel world lines; "now" being an arbitrary convenience in it without necessity of any position.—

Conversely, in the absolute subjective view there would be 3 temporal dimensions and one spatial one, all perpendicular to each other. No one is ever seen directly but only reflected in one or both of the other two. They are past, present, and future, as the 3 temporal, and individual historical movement as the 1 spatial one: the importance of the notion of the perpendicularity of the 3 periods of time to each other subjectively cannot be overestimated. While "Individual Historical Movement" is, as it were, the "part of subjectivity that belongs to the object", in subjectivity, the continuum of world-lines in the object is that part of the object which, as it were, "belongs to the subject in the object": this interlocks subject and object and makes them inseparable. It also, by the difference of the positivity of spatial relations and negativity of temporal relations, gives a positive nature to the object and a negative one to the subject ("It is through woman that negation comes into the world").

For the desperate unsatisfactoriness of the one time-dimension in purely objective science, see particularly Kant's Theory of the Subjectivity of Time, Eddington's "New Pathways of Science" on the "direction of time-flow" corresponding with "increase-decrease of entropy" (only a theory, mark you!), and Heisenberg in "Atomic Research and the Law of Causality in Nature", ("Universitas", (Engl. ed.) 1957, No. 2), on difficulties of knowing direction of time in the "small-scale" non-statistical field of the atom. Has anyone before suggested that past, present and future are subjectively perpendicular? Scientific four-dimensional time-space has no "now" (April 58)

362. I leave the study of order and structure to the mathematicians and (in so far as they are capable) to the

philosophers: I am more interested in disorder and distructure. (This is what I say absolutely sometimes.)
(April 58)

363. 'So, then, in choosing absolutely I choose despair, and in despair I choose the absolute, for I myself am the absolute', says Kierkegaard (Either/or, ii, 179). This is a curious undeveloped insight into an uncomfortably true half-truth: the pure solipsistic standpoint of the unique "I" (not the abstract and quelquonque "an ego among others" of the psychologists). Purely subjectively "I" am unique: only that pure subjectivity is a half-truth (I do not know anywhere where pure solipsism is expounded honestly, as pure solalterism is by, say, the more reputable Behaviourists). In those terms of pure subjectivity "the others" are passive modes of "me" projected outwards (vide Sartre's être vu). This abstraction is an offence: and so Pascal says that "le moi est haissable", perhaps with that in view. When the words "I see you" are heard the meaning (in itself utterly ambiguous) is fixed by me with relation to "my body": if perceived as coming from my body, the "I" heard is identified with the unique absolute subjective "I"; but if perceived as coming to my body, the heard "I" and "you" are reversed (in this special abstract interpretation, "I" being always explainable as active subjectivity and "you" translated into "me" as passive subjectivity). (April 58)

364. Solipsistically, "I" (am) absolute and unique, and active with "me" as passive; "Thou" (art) the active "I" projected with "thee" as passive. "He" and "him", etc., can only be arrived at through "us" and "we" ("We" and "us" regarded as (1) "I"/"me" on different occasions, or (2) "I"/"thee" — "me"/"thou" simultaneously). (April 58)

365. Definition of rectolinearity: three points such that one is hidden by the second from the third; or unobservability of any two points simultaneously.

Definition of perpendicularity: Three points such that one is not hidden by the second from the third; or observability of any two points simultaneously.

(For "two points", "3 points" and "1 point" one can read "duality", "trinity" and "singularity".)

The irreducible basis of observation is the trinity of the observed, the not-observed, and the observation-point; or the observed-as-present, the observed-as-absent, and the (perpendicular) observant. (But this only "appears" in reflexion). (April 58)

366. The objects of science are all publicly measurable: by "dial-readings" or by confrontation with a "piece of matter called the Paris Metre" or by confrontation with the standard inch, the "average girth of the thumbs of three Scotchmen". Those data which are private, such as feelings of bodily pleasure or pain, mental joy or grief, willing, clarity of perception are all measurable, too, but in a different way: they are measurable only by the action which they facilitate or inhibit ("I had such a tooth ache I couldn't read", "I wanted to see you so much I couldn't sleep", "He was satisfied enough for him to continue his work", etc.). Pure consciousness is, however, immeasurable. (April 58)

367. Certainty is absence of infinity; infinity is presence of uncertainty. (April 58)

368. Nothing whatever can be apprehended apart from its opposite: but its opposite cannot be present at the same

time-place; for anything whatever to emerge from anonymity as present to consciousness (which is not it) it must be haunted (shadowed) in space-time by its opposite, otherwise it cannot detach itself from the unknown.

(April 58)

369. Cursed with the blessing of being condemned to be free. (May 58)

370. I can't find I; for when I do, what I do find: it's myself or me I need first find; I can find 'thou'; for when I do then 'thou' when by me found art thee. (May 58)

371. Being, considered as Action, appears as becoming (beginning to be or movement).

Action considered as Being appears as experience (history or staticity).

An analysis (description or definition) of Being must completely avoid all uses of the verb to be and all its derivatives and synonyms.

That of Action must likewise avoid all active verbs and nouns.

Failure in this appears as a petitio principii or as a tautology.


Appearance can be taken as the objective manifestation (ideal and real) of both being and action, which I subjectively experience. Together these make up existence.

Essence merely duplicates either idea or being, and has no separate referent.

(The verb to have duplicates the use of "there is" with the dative (in Indian languages).) (May 58)

372. "Ideas" appear as the objects of the mind and "realities" appear as the objects of the five senses. The mind and the five senses are irreducible personal data together with their respective types of objects. The mind can "handle" say visible data either through the eye (as visibles) or directly (as visual images) and can confront these two and compare them ("This ink pot might have been better designed like this"). (May 58)

373. Consciousness (o) perpendicular to what it is aware of



and not perpendicular to what it is not aware of. It (o) is aware of presence (+)-cum-absence (—) in a state of asymmetricality ($\uparrow\downarrow$). (May 58)

374. All these mental foot prints in this book: what beaten tracks they make for themselves and follow! And how these tracks emphasize by contrast the areas where they never tread! (May 58)

375. Life is mainly solalterism: death pure solipsism. (May 58)

376. Three forms of agnosticism: (1) I am certain (know) that this is impossible for anyone else to know. (2) I am uncertain (do not know at present) whether this which I don't know now, can be known by me or by anyone at some time. (3) I am certain (know) that this which I do not know, can be known sometime.

These three cover agnosticism about death.

Three main attitudes to death (my death): (i) I believe (know) that I shall survive my death. (ii) I believe

(know) that I shall not survive my death. (iii) one of the three forms of agnosticism.

It is impossible for ordinary, normal thought to confront the idea of (my) death except in one of these attitudes. All of these attitudes are wrong through the assumptions (explicit and implicit) that they necessitate. Consequently it is impossible for normal thought to confront (my) death with a correct attitude. (May 58)

377. If there is rebirth then there is nothing in this whole world, not even oneself, that is worth killing anyone for. But if there is no rebirth, then there is nothing, provided only that I am clever enough to evade the direct consequences, to prevent me killing one who gets in my way. Materialists might not (like?) this. (June 58)

378. There is no kind of act which is not wrong in certain circumstances. Suppose that were true? (June 58)

379. What nonsense it is to say that truth is beauty or what is true is good: is torture (the 'flagellation', say) not true and paintable? (June 58)

380. If absolute union with God (as in the Advaita) is taught, then who is lost, 'I' (in which case I no longer exist) or 'God' (in which case I assume the Nijjinski madness 'I am God......') or both (in which case the state is not distinguishable from no-god). Again if the personal Idea of God is replaced by Pure Being, then Being, to be pure, cannot be accessible to knowledge or, if it is, it is not pure. But if it is not, then it cannot be known whether it is Pure Being or Nothingness. (June 58)

381. The mind's mouth is greed, its body ignorance, and anger its anus. People who quarrel with one or with

each other in one's presence, expose the bare backsides of their minds just in one's face and shit on one's door step. (June 58)

382. What is the human world if not heaven reflected in hell's pitch-pool. (June 58)

383. The world had treated me for 52 years now with admirable indifference and allowed me to go very much my own way. To me it has been on the whole tolerant and helpful. When I see what it has done to so many others in my time I think how easily it could have played the steam-roller or the cat-and-mouse trick with me. Who knows what is to come? (June 58)

384. Canticle (Persephone and All That)

Only Mortality is immortal: all things mortal she mortgages for ever.

Only Temporality is eternal: all things temporal he tempers for ever.

Only Particularity is universal:
Only Perception is unperceived:
Infinity! Infinity! Infinity!
Not squared, not cubed; but
Raised to the power of infinity. (July 58)

385. Since being applies everywhere, to positive and negative, without distinction (for what is not IS in the negative mode), while what is IS in the positive mode) it is impossible to define it, though it can be, in a sense, described. Being, in fact, = self identity; to be is to identify. Whatever is is itself (see Sartre for the two modes of en soi and pour soi). Now since nothing whatever that can be individualized is simple (if it were simple it could not be

individual in the sense of being distinguishable as individual), it follows that for any individual to have a self there must be identification between the individual and its self. Its self is thus both the individual and not the individual, and the individual is both itself and not itself, and its self is both individual and unindividual. How is that? Because identification takes place through coalescence. (......) when two (complex) individuals are seen as having the majority of their qualities in common and the quality or qualities (or quantities) that individualize them, one from the other and from all else, are ignored, when this ignoring takes place involuntarily, an individual is seen to be itself. This is the objective aspect of things. Other people (seen in the accusative) and I (seen as me) are also "thingified" (= realized, made a res). Consciousness is nothing: 'I', subjectively, am an action for me (as myself), 'I' then being identified with 'me' (the untranscended sum of my actions and possibilities) — the individualized negative act with the individualized thingified history — am myself through coalescing, ignoring and forgetting the different qualities (or multiplicity) by which 'I' am distinguishable from 'me'. The moral of all this is simply that without ignorance there is no being or non-being. (June 58)

386. But how absurd it is to identify being and good, since evil is. And how can good be simply defined, without reference to evil, as the object of the will? And how can being be defined, without reference to non-being, as the object of consciousness's affirmation, and since being is without limit, how can it be defined?

No wonder scientists fight shy of ontology as it has been shaped in European thought — but they have none of them seen why. (June 58)

387. Logic is impossible without the identifying process of the copula is and identification is the function of ignorance. (Swallow that, if you can, you logicians!)
(June 58)

388. In the physical world, with relativity and the maximum speed of light as a fiinite quantity, while "uniform motion in a straight line (= rest)" implies change, in the surroundings of a coordinate system, it predicts nothing internal of the CS itself. But with, say, a (constant) acceleration the CS not only takes on an internal orientation but also approaches the maximum speed, from which it must result that the change will be in a sense (seen from outside the CS) trajectorial (like ageing*, is distinct from mere altering) and is bound to result in eventual catastrophe to the CS ("death"). In the physical world, the phenomenon of gravity is in many ways equatable with accelaration. (Maximum speed with what?) We can regard the earth as CS expanding acceleratedly, which acceleration keeps us on its surface and makes us "heavy". (Why then doesn't the earth get larger? — That is beside the point.) Without the "acceleration" of gravitation the earth could disperse in dust and vapour, into nothingness.** But not enough, this gravity-acceleration, — if there is a maximum speed (speed of a CS, relative to other CS), must result in the earth's ageing-curve and eventual death as an internal phenomenon. Conversely, the seeming inevitability of ageing and death of the complex conscious animals, including man, might suggest both an acceleration and an upper speed ceiling. Suggestive as this line is, it suffers from two disadvantages: it smacks of argument by analogy, and it is entirely objective (in the scientific sense), which,

*I only "see" my own ageing, as it were, from outside my self.
**Mere solidity (= motion) in a straight line.

though sound for physics given the self-imposed limitations of the scientific premiss, is nevertheless totally inadequate for analysis of subjectivity. (Note the subjective analysis might be made on the basis of the theory — see here No. 361 — of the subjective orthogonal 3 dimensions of time and 1 of space.) (June 58)

389. Everything I see hides something else: what is behind that tree-trunk? What is behind the positive emptiness I see extended between the stars? Everything I hear blots out some other sounds behind this conversation I hear and take part in, what is being said at the next tables on the right and on the left? Behind the roar of waves, what sounds are there? Behind the light buzzing of the ears in the silence of the night or of a cave, what sounds? Behind the smell of Camembert and taste of salt, or the taste of spittle in an empty mouth, the smell of nasal receptivity in a quiet nose, — what smells and tastes? Behind this touch of velvet or this (?), what other touch? And lastly, behind these ideas and images, what ideas and images? What? What? — But why do I ask? To recognize something revealed is to imply something hidden by it. (June 58)

390. The principle of non-commutative multiplication legitimates the idea of asymmetrical pairs or opposites which, while opposite, do not cancel each other out; pleasure and pain are one of these pairs. (June 58)

391. Expediency is really the reproductive organ of morality (its "shame" which it covers up), without which it would be sterile and its race die out. (see here No. 342) (June 58)

392. Perhaps the amount of pain one suffers is the measure of the amount of clinging to existence one has

fundamentally. For the 'body' that one has in dreams is too fragile in its continuity to withstand pain. It takes the solidly organized waking body to stand pain. Pain is inimical to continuity. But if continuity (life) is desired (voluntarily and involuntarily), an organization is needed to localize pain and contain it when it rises; this is the physical body. In this view the physical body is a pain-barrier (rather as the tonsils are the germ-barrier) in the whole personality in waking life. In dream, to repeat, though there is my body in all my experiences in dreams, it is unstable and its situations (as seen in waking reflexion) succeed with disconnected jerks: bits of disconnected continuity, some long, some short.—But there is no bodily pain in dreams to any noticeable extent. To maintain continuity, ability to have a physical dam against discontinuity is gained at the price of bodily pain. (June 58)

393. It is best to live at peace with the devil one knows and not to try to make a breach too soon; for then he may go away before one is ready, and others whom one does not recognize may then take his place. (June 58)

394. If number is definable as what you can count, it is therefore finite, but an infinite number (see Russell, Mysticism and Logic) is what you cannot count, and is therefore not a number except by a pun (vide Russell's statement that "the number of finite numbers is infinite" —which in "straight" language should be stated as "no number of numbers is countable"). A definition of infinity is self-contradictory, verbally, since it involves placing a limit (finis) to that which is stated to have none. (June 58)

395. What I believe I know, I do not yet fully know: what I know I believe, I no longer fully believe. (June 58)

396. Ignorance screens the truth. It is on that screen that people paint pictures and write underneath their labels "god" and "not-god" and "theism" and "atheism".

(June 58)

397. Can definition define itself or description describe itself? Or can it be that description can only be defined, and definition described? (June 58)

398. In these days both theism and atheism have got a bit greasy with the smoke of Auschwitz — but why ever put up a memorial to that? What is there (that) art is not capable of? Anus mundi — it can kiss the world's arse, it seems.

399. Goodness can only be finally established by destruction of evil, and destruction is doubtful as to whether it is good.

Truth must include evil, since it is manifestly wrong to assert that evil is untrue.

Beauty, as art, if it can take the Cross (the crucifixion by torture and murder of a man-god), and Auschwitz (the crucifixion by torture and murder of humanity) for its aliment, would seem to be a foul feeder with no limit to the horrors it is willing to devour, without pecksniff ethics to censor it. (July 58)

400. Mythical entities can be measured: they used to measure phlogiston, and they still measure force. (Aug. 58)

401. Space and time are the great subjective mistakes which we all agree in making and on and in which we build all our disagreements. (Aug. 58)

402. Charitableness to one's neighbour is like clean linen: to be worn rather than talked about. (Aug. 58)

403. The impenetrable secrecy of substances. Things hide their substance behind their surfaces. Crack open the surface to see the substance, and what do you find? Another surface, and so on. Substance is secrecy.

And the secrecy of persons. You in all honesty — as I honestly believe — tell me all your secrets as a friend and confidant, but I can inherently never know that that is so, I can only firmly believe it (and to know that I believe is half to doubt while to believe that I know is to be half in real ignorance). What distinguishes me from you (or you from him or me from him) and vice versa, as persons rather than things, — the mode of difference between persons that differs from the mode of difference between things — is that, however honest and open I am, however much I try, through love or hate, or fear and terror, physical or mental, I can inherently never completely disclose my 'self' (for if that were possible, I and myself would disappear quite). Thus I am a secret and you a suspicion, that can never be removed (or vice versa). So lovers are jealous, and people torture each other in order to obtain information; no less now, in the 20th century (with the modern aids of science and psychology) than in the middle ages or the renascence (Tolstoy said a man does not know a State if he does not know the insides of its prisons) — yet with all the aids that science can and will be able to give one can never be quite satisfied that one has got it all. The irony is that this secrecy is itself so secretive that people quite forget it and believe all can be disclosed. A man can only tend towards openness — he can never quite get there. Socialism, if it degenerates into a flight from this fact, by pretending that the Ego (the psychologists' depersonalized and quelquonque, and therefore fictitious 'I') does not matter and the individual

is really subordinate to the State. The old regime has failed through failing to recognize that the State (other people) cannot be subordinated to the individual. (Aug. 58)

404. The Absolute can only receive its Absolution from Consciousness (failing which / there is / neither absolute nor particular), and in so doing the absoluteness is particularized as such, and so is no longer absolute. (Aug. 58)

405. A man can only tend towards frankness, he can never achieve absolute frankness or he would be a mere mechanical device. When he has deviated some way in this direction, people identify him with the idea of great frankness. They say 'he is frankness itself'. (Aug. 58)

406. Whether one accepts an idea with the left hand of horror and indignation or with the right hand of welcome and approval, one has accepted it just the same and is left holding it — and it is no good hiding away from oneself under one's coat what one has accepted with the left hand. (Aug. 58)

407. Honour is a principle that asserts the Person above the Principle (and changes persons): The Nihilist or Revolutionary is the Person that asserts the Principle above the Person (and changes principles). (Aug. 58)

408. What always distinguishes my body from all other peoples' bodies? All bodies appear incomplete, but while other peoples' bodies appear incomplete away from me, my body is the only one that appears incomplete towards me, too. This is true of any view point at any time. (Aug. 58)

409. God is invented as the counterbalance to the unique 'I' - illusion of pure solipsism. Atheist science therefore

has, of necessity, to take refuge in Solalterism; for without god, if the unique subject 'I' is admitted (and science cannot control it), it must assume divine and absolute proportions and become madness (Kirillov). Buddhism avoids this by removal of the 'I' - illusion in all aspects, whether in that of god or the solipsistic misinterpretation of the unique 'I'. (Aug. 58)

410. A: On the basis of monotheistic theology free will can only be freedom to do evil—if good and God's will are equatable—; and God, as the Creator of all things, is creator of evil through man as His Instrument, as creator of man's will to do evil.

B: If you say that, I will destroy you. (Aug. 58)

411. **Seek and you shall find**—what shall I find?—The seeking. **Knock and it shall be opened unto you**—and what shall be opened unto me?—The knocking. (Aug. 58)

412. The process of gathering evidence on which to base a conclusion necessitates excluding irrelevant matter—it is always a process of selection and rejection, thus it must always be incomplete. This suggests that any conclusion based on evidence is always incomplete—'no conclusion'—and provisional, however 'final' it may be believed to be. To reach a 'complete' and 'final' conclusion about anything, everything would have to be considered and taken into account, which, since it would require infinite comprehension and eternity, would be the unattainable—the always possible that cannot be 'killed' by realization: or in other words, 'the absolute future'. (Aug. 58)

413. People who set out to explain the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar, always end by explaining the familiar in terms of the unfamiliar. (Sept. 58)

414. The Truth is often so insulting. (Sep. 58)

415. The theists are men who, in order to see the light, build stone cathedrals round themselves with stained-glass windows showing the comprehensible attributes of their incomprehensible God. The atheists, in order to see more clearly, curtain off the stained-glass windows. (Sep. 58)

416. It seems to me that (first?) rest, motion and acceleration, are inseparable in any total situation or event, and are thus 3 copresent structural modes. Modes of what? Copresent structural modes of permanence. But surely permanence is a delusion? And what moves and accelerates, at least, changes and is thus impermanent. No, rest or motion or change are together three modes of the situation, not of a thing—a 'thing' has one of them in appearance, when the others are relegated to the rest of its situation or event.—Properly change is an alteration of quality or quantity in which no one, nor all, of the three modes of permanence is present. Only a 'thing' can be at rest or move or accelerate, and a thing has illusion of permanence while it is that thing. When it changes, it is no more that thing, and so no motion or rest or acceleration can be attributed. (Sep. 58)

417. The Law is nothing but a set of techniques for canalizing hate into order and away from chaos (as commerce is for canalizing greed similarly). It is a mistake to identify war with hate: wars are made for greed and for fear more then for hate—see also Uncle Toby's defence of war in Tristram Shandy. Judge Wildegoose's description of Law as a device for delay (rather than for administration of justice), in which passions cool down and litigation solves itself with the passage of time and the help of boredom, is acute. (Oct. 58)

418. The Love/hate opposition is misleading and not true to facts. Better would be Love/fear and greed/hate. Or perhaps better a triangle. hate



which is constantly being forced into a duality by identifying one of the pairs: that is what makes the world go round, no doubt. Trying to make an axis out of a try-angle by axing one angle on trial. (Oct. 58)

419. Why, I sometimes ask myself, is speech so geometrical? If I exaggerate I speak hyperbolically. Arguments always follow a certain line and are sometimes circular. Statements are sometimes elliptic. A statement either has a point, or is pointless. Parables come from the word parabola (which is a simile or metapher or a something that follows something else: speech follows experience), and lastly, I find in the C. O. D., parlance (the English form of French parler, Italian parlare) comes from the Latin parabolare, to talk. I haven't discovered any verbal squares, triangles or cubes yet. So it seems that the strange geometricity of speech (=parlance, remember) in general is confined to conic sections and covers them all. It is very odd. 'But', some wiseacres may say, 'you have got it upside-down. Speech has not borrowed from geometry (it is much older); geometry has borrowed from speech!' — But then I ask why have speech metaphors invaded geometry and taken possession of conic sections? There is no such situation in arithmetic that I know of. (Oct. 58)

420. Among the principal essentials of existence are: the pun (no meaning or idea is quite unequivocal), the

dialectic (no choice is settled except by a belief), conditionality (no thing or quality ever arises or is found alone; for if found, it is not alone since in the presence of what finds it), impermanence, identification (the self-illusion made on recognition of anything, which is always wrong against the standard of Truth-that-never-disappoints), consciousness (without which there are no ideas at all), being (without which illusion nothing whatever can be cognized by recognition as either recognized or unrecognized), individualized perspect (without which there is no 'view'), etc., etc. (Nov. 58)

421. FABLE. — Once a person called "P" went to a place called "kitchen", and with a lot of impersonal things variously called, including a thing called "a spoonful of salt", performed some actions called "cooking" and produced a thing called "delicious dinner", which the person called "P", in another action called "serving a dinner to guests", sat down to, with some other persons variously called, one of which was called "Q". He was a chemist. He said "Chemically speaking there are only elements and combinations of elements, 'you' as a person, and a 'teaspoonful of salt' as a thing don't exist chemically. 'You' and 'it' are both just combinations of chemical elements, which are real. Now this so-called "teaspoonful of salt" is, for instance, merely a combination of the elements chlorine and sodium". The person called "P" was impressed. For the next action called "serving a dinner to guests", "P" thought "Why not, since Q said they were the same thing — that 'salt' is merely chlorine and sodium — why not be original and serve some chlorine and sodium instead of salt? So much simpler! Why bother about their being combined as salt? They are more real too" he said. "We'll combine them in ourselves at dinner".

So the person called "P" undertook an act called "buying some chlorine (poisonous gas) and some sodium (metal that burns and explodes in contact with water)", and these things (not elements in this action), with other things, the person called "P" acted on in a way called "serving a dinner to guests". Now the result was quite different to that of the previous action also called "serving a dinner to guests" and identified by "P" as the same (sort of) action. The result this time was very painful to the person called "P" and the other persons called "guests", and they all "died" very "puzzled". Why was that? Because they didn't mind their P's and Q's. (Nov. 58)

422. The profoundest of all illusions is the illusion that there is no illusion. (Nov. 58)

423. It is when the ethical fails that it slips back into the immediate — but as the ironical immediacy. It is when the religious fails that it slips back into the ethical — but as the comic ethical.

Failure in the immediacy is simply immediate suffering. (Nov. 58)

424. Besides the fact that no virtue stands out as such except against the background of its corresponding vice, it also seems impossible to find any virtue whatever that is not, on some occasion, in certain circumstances, itself a vice. If this were not so, no judgement would be needed — all would be settled by rule — and is judgement a virtue? (Nov. 58)

425. In the pattern of ideas everything is possible — even a contradiction. In the opposed pattern of existence (the might-be, the is, the existing), the possible and impossible are, more or less arbitrarily, distinguished, and

what is possible then being only discernible by observation and learning. This points to an arbitrary fixed solution of dialectic on the basic existential level in existence, which perhaps distinguishes the individual personality during his life span. (Dec. 58)

426. Heaven can be made into hell by other people or oneself. Hell can be made into heaven by oneself. In either case neither endures indefinitely—*le Paradis est toujours à refaire.* (Dec. 58)

427. The best way to govern the world would apparently be to put half the population in prison and set the other half to guard them. This would be essentially humane since one of the characteristics that distinguishes human beings from animals is the habit of building prisons and imprisoning some of their own kind,—not to build and maintain them is inhuman. But perhaps there is no need to bring this about, to make this "essence" "exist", since perhaps it is in fact how the world is now being ruled: now as it is and always has been. Half the world is in prison: each man is half in prison. Otherwise what need to talk of freedom? But prisoners are so optimistic, aren't they? Don't they imply that freedom must be? And then who is inside and who is outside? (Dec. 58)

428. The scientific writer Sluckin in his Penguin book on Cybernetics dismisses introspection as valueless because of the vagueness and ambiguity of the data it provides. Now I maintain that this very ambiguity—this constant punning in the mind—is one of the most valuable data that is provided uniquely by introspection (a veritable pearl cast before the Sluckin-pigs). I also believe that the techniques initiated by Descartes' Cogito ergo sum (disregarding his construction of dual substances with which he

obscured this) and Sartre's ontology of *Etre et le Néant* provides the basis for a technique for the study of ambiguity. This basis is description (as opposed to definitions which are always ad hoc and unilateral fixings of a dialectic and, as such, can inheringly never provide any final solution but only a direction for a further movement). The special dialectic of ambiguity is whether to choose to fix an ambiguity by a definition and so merely shift the ambiguty elsewhere and conceal it (useful in certain techniques such as those of science, excluding the Uncertainty Principle) or whether to recognize it as a valuable and true subject for description, when complementarity is needed.

It is a certain fundamental type of ambiguity that distinguishes beings and things from qualities. The study of them must take into due and close account both certainties and probabilities (the scientist's "exactness" and "certainty" are never exact and certain but only approximations of probability to the absolute certainty of introspection that they can inherently never reach — the certainty of the ambiguousness).

This technique corresponds to *yoniso manasikāra* in the Suttas. (Dec. 58)

429. There is an inherent special ambiguity about the "present" as an idea or as an existent, which it does not seem to share with the past or the future. Some argue that the present has no duration, being simply a surface between past and future, while others talk of its duration though they can't agree on what length it ought to have and take specious refuge in a "spacious present". Without paying particular attention to these two views, I find the mere fact that they are asserted indicates that the notion is elastic in the minds of other people and so too

I find it in my own. Also the "present" seems to me equally admissible both for "what I am doing now" (extended) and for "what is present to me now" (instantaneous). And the first (subjective) may be the "shortest thought flash conceivable" or "my whole life I am living" or "eternity of past and future in the now". In the last (objective), all temporalization, in its three "orthogonal dimensions" of past, future and present, "appear present" as follows: the past was (present), the present is (present), the future will be (present), and (this is an important point) all three together eternally may be. Again concern with the past (taken as probable) gives us historians (and Hegel), concern with the future (taken as possible) gives us scientists, politicians and astrologers (and Hegel), concern with the past and future gives us logicians (and Hegel). The Buddha recommends concern with the present in the *Bhaddekaratta-sutta*, and this is only possible by introspection which reveals the ambiguity, absurdity and contingency of eternity in time. Again, perhaps, the past is the legitimate field of knowledge (which comprehends), the future is the legitimate field of faith (faith being ignorant man's instrument for groping beyond where knowledge extends). The present is the legitimate field for describing, in terms of the 3 times, and for remembering what one has described. (Dec. 58)

430. (Vide Kierkegaard) Immediacy is ironical since, for lack of foresight, it risks failing to get what it wants and is, when inspected from without, always exposed to pain and disappointment, with no defences against them. Ethics, its immediate remedy, is either expediency with the purpose of gaining some future immediacy, or it is discipline to gain liberation from immediacy-with-its-blindness: ethics thus always points out of itself and risks,

on inspection from without, appearing ridiculous. Liberation, its ethical remedy, points to the liberation of all needs...... (Dec. 58)

431. Every victory won in this world is a stalemate on another level. (Jan. 59)

432. That **esse est percipi** I do not deny by any means, though I think it incomplete. What is lacking? Nothing. How? Because, given that statement on its merits, it implies (in order that it may emerge at all) **percipiens non est** (i. *e*. non esse est percipere—perceive is a recul from being). This statement **esse est percipi**, is not quite of the same order as **cogito ergo sum** (a description, not a logical-causal deduction), which, if translated into its terms, would be **cogito ergo percipior**, which seems a quaintish **non-sequitur**, since it does not come out well either as a logical deduction or as a description. That **percipiens non est** I do not deny either. But this is only a starting-point for completion, for the self-identity of the **percipiens quis percipitur non esse** (=**non esse est percipere**) now enters, and with it ramifications that extend thence **ad infinitum**.

Now phenomena **qua** phenomena must be (**ought to be**) distinguishable from what they are not in order that they may emerge at all and that the word may have a meaning (referent) and not be entirely redundant. If so—if they are, as such, distinguishable—it is from being, though with great caution (a limitation of being). And so, if they can be said to have a phenomenal-characteristic peculiar to them, by which they can be so distinguished, it is that when a phenomenon appears, it does so as hiding something else; but that when a search is made, on this invitation, for what **ought** to be beyond it, only

other phenomena ever appear when it disappears (and so never disappears!). On these terms consciousness could be said to appear as the phenomenon that hides nothing when it appears. Now, complementarily, if being, which phenomena are thus not, has, as such, an ontological characteristic peculiar to it alone, it is either that it has nothing beyond it, or better that it is hidden. A phenomenon, then, while thus certain in its phenomenality is ambiguous in its being. But if, as is always possible, the ambiguity in the being of the phenomenon is dialectically resolved, it reappears again in what the being is not, i. e. phenomena, as their non-phenominality (*i. e.* ability to appear). All this, in repetitive pattern and infinite (=indefinite) ramifications, vistas and hierarchies, levels, planes and ranges, provinces and pastures, is what the structure of this play consists in. Hence the Double Ambiguity "whose naming kills and has it born elsewhere". Herein, too, lies the ambiguity of "essence" as the distinguishing characteristic: is it phenomenon or being? — logical copula or predicate? (Jan. 59)

433. *Etre en soi* is what phenomena appear to hide, which itself appears, in pure positivity, as what must (ought to) and cannot ever, be (found). *Etre en soi* is thus the real objective paradox — the paradox of the real (res). (Jan. 59)

434. What is probable? Certainty. What is certain? probability.

What is infinite? Finiteness. What is finite? Infinity.

What is permanent? Impermanence. What is impermanent? Permanence. (Jan. 59)

435. The only one is the many. and many the ones. The only one that is the many, is one of many.

The only eternity is of time, and temporal the eternities.

The only infinity is finiteness; and finite infinities.

The only permanence is impermanence; and impermanent the permanences. (Jan. 59)

436. What a glue is made by a mixture of guilt and gratitude, and how well they sometimes mix in some pots! (Jan. 59)

437. It is no ipso facto escape from dogma to assert (knowingly or not) non-dogmatism dogmatically.

It is no ipso facto escape from credulity to believe in one's own scepticism. (Jan. 59)

438. Phenomena are secretive and what they secrete is being (pun). Hence the reason why, when we see some visible object, hear some sound, etc., we so often ask "what is this?"

439. How often R(ationalized Unr)ighteousness passes for Righteousness! (Jan. 59)

440. The proverb speaks of making a Virtue of Necessity; but the philosopher Emanuel Kant speaks (in the Categorical Imperative) of making a Necessity of Virtue. (Jan. 59)

441. What is an identity? It is the essential oneness of two entities whose difference, if any, does not count.

What is a plurality? It is the essential plurality of one entity whose oneness, if any, does not count. (Feb. 59)

442. "Essence" (from the verb *esse* = to be): a medieval logicians' concept, initiated by Aristotle, and used by logicians and philosophers as a synonym for characteristic (i. *e*. characteristically distinctive phenomenon by which we recognize what a thing, or class, is, by which it is recognized to be itself). This ontic metaphor from subjective-objective being to purely objective characteristic is a pun-by-metaphor of fundamental importance, and indispensably useful for those (Religious Doctors, say, or Scientists) who need to employ the "Utraquistic Subterfuge" (which is so valuable for verbal presti (-di-) g(itation-)e — remove what is in the brackets and see what remains. But a characteristic-phenomenon of such kind, called metaphorically "essence" (*le phénomène de l'être*), is then that of something which has that essence and consequently is not it (whether that something is regarded as a Kantian "Ding-an-sich" or as an Abhidhamma constellation-of-dhammas-with-no-self-substance, or what you will, makes no difference here); it is the special phenomenon by which I recognize what this, which has it, is, and by which I believe this to be what it itself is. Now by this utraquistic ontic metaphor of "essence" applied to the characteristic, being has been subtly drained away from the subjective-externalized in appearance; it is thus rendered possible to appear to verbally externalize Being and to objectivize it entirely. Thus it is now easier (apparently) to handle "existence" (that same thing's Being) as just another axternal attribute, namely as that thing's "quality-of-existing" predicatable of it. The fraud is now nearly complete; and if the logical copula is (the verbal mode of being agreed upon as one of the basic assumptions of logic, and a logical constant) can only be passed off as quite divorced from being-and-existence with the mediation of the metaphor of "essence" externalized as characteristic or attribute, then the logicians

can forget about the copula and make others overlook it, forget that it is the true verbal symbol for existential being by which, and only by which, logic maintains a connection with life, and forget that it contains the (hateful subjective) element of self-identification. This play with the "essence"-metaphor is possible because of the actual existential miragic identity-relation of ambivalence (one-in-two, two-in-one) between consciousness-and-being and between being-and-phenomena. This ambivalence, which lurks in the copula *is*, is an anathema to logicians who seek by any means to hide it away. So now we have split being into two and we have apparently drained away being from the copula by means of the "essence"-metaphor and now we can proceed to make believe that the copula *is* is not really being at all (which is quite untrue, since it remains being on the verbal plane; and if it did not, no statements would correspond at all to life), and so the copula can be exempted from all question or analysis. When we propose to investigate being, this investigation can be handed over entirely to Logics, which, since the copula (its constant) does not count as being, is capable of handling the whole thing and indeed all existential problems (and so, if it seems that logic cannot answer some such problem, then, my dear sir, your problem is wrongly stated, is fictitious, and no problem at all since logic is always right: evviva il Positivismo Logico!). No wonder the cogito enrages the Logicians so! This is not to decry logic in its own proper field which is that of being, but to expose its false claims that being can be subordinated to it or investigated or analyzed by it. The proper instrument for that is *yoniso manasikāra*, of which elements are contained in the cogito. (3 Feb. 59)

443. The past came before me now; the future lies before me now; the present is before me now. (Feb. 59)

444. Space = simultaneity of time. Time = allotropism of space. Space = homotropism of time. Time = consecutivity of space.

445. First, examples of ought to be and must be as duty: "A man ought to be married and be a father of a family". "A man must be a good patriot if he is to earn the esteem of his fellow countrymen". "Darling, you must be grateful to God for giving you your good dinner". "My dear boy, you ought to be making a living for yourself at your age", etc., etc. — This is duty. This is concerned to get it accepted that "duty is" in the sense that "duty is a valid field of perception" (Kant's Categorical Imperative). Duty then, if only it can be established as a valid field of perception will decide such dialectics for us if we "just open our moral eye". (Others say that duty is "what other people want us to do".) This as duty. This, as duty taken ontologically, implies that the subject is not what he ought to (must) be - he is not (or there is doubt about his being) married and a father; a good patriot, grateful for dinner, making a living, etc., etc. Ontologically (superficially, at least) they are all straight-forward.

This is merely to establish the duty form of "must be" and "ought to be" in common usage in order to dismiss it, because it is the other use that I want to bring out.

The other (equally common but much more ontologically subversive and misleading) use is this, as the following examples may make plain: "We have been

travelling two hours already; we ought to be nearly there by now". "It is half past two; the boat must be out on the open sea by now". "What is the time? It must be about 11.30". "Who is that coming down the street? It ought to be Smith by the looks of him". "The world is so marvellously designed, there must be a creator of it". "There must be a way out of the mess" "there must be a way up this mountain", "there must be something in nibbāna". "It is so because it must be so; how could it be otherwise?", and the closely allied "It is too awful; It can't be true! No! No! It isn't so!" Now in the/first/case of "duty-must-be", what must be is regularly what is not; but, on the contrary, in the case of this "certainly-must-be", there is the presumption ranging between suspicion and the certainty of *mauvaise foi*, that what must be is (Are you sure it is?—Certain.—Have you seen it or verified it? —No, but I am quite sure."). This is just the opposite, and to dismiss (?) certainly-must-be under "duty-must-be" is to confuse and overlook a whole range of (often very bogus, misleading and dangerous) reasoning. Larelle's Ontology is a good example of what must (ought to) be as what is; and so is Plotinus at times. What is simply is, and, as such, is wider than certainty (certainly-must-be in this sense). Certainty and being are thus not coextensive. Certainty, in its special dialectic (that of certainty/uncertainty), is a "department" of being, which is obvious if we remember that to be is equally well to be certain as to be uncertain. It is this confusion of what must be in this meaning or certainly-must-be with what is (as against what is not, which also is in the negative mode) that led Alain to make his famous and absurd denial of images: They cannot be, therefore they are not. (Feb. 59)

446. Ethics results from an effort to escape from the chaos of aesthetic immediacy. But ethics needs justification: justification of ethics by reason (with the aid of logic) produces the dialectic of rational philosophical systems; justification of ethics by feeling produces the dialectic of religions (with or without logic, and/or holy wars). Justification of existence is their incestuous offspring, and so is condemnation of existence. (Ap. 59)

447. What do they give medals for? Why, for meddling outstandingly in other peoples' affairs, of course. (Ap. 59)

448. The meaning of this is that, the meaning of that is this; the meaning of any this is all this or any or all that,.........: the meaning of All is Meaninglessness. (Ap. 59)

449. The basic Irrational Act which is renewed every moment of life, is not to commit suicide. (Ap. 59)

450. The descriptions of what cannot be found are almost limitless in their variety and contradiction - limited only by the limitless field of what can be found. (Ap. 59)

451. Tertullian's famous outburst on the enjoyment of seeing others — 'the wicked' — burning in hell betrays the unadmitted fact that all our paradises are other people's hells. (Ap. 59)

452. The 'self-becoming' of the Absolute, as they like to present it, seems a sort of ontological incest. (Apr. 59)

453. Bad as the world is (supposed to be) without any meaning, it would be infinitely worse with one. The moralists all try to find one, but if they succeeded, that would be the end of meanings. (Apr. 59)

454. There are the systems x and y, who regard each other with internecine hatred, and who shout against each other and at all others "He who is not for me is against me". But I do not say "A plague on both your houses"; for I have no wish to wish plagues on anyone's house; and besides, even if I did, it would be superfluous, since each, by its own attitude, is already the plague on the other's house. (Apr. 59)

455. Eddington's "two writing desks"—one being the familiar piece of furniture at which he is seated resting his arms on it, and the other a scientific physical body lacking all sensual qualities, the greatest part of which is empty space—nothingness—interspersed with innumerable specks of the uncertainty principle in the 'form' of atoms ('open structures') with their electrons and nuclei-separated by distances at least 100,000 times their own size. (See Schroedinger, Mind and Matter)

456. 1. Justice must be done.

2. It is not enough that justice is done, it must be seen to be done.

3. It is not enough if justice is done and seen to be done, it must be admitted to be done by those (the punished criminals, the losers of litigation) who are punished by it.

And what if they won't admit it? Shall they be forced to do so or shall justice suffer the dishonour of defiance

and of timorous support? In the last analysis, does not justice demand — has it not the right — the sacrifice of every other value at her altar, with only fear, common sense, weariness and forgetting to restrain her? How justice hates Mercy! How mercy loves Justice! (May 59)

457. What an ideal language classical literary Chinese must be! 'No active or passive, no singular or plural, no case, no person, no tense, no mood' it is said! To be perfect it only needs to be no language at all! (June 59)

458. Broadening of perception without broadening of judgement (understanding) seems to risk leading to increase of hate or of greed, with corresponding strengthening of delusion (the latter, perhaps, having something like a quadratic functional relation to the first two,. (June 59)

459. Taking the physical outside world as my looking-glass, what is recognizable there as myself reflected? The Philosophers' and the Physicists' matter, as the unfindable 'substance', the 'reality', behind appearances. My self cannot be found, and that is one aspect of it. Worship of it is a kind of narcissism. (June 57)

460. How much one has learnt may perhaps be known to oneself. How much one has not will certainly be shown in one's behaviour when the squeeze is applied. (June 59)

461. "Don't build yourself an ivory tower" the moralists say. But I am an ivory tower by the mere fact that I am. On the crude physical level the body is a frame of (ivory) bones on which the muscles are stretched, crowned by an (ivory) bone pill-box turret housing the brain — shielding it from the blows of 'reality' so that

it can get on with its absurd work undisturbed. On the non-physical level my I-ness is an ivory tower of orderly individual views and vistas shielding 'me' from being swallowed up in chaos. Dear moralists: don't they see that life is a constant flight up and down the endless steps of the dark ivory tower seeking to escape from the horrid chaos of real freedom? (June 59)

462. Heisenberg has formed his Uncertainty Principle for atomic physics. There seems to be something of the sort needed in epistemology; for Philosophy points to the Absolute (conceived dialectically as Being or consciousness). But such an Absolute, to be known, must be the object of knowledge, in which case it is relative to the knowledge and not absolute. If it is attempted to purify it of that last relativity, then, with the withdrawal of all knowledge, it cannot be known whether the Absolute (Being or Consciousness) is absolute or non-absolute (Being-or-non-being, consciousness-or-non-consciousness). The concept Absolute (or All), then, in the Absolute sense, is in other words, Ignorance (and Heisenberg says that ignorance is now accepted on principle as one of the characteristics of atomic matter). (June 59)

463. **Pun**

A. The only content of knowledge is the known.

B. Very nice. And so it would seem that the only discontent of knowledge is the unknown. (June 59)

464. Discord: passion and understanding opposed in a fight to the death that never comes.

Harmony: Understanding as the understanding of passion; passion as the passion for understanding. (June 59)

465. The ultimate object of knowledge is only ignorance, which in philosophy is euphemistically called 'substance'. (June 59)

466. One is walled in by what one denies; one is chained by what one affirms. One is one's imprisonment. (June 59)

Politically an example of this is the Communist who is shut in by the bourgeoisie he denies, and the consequence in practice is that he becomes even more bourgeois than the bourgeoisie.

Religiously an example is the Christian whose Church, in denying the antichrist, falls into his power by denying him. (June 25/59)

467. What the psychologists — no, psychoanalysts — call a 'fully integrated personality' is he not simply one who lives (loudly and contradictorily and humanely) according to the Old Testament pattern? The New Testament is not an integrating force: 'I bring not peace, but a sword....' (June 59)

468. Why should 'integration' be a good thing?

'Integration' as integration of ignorance and craving in the personality, just as we now have ignorance and force integrated in the atom with Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle — 'Ignorance' and 'Force' — those old myths? (June 59)

469. Absolute self-creation is the transparency of transparency, — not distinguishable from nothing at all.

(June 59)

470. "I" = focus of ignorance in perception; "me" = focus of ignorance in '*être-vu*'.

471. The most important philosophical contributions of the scientists are those principles which they have admitted they are forced to accept against their inclinations. Foremost there are Einstein's Relativity, Bohr's Complementarity, and Heisenbergs's Uncertainty (= ignorance as a basic principle of matter). Scientific theory erected upon these basic principles is philosophically unimportant in so far as it is 'mystical' (see Whitehead's remark) or inherently unverifiable (material substance,) or any such unproved or unprovable assumption. The Quantum Theory, for example, is an ad hoc empirical makeshift which works, but which contains the logically disagreeable contradiction of complementarity, and it may well have to be replaced by another.

The present-day Holy Trinity of Science is therefore: Relativity, Complimentarity, and Uncertainty. (Homousion or Homoi-ousion, of matter (physics)?) (June 59)

472. India has three heavens: the sensual paradises, the heavens of pure form where there is no sex, and the formless heavens where there is no perception of form or of multiplicity. It is tempting to trace these to an unconscious projection of the three principal phases of human life as distinguished by psychoanalysts (especially by Freud on the basis of sex and infantilism): the first is idealized adulthood (which is why it is placed nearest 'this human world'), the second is then the pre-puberty

(sexless,) stage (from say 4-years to 12/15 years), which, n.b., is as far back as the normal man can consciously remember. The third, with its blotting out not only of sex but of perception of forms and of difference represents the pre-4-year-old period (or what is behind the normal field of memory). Childhood is normally sentimentally idealized ('My happiest days were....' etc.) which equals heavenized ('Unless ye become as little children ye shall not enter the kingdom of heaven!'). A point to remember here, which is extremely important is this: the break between the first period (before memory) and the second-and-third is quite obvious, but the break between the second and the third is, although the fact is obscured by the apparent continuity of the historical memory, quite as absolute as the other on the level of sex values. While one can 'recreate' by memory one's 'historical' experiences during the period between the first memories and puberty, one cannot revive the sexless values and patterns (what the moralists like to call the 'innocence') of that period. (How futilely confused the moralists are here is well shown by the frequent unethical behaviour of children (excellently well portrayed in 'A High Wind in Jamaica'): a child's attitude to theft and violence is practically unrevivable by an adult, even if a thief or violent himself). In this sense we have the 'three planes of being' corresponding to to the 'three planes of heaven' in this life; and in this life they are just as absolutely separated as the 'three planes of heaven' are. (June 59)

473. The Middle way: Their tram-lines: on the right their Ivory Towers, the factories and Trust companies; on the left: their work-houses, cancer hospitals, undertakers, their prisons and lunatic asylums. (June 59)

474. Dante, in exile in Verona, lamented his having always to 'climb other people's stairs'. But I ask myself, where are the stairs that are not other people's? Where are the stairs that are mine which they cannot demand rent for or commandeer or confiscate if they please?

(June 59)

475. In the corridor: he saw a door bearing the words: 'Don't open me'. He opened it. A dull room inside with windows of frosted glass and another door on the far right bearing the words 'Don't open me'. He opened it. Another dull room with windows of frosted glass and a curtained looking-glass opposite the door on whose curtains were printed the words 'Don't look in me'. He drew the curtains and looked, and he saw the same dull room reflected, with another door half-right behind him bearing the reversed words 'Don't open me'. He opened it and found himself back in the first room. There another door on the left bore the words 'Don't open me'. He did so and was back in the corridor.

476. Up-to-Date Glossary

Beauty — the current style of hair-do and make-up.

Truth — What no one knows — does it matter? Perhaps what science is about to reveal to us after religion has had its day in doing so.

Goodness — = gracious (a gentle exclamation).

Philosophy — Solipsism ('What am I?' and all that: rather discreditable).

Psychology — Solalterism ('What you are' and all that: better than philosophy).

Psychoanalysis — Well, well! very deep and dirty.

Ethics — my right to decide what they shall do.

Politics — your right to oppose me.

Government — their obstruction of us.

Art — the normalization of the Enormous (e. g..... Empire-State Building, Tachisme, Auschwitz memorial, and what next?)

Duty — to be politically conscious.

Christianity — the opposite of Marxism.

Marxism — the opposite of Christianity.

The Middle Way — sitting on the fence.

477. The only difference between discovery and creation seems to be that discovery objectifies its object in the involuntary mode, while creation objectifies its object (the otherwise same object,) in the voluntary mode. Hence the reality of the discovered against the imaginary fictitiousness of the creation. However the created thing, once created, in so far as it takes on an involuntary aspect (what is done cannot be undone), itself becomes discovered as created and so it too gains a species of reality. (Then the 'false' can be discovered too, but that is perhaps another question) (July 59)

478. The absurdity of love is that it assumes the very separateness it is its nature to wish to unite. (July 59)

479. Positivism is the wall: Negativism is the locked Door in the Wall. (July 59)

480. Mostly a man is ashamed to tell all that he does, ashamed to do all that he thinks, ashamed (or unable) to think all that he is.

481. War: He who is not for me is against me.
Peace: He who is not against me is for me.
(The only difference is in the arrangement of words.)
(July 59)

482. Ordinary knowledge, which emerges against ignorance, cannot act because it cannot by its very nature know the acts' desired result (which lies in the uncertain and only probable future). In order to act, therefore, faith is necessary, which supplements the deficiency of knowledge here. Such knowledge knows with certainty the pure opacity of its object which absolutely walls it in, and behind which wall is the province of ignorance. Faith is confident about penetrating the wall by action, whose result, during and before the action, cannot be known. This kind of knowledge is thus a making opaque of the grounds or material for the action without which no act can be begun, while faith 'sees' through this (to knowledge) absolute opacity to the result. Faith is thus a clarifying in its own field. When the act is completed it is then known to knowledge as the 'completed—act—with—its—result' (or as a failure), but then it is made opaque and faith has withdrawn from cooperative knowledge. Faith and knowledge cooperate in an act to overcome ignorance, which is restored when the act is known to be completed.

For faith to act it must not be known to be doing so (reflexion); for such knowledge inhibits faith (the centipede who fell into the ditch when she reviewed her legs' function while walking). If faith is forced up

into knowledge's field either it dies or it becomes 'mauvaise foi' of the kind Sartre describes. (July 59)

483. Knowledge emerges from ignorance as its 'opposite', faith needs and uses ignorance for its medium, since it is essentially the aid for knowledge beyond its own field.

The three have a triangular relationship in an act (with no true opposite for any of the three).

In the ordinary sense knowledge is certain that what is is and that no action is possible. Faith is certain that no result is impossible. Ignorance is not certain how the action is being done, which changes what is known to be into what it is not.

484. One's thoughts are like nothing so much than an uncorrected text full of mistakes. (July 59)

485. People seem to approach religion for one of two main reasons or for both mixed together: They are moved either by a wish to discover truth (leaving that vague word vague here) or by a need to find justification for a predilection. Of the first, an outstanding example is, perhaps Kierkegaard. The second is far the more common. In myself I find elements of both. Perhaps the two merge with the incompatibility of two lines that meet at right-angles, and from the meeting-point some set out in one direction and some in the other. (July 59)

486. Discord is the monotone. But there are so many monotonies. (July 59)

487. It is only death that lives for ever: and the life-everlasting is death.

It is only life that dies for ever: and the death-everlasting is life.

The lifeless has died for ever. The deathless has lived for ever. (July 59)

488. ACTION

The 'actional' attitude has two complementary modes: (1) The voluntary ('active') ('exercise of will', 'free will', control, doing, etc.), and (2) the unvoluntary ('passive') ('limitation of will', 'out-of-control', 'inaction', etc.). These two modes are constantly interlocking and alternating in the process of existence-as-becoming. The **Result of an Action** comes under (2). (1) looks to (2): that is, any act is done with respect to its expected result, without which is no act at all. This means what is called an ACT is, in fact, an experienced transition from the voluntary (active) state of (1) to the unvoluntary (passive) state of (2), E. g., the active, voluntary igniting of a fire-work is an example of (1), while the passive, involuntary, nose-tickling firework's independent buzzing (or the ensuing sneeze), is an example of (2). This whole ACT, as an 'experience of a transition' from the one type of constitutive cognizance to the other, opposite, type - on the voluntary-involuntary dimension — involves the manifestation of faith-ignorance already discussed: faith that the result will ensue as expected, and ignorance in the actual experience of the act-as-transition). For simplicity's sake the examples cited are those of the relation conscious-body / inanimate-thing; but the relation of the Act/result between two conscious-bodies ('persons') is not essentially different in its basic structure — as I/not-I, — from the first-mentioned: then I am this result: what I am is out of my control. More

briefly, these two are respectively expressed by the words 'I' and 'me' — 'I' voluntarily make 'me' the involuntary result, 'me' being the reflection I see in the not-I.

(July 59)

489. Idiosyncrasy — or the individual idiot's singular craziness. (Aug. 59)

490. Two kinds of people: Those who, when a new idea is placed before them immediately assess it in terms of good and evil, and if received as good, they refuse to consider its impossibility, but, if received as evil, they refuse to countenance its possibility; and those who assess it in terms of possibility or impossibility, and if received as impossible, refuse to consider whether it is good, but if received as possible, then for them its possibility is more interesting than its evil — Ethics and Science.

(Aug 59)

491. Any description is always a reduction in dimensions or a projection onto another dimension (or set of dimensions). (Aug. 59)

492. Let us unite for, not against, lest, by uniting against, we affirm and consolidate what we unite against, and lest, if what we have united against is no more, we do not know how to disembarrass ourselves of our againstness and so turn against each other. (Aug. 59)

493. Being, being universal, cannot be defined except in terms of itself, which is no proper definition. But split, say, into positive and negative, it can speciously be defined as the one in terms of the other: that is ontology. So with consciousness only in asymmetrical .... (?)

(Aug. 59)

493. The imposition and perfection of order kills slowly. The introduction of complete disorder kills violently. Perfection of order is death by old age; interruption by chaos is death by violence. The breath(?) of life needs both order and disorder. (Aug. 59)

494. If all men are equal in the modern world, what place have teachers in it? (Aug. 59)

495. Words distort thinking, thoughts distort perceiving, percepts distort acting, acts distort being, [beings distort naught, that I may be the acting of the perceiving of the thinking of the wording of the question 'who?'.]

[ ] *added in pencil* (Aug. 59)

496. To do is to act. He who acts is an actor. An actor is essentially one who acts a part that he is not. But is not this the characteristic of all action? Is there not an aspect of falsity and ignorance, when evaluated in terms of being and knowledge, in the very nature of any act, of action itself (if action can indeed be said 'to have, be or "do", a self')? Curious, too, that to "do" someone is to cheat him. (Aug. 59)

497. TRAGEDY

A man had to go and live on a lonely moor near a deep bog, in summer full of flowers. He was not married then. He had two friends. One came to visit him. As he walked with him on the rocks beside the bog, the friend decided to gather flowers. The man warned him not to step on the bog. He laughed and was going to step out on it: 'Why, it is good firm turf!' he said. The man knocked his friend down, just in time to prevent him. The friend took such a great offence that he went straight away and avoided the man

ever after. The man was sorry in a way. Soon his other friend came. The same thing happened, but this time the man decided it was perhaps better not to offend the friend than to save him. So when the friend stepped out from the rocks onto the bog, he said nothing and did nothing. The friend sank and was drowned. The man was sorry in a way. Now he had no friend. Soon they came and filled in the bog and built a town all over it and they turned the moor into a mine. The man got bored and died, but only after a long time, at a great age, after doing a lot of work. (Aug. 59)

499. It is reckoned a good thing to be able to 'rise to an occasion' adequately, and the greatest men are those able to rise adequately to the greatest occasions. But there is one occasion to which none is able to rise, and that is another's death. The nearer and more important the death, the greater and more disturbing the inadequacy. Inadequacy is in the highest degree a painful state. Hence the flight into the conventional group-behaviour of funeral rites, chief mourners, wakes, and all the rest. If the Forgetting-Mechanism is in good order, it removes the inadequacy. (Aug. 59)

500. The axiom assuming that the difficult must be explained in terms of the easier, is legitimate, centripetal, regressive and mean. Why not explain the easy by progressive stages in terms of the more difficult, if we are to broaden our minds? (Aug. 59)

501. It seems to have been one of the regular comforts of Church Philosophers to believe that what cannot be thought can be said. (Aug. 59)

502. Though it is possible to define fog perfectly

clearly, such a definition will not aid one to find one's way about in the fog. (Sept. 59)

503. The knife, by its being kept sharp is sharpened away. (Sept. 59)

504. The dialectic of existence as the war of having to take sides. To sponsor affirmation of the world (like Nietzsche or Schweitzer in their very different ways) leads to championing that side, leads to suicide, which is conquest and enslavement by the opposite. Then the whole process can be worked out on the opposite side by denial and satanism (Byron, etc.) when the counterpart suicide-as-conquest-and-enslavement by the opposite takes place. The average man crowds the middle areas, but his ideals all point to taking sides: when the pressure is put on he takes sides for all his pacific arguments.

Suicide here is self-sacrifice to the acknowledged master as the necessary consequence of achieving mastery in affirmation or in negation. To be the complete master of affirmation is to sacrifice oneself wholly to negation and into its slavery, and then the suicide-death is simply a switch of the fundamental being to the opposite, with the switch from mastery to slavery... (Sept. 59)

505. The 'sense of evil' — in addition to 'fear of pain' — seems to arise as a consequence of an involuntary attribution of animateness to the inanimate or to the unseen. 'Evil' is thus inherent in the three Semitic religions and in Hindu philosophy (wherever animist). In Buddhism it falls away and leaves the basic experiences of pain and fear of pain, as they are and as they arise and cease. — The pictures of Max Ernst, in so far as

they suggest animateness of the inanimate (which they undoubtedly do very strongly) stimulate the 'sense of evil' very strongly. 'Evil' arises from the conception of a 'will' alien to my own (other human wills, however hostile, are not thus alien, since they are human: God is always accompanied by the Devil). (Sept. 59)

506. It is the nature of consciousness to look back and forward, when it arises, in time. But that proves nothing as to whether anything did happen or will happen. The a priori is a conascent perspective. (Sept. 59)

507. Suppose we say that existence is life-and-death and that every time we use the word 'to be' and its derivatives we are being metaphysical? (Sept. 59)

508. The honest man is describable only in terms of dishonesty. For his honest quality he possesses in the form of his acts. And acts are alterations made. But he is not his acts: he is not what he possesses: he is not honest or he is his acts: but then by acting he is a changing, and so cannot remain honest, or in other terms: he is what he is not, if he is what he has.

(Sept. 59)

509. Singularity is the identity of two; duplicity is the non-identity of one. Identity = ignorance of duplicity, duplicity = ignorance of identity. Need assumes the identity of what it needs and the duplicity of what it does not need (needs to reject). (Sept. 59)

510. In the "flow" of time the only constant is space. In the "extension" of space the only continuity is time. Time is inconstant, space is discontinuous. Time is constant in one place, space is continuous in one moment.

511. There are two ways of attempting to deal with the appalling difficulties of choice on the higher ethical levels (Truth/beauty/goodness; family/country, war/peace, principles/persons...): (1) one can attempt to justify a one-sided choice, and this is what philosophies of value and religions attempt to do through reason and faith (feeling,) respectively. But this always founders or is never safe from foundering. (2) Or the dialectic can be squarely faced in the fact that no one-sided solution of it is ever justifiable by reason or by faith. And here enters the question not of acceptance or refusal, nor of affirmation or denial, but of letting-go. The letting-go, however, is limited, in life at least (and without taking death into account) by the boundary of ability to let go. (Sept. 59)

512. All action, regarded (mathematically) as a functiod of me, and I being a function of ignorance, action is a function of reflected ignorance. (Sept. 59)

513. Does the escapable-from-ness justify the prison?

514. Imperfection is the window through which the beauty appears in the world. Remove the imperfection, and no more beauty. (Sept. 59)

515. What he is is doing, what he does is having, what he has is being — the "circuit of ipseity". (Sept. 59)

516. In existence, goodness is no protection against ugliness, beauty none against falsity, truth none against evil. All three together do not avail against starvation and death. (Oct. 59)

517. Religious people are like people who gather in a doorway (a favourite Italian habit), lean against the door

jambs gossiping and block the passage — the passage leads to other doorways, which give onto other passages.

(Oct. 59)

518. PATTERN

The ultimate aim is aimlessness (the ultimate meaning is meaninglessness). Whether the vista of aims (or meanings) is bounded or infinite, it is the same. The dialectic of aim/no-aim (the affirmation-and-denial of meaning) swings from the idea of aim unaffirmed and undenied; it vanishes with liberation from the basic Idea (with cure of the disease of meaning). (Oct. 59)

519. Where Religion takes refuge by identifying the Absolute with either universal Being or Consciousness, the philosophies deriving from Hegel elevate Action to the highest level, identifying that with the Absolute as an (economic) Becoming through Hegel's of Being and Consciousness (object-subject).

But Consciousness, Being and Action are all both incompatible and co-present (hence the internecine quarrel). (Oct. 59)

520. Belief as an inflation of knowledge (currency, size of a balloon): the skin of a rubber balloon is known in the sense that it is (deflated) an evident phenomenon. Knowledge is essentially involuntary (I cannot, by mere willing, unknow what I know): the balloon-skin lies in my hand as an evident fact. If the balloon-skin is inflated with a suitable gas (hydrogen, say) it will float in suitable conditions. But the gas that makes it float (miraculously) is hidden from knowledge by the balloon-skin while it floats: it is there by faith. If I try to convert this faith into knowledge by letting out the gas for inspection, the floating

vanishes: the faith has died by being produced for inspection. The power of faith always lies in its voluntariness (as opposed to knowledge) being hidden: if exposed it is rendered powerless. Faith, in order to have absolute power, must be absolutely inaccessible to knowledge — and (here is the paradox), owing to the nature of knowledge, then faith is indistinguishable from knowledge. (Oct. 59)

521. So long as one assumes death as an absolute fact, one must have, as an assumed absolute value based on it, the decision either to kill or to be killed in the last extreme (and this includes attitudes to suicide and to 'natural death'). This alternative ultimately divides all people (who make that assumption about death) into two types. With a proper understanding of death, the decision (dialectic) must collapse on the laying bare of the assumption. Freud has remarked, that death is inconceivable to the Unconscious, a statement which, though open to the usual criticisms of F's mechanistic assumptions about consciousness, does point to a very important factual dialectic in assumptions about death. (Nov. 59)

522. An act is the action of an actor; an actor acts a part; in so far as an action is the acting of a part it is the action of one who is pretending (pre-tending) to be what he is not: an act completed is thus a pretence or fraud or betrayal waiting for justification by History, which has no end. (Nov. 59)

523. Absolute dictatorship as organization of dutie(s) without right(s): absolute democracy as agglomeration of right(s) without dutie(s); existing human societies float at different levels between, and they stand upon two feet: the claim of rights against duties, and the claim of

dutie(s) against right(s), and on these two feet they "march forward". (Nov. 59)

524. The world is absurd and has no meaning; but it is not that the world has no meaning; for it always has a meaning, cannot be divested of it, is haunted and eaten up by it — but no single ultimate meaning can ever be identified. This is the absurdity, when it is seen. (Nov. 59)

525. All old philosophies aim at one of the alternative absolutes of 'pure being' or 'pure consciousness'; they subject action to this end as the means. A consequence is that this ultimate goal is beyond this life, has to be so. It is in the 19th century only, in Europe, that, with Hegel, pure being and pure consciousness are fused and the way prepared for subordinating both to action. Marx does this fully and, going further than Hegel, who remains suspended in the abstract, identifies action with economics. This identification is dialectic. In Marxism, logically everything is fixed in the movement of Action, identified dialectically with economics, and past history is involved in the movement of change: for not only is it being built but what is already past and built is itself being changed by action. The Judgment of History is thus a changing one. The 'fading of the state' is the fading of History itself. Consciousness is dependent on action (n. b.) and being is action (also n. b.). (Nov. 59)

526. It is not memory but forgetting which is the positive function in maintaining existence. It is partial forgetting that conceals the contradictions and makes what is not forgotten, to be possible. (Nov. 59)

527. The fundamental existential choice (made by the individual in infancy) is the identification of I/me with a historical facticity, as this-unique-body-of-behaviour-which-I-am-becoming. That fundamental choice, as part of its necessary facticity, must have a particular perception associated with it (my body is thus, not otherwise), a particular affectivity (it is a pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent choice, whence 'I love life', 'I am even-minded' or 'I hate existence') and conative (in the sense that it is 'voluntary' or 'involuntary', i. e. passive and imposed). (Nov. 59)

528. In some ways a saint is no longer a saint as soon as he is recognized and proclaimed and worshipped. A saint is a saint in so far as his being influences the actions of others, without their reflexive awareness of the fact, towards the lessening of suffering. But as soon as he is proclaimed and worshipped then that state, in which his worshippers try to emulate (imitate) him impossibly by being his disciples (a disciple de facto cannot be or even imitate his master, whose being consists in not-being-a-disciple), then his influence is channelled away (in this respect worship is as dissipating as laughter) and (perhaps by some Hegelian 'passing over into the opposite') under the worship with love lurks the anti-worship with hate. The saint's name has become stale and provocative of suffering.

(Nov. 59)

529. **TEMPTATIONS**

1. The temptation to make something positive, no matter what, of religion in this or some future life.

2. The temptation to commit what I shall call the 'obverse of murder', i. e. suicide blamed on someone else or on some group or on society as a whole ('you do not want me so I shall let myself die and that will be your fault', and 'they will punish you or you will punish yourselves').

3. The temptation to deny and to cling to denial (denial of meaning in life, etc., etc.), which is the form of assertion opposed to affirmation.

530. The evidence that constitutes the proof is connected by a leap to the truth that it is believed to prove. (Dec. 59)

531. **Being/consciousness/action.**— It is only in terms of action that being can be critically assessed and only in terms of being that action can be critically assessed. To act, like all verbs, has its substantative-essence-action. Being, like most substantives in fact and like all in potentiality, has its verb — to be. Consciousness (as knowledge or ignorance, n. b.) is no standpoint but is what has—or gives—a standpoint. It cannot of itself provide terms for critical assessment of anything since it simply knows (or ignores) - is knowledge (or is ignorance). Since all phenomena are what consciousness is not, it is in terms of phenomena purely negative. But phenomena have two incompatible and coexistent dimensions, namely being can be critically assessed in terms of phenomena that act, and vice versa. (Dec. 59)

532. Being as action is changed identity; action as being is, identification. To be is to identify. To act is to change identity. (Dec. 59)

533. The greatest possible joke would be the fact that the greatest joke of all was not a joke at all. The supremeness of the joke would lie in its being found to be no joke. (Dec. 59)

534. The ultimate meaning of meaning, to repeat, must be meaninglessness, and the ultimate aim aimlessness, the ultimate end endlessness. For an aim that has an aim beyond it is, in regard to that ulterior aim, not an aim but either a means or an obstruction. Therefore to look to an ultimate aim, however conceived, is to look to a state of aimlessness and to live according to aimlessness as supreme value. Those, on the contrary, who do not admit this must live without supreme aim, and doing so either in absolute aimlessness without any aim at all or with only a succession of relative aims assumed and then attained and replaced by another: or found unattainable and forgotten and replaced by another: and so on without foreseeable end (aim or meaning) in the ultimate sense. In any case, however stated in terms of meaning or end or aim, any situation that implies meaning (or end or aim) must ultimately resolve into or point to absolute meaninglessness, endlessness or aimlessness, for which eternity is a name. (This is very satisfactory and restful.) (Dec. 59)

535. A gate-crasher never really gets inside: he only brings his outsideness inside. An ivory-tower dweller never really gets outside: he only brings his insideness outside. (Dec. 59)

536. One can count forwards for ever because one knows where to begin with one (oneself?). But one can never start counting backwards because one never knows

(inherently) where to begin. Why does time go in only one way (time as repetition)? Is history anything more than mere arrangement by enumeration? (Dec. 59)

537. Matter: what, it is assumed, cannot contradict itself. Mind: what, it is found by experience, can contradict itself. (Dec. 59)

538. Other people: the innumerable outward vanishing-points in the perspective. 'I': the inner or central vanishing-point in the perspective. (Jan. 1st, 1960)

539. When silent all are in agreement. (Jan. 60)

540. Existence described as a system of null-functions activated into partial non-nullity by ignorance. (Jan. 60)

541. Anything whatever that is expressible is expressible in more than one way.

Any expression of it is one among a choice of ways of expressing it.

An expression of something is a verbal movement from here to there.

There is no one way from here to there.

(Jan. 60)

542. DIMENSIONS OF AMBIGUITY

1. The point = line from thy eye through the point to infinity.

2. The line (straight or curved) = plane (straight or curved) from thy eye to infinity (conics?).

3. The plane = space from thy eye to infinity.

4. Consciousness = all my time.

5. Nothing = I myself (all negative statements

have open ambiguity, all positive statements concealed ambiguity).

543. Any act assumes the role of an actor. The act interrogates the world. The result is the being satisfied with the world's assumed reply to the interrogation. (Feb. 60)

544. Being applies to all qualities and substances, both to their affirmation and to their negation. It is thus quite vain to attempt a definition of being. A definition must be made from outside what is defined: but outside being is....nothing. To the question "What is is?" the only possible reply would be "is is is", which does not define but merely states the ambiguity of identity. (Feb. 60)

545. All the questions asked about death are wrongly put. (Feb. 60)

546. People who generalize: those who generalize from a single instance, and those who generalize from a statistical collection of instances. (Feb. 60)

547. People who regard truth as something to be created and people who regard it as something to be discovered. (Feb. 60)

548. The world is a collection of part-truths which invite one's putting them together to form a whole. That is not difficult; but when it is done, always there are either some parts left over or some missing. (Feb. 60)

549. Suppose the following advertisement were published everywhere: "Science has now discovered how to avert death: by calling at the nearest hospital and receiving an injection you can be assured of living for ever.

barring accidents. Nothing else, however, is assured. Though science has not yet discovered how to control ageing it hopes to do so, given time". Would I call at the nearest hospital, I wonder? (Feb. 60)

550. I am myself = I am what I have.
I am what I did: I shall be what I do.
I am doing my work: I do exist my being.
I have to do to be: I have to be to do.
I am not what I do: I undo what I am.
(Feb. 60)

551. AMBIGUOUS KEY WORDS

Reason	<	the breadth of reasonableness the narrowness of rationalism	
'I'	<	'I' the unique subjective 'I' spoken by everyone else	} the "Ego"
is	/ \	existence entity essence	\ / < many one
truth	<	beauty - valuable evil that exists - to be destroyed	
Consciousness	<	observed subjectivity observing subjectivity	> < one many
all	<	all of these but not of those all of all without exception	
to exist	<	to be = to be static ~ death to become = to be dynamic = life	
positive	<	positive good positive evil	

and negative statements as:

I know nothing	<	have no knowledge I know what nothing is

552. **DIALECTICS or SAME THINGS AS:**

"Good"	"Bad"
patience	weakmindedness
tolerance	connivance
service	servitude, servility
independence	instability
freedom	chaos, crime
liberty	licence
popularization	vulgarization
law and order	slavery, rigidity
conversion	apostasy
rectitude	bigotry
sincerity	priggishness
unity	bondage, loneliness
virtue	constraint
justice	revengefulness, punishment
universal	insipid, colourless
grace	caprice
to sacrifice	to squander, to destroy, to betray
The Incomprehensible	the absurd
honour	conceit, arrogance, want of humility
equality	monotony (undiversity)
fraternity	nepotism
implacable	unreasónable
adaptability	opportunism, weather-cockery, turn-coatery
steadfastness	ideée fixe, rigidity
purification	impoverishment
enrichment	corruption

End of the Second Note Book

A D D E N D A

(From Note Books and loose leaves)

General

Notes on Philosophy

Notes on Dhamma

ADDENDA

General

553. I admit that a theist might well counter that "with God all things are possible", which clothes the nakedness of the Absurd with a seemly veil; but I should like to watch him actually undertaking to accept, without reserve, whatever is absurd as a proper object of faith as soon as presented simply because it is absurd — a square triangle, perhaps, and lots and lots of centaurs. But a further question arises: How does he choose the object as one of faith, how is he aware that it is really absurd at all, except by the action of understanding (knowledge), which he pretends he has castrated his mind of? More "mauvais for", I fear.

554. God, they say, made man in his own image: thus what a mine of information about the nature of god is the behaviour of man!

555. Why should I worry if threatened with a mortal disease? Have I not already within me the germs of that hereditary disease which no one can avoid or cure, namely, old age and death? (undated)

556. If I must live like an amateur, let me die like a professional. (1949)

557. Flour forms the basis of an enormous number of dishes — it is nasty when raw, and it is sensitive to skill in cookery. "Progress" is a sort of mental flour out of which people cook up a vast variety of food for thought. But it is just as easy to make a filthy, dyspeptic pudding out of the one as the other — and one has to admit that some of the cooks are awful. (April 52)

558. One thing modern science has done for Cupid is to give him new rubber wings. (April 52)

559. "These acts are right and those are wrong no matter who does them," and "whatever dear so and so does is right, whatever filthy so and so does is wrong" are two threads which we weave together into the ambivalent texture of our attitude towards, and judgement of, other people. (April 52)

560. If, in present conditions one man (and this is not inherently impossible) were to develop in himself the power to see what is going on on the surface of, say the planet Jupiter in the same scale of detail as normal men see what is going on on the earth round them, this would at present be unverifiable by all other men. This knowledge (experience) would only be accessible to the one man. In what would this differ from a hallucination for so long as it remained inaccessible to all other men? If he announced his knowledge would he not be called mad? And rightly so? (June 52)

561. The dynamic conception of beauty is in the transfiguration of the ordinary or the ugly. The static conception of beauty opposes beauty, per se and absolute, to the ordinary and the ugly. The first is unlasting, the second incomplete. (Aug. 57)

562. A saint who has achieved liberation would seem to be less free than an ordinary man, since an ordinary man can be sometimes saintly and sometimes not, whereas a saint is never allowed to be not saintly. (April 56)

563. One advantage in having no friends is that one cannot let one's friends down.

And those who live on the hard ground cannot let themselves down. (Jan. 53)

564. I have been unable to find

any one rule with universal application, that is "absolute" — there is always more than one unique rule:

anything that I can call a self (vide Hume);

any two pairs of exact opposites ('yes' is not the exact opposite of 'no').

565. — There is always some point from which any passion seems comical and is ironical.

— That is a hard saying.

— Then why not put it the other way round?

— Silence. (Sept. 57)

566. There are certain controversies which involve one in untruth, whichever side one adopts, such as the existence or non-existence of god. (Sept. 57)

567. An absolutely objective thought is as sterile as an absolutely hygienic copulation. (Sept. 57)

568. Truth as the Good and the Beautiful overlaps, but is not coextensive with and is incomplete in com-

parison with, truth as "acts and facts", which again are incomplete without the constituent negative mediant of consciousness as manifested in the individual that makes lies true. (Aug. 57)

569. The mistake (if that is a legitimate phrase) lies in attempting to remedy dialectical instability by logical rigidity. (Oct. 57)

570. The argument that God cannot have created the world because of the suffering, misery and ugliness in it (or some similar form) has always seemed to me as inconclusive for proof that there is no god as the opposite argument that 'God must have created the world because of the order, joy and beauty in it' (or some similar form) seemed for proof that there is a god. In either case it is presumed that one knows, can distinguish, what god ought to be. Both alike imply that the holders of each view will only believe in what they approve of, i. e. in what pleases them.

Now, surely, is it not that assumption, that growth or surcease in one's subjective self, that ought to be understood and faith in its subsidence cultivated? (Dec. 57)

571. If I did not ultimately disagree with everyone else, if I had absolutely no secret at all from anyone else, I should not be 'I' at all, not even someone or everyone else. (Dec. 57)

572. Is any historical fact worth remembering in itself so long as one remembers how to act? Surely, a man who remembers a fact but cannot remember either how to repeat or avoid it, is an object of pity. (Dec. 57)

(Addition:) If you can act, why remember the fact?

573. Most (and all the principal elements) of what I ever learned of vice (and that is not claimed to be much) was learned from the inventive condemnations of the indignant pious; what I learned from the vice-addicts was much detail but little generality in comparison; but I learned much virtue from some of them. (Jan. 57)

574. The Train of Thought can have both a restaurant car* and a sleeping car.

One's baggage is then one's conceits. They can be stolen or lost.

* viññāṇāhāra? (= Nutriment of Consciousness).

575. I must and can't
(what happens if I ain't?)

I ought and won't
(what happens if I don't?)

576. Two demons: one who insists that what is to be inferred by verbal processes must correspond to experience; and one who insists that what cannot be arrived at by verbal processes cannot correspond to experience. (July 53)

577. When we are children we are not quite deceived by the fairies with which our minds people empty places, or by the "let's pretend"; but when we are grown up we forget that we imagine many things and so we no longer know the truth about the things we imagine. (Nov. 53)

578. Odd how people interested in religion spend so much time trying to convert the obvious meaning of their texts that are their authority. (Nov. 53)

579. Mutual admiration societies, it seems to me, are quite admirable — so long as they indulge in private (as secret societies). It is when they make public exhibition of themselves that they invite the throwing of mud and stones. (Dec. 53)

580. The whore-shop of publicity. (Aug. 56)

581. People who live only in and for towns and spend all their time in socialities and business with no knowledge of or feeling for wild animals and trees and rocks and oceans, are no longer more than half human. (Aug. 56)

582. Transparency = sameness on different levels. (Aug. 56)

583. 'A place for everything, and everything in its place' say the devotees of tidiness — but they have turned thei backs to, and are haunted by, the counterpart 'No plac for confusion, and confusion out of its place'. (April 58

Notes on Philosophy

584. One must start in analysis with any comple situation or datum that, if anything, is basic. To wor away from this by analysis or simplification or abstractio is not to arrive at the more fundamental or true, bu only, perhaps, to sort out the relatively more general fro the the relatively more particular, as a means to find ne complex experiential situations. What is fundamental i this view is complexity. (1954

585. (Indiscriminate) generality implies distinction Distinction implies perceiving. Perceiving implies name

percept. Named-percept implies variety of fields. Variety of fields implies awareness (Ogden-Richard's with reference to named perception); awareness implies affectivity; affectivity implies conation; conation implies habits (unconscious, inherent tendencies, reflexes, etc.); habits imply being-and-action; being-and-action implies production (creation); creation implies decay and vanishing: (with all the emotional bother involved).

Nothing is unless it is originated by other things and with other things.

Feed-back operates.

586. Transcendence (in being) = ignorance = infinity. (Sept. 57)

587. If a and b are considered in rotation(?) as the related qualitatively-differing elements, then a can only change (be seen to change) against b's fixity, and vice versa. The fixity/change relationship is on principle reversible, but only by a step. When a third element, c, (or more), is brought in the dual motion (change) of a and b against (...), c's fixity can be experienced. a, b, c, etc., can be equated thus, say, a: affectivity (pleasure/pain), b: rationality (assertion/denial); and then, perhaps, c, etc., as action/inaction, etc. One (though which is indeterminate), or one set, must, however, be fixed for change to be experienced (either may be overlaid by ignorance which then gives the experience of 'absolute motion', 'absolute fixity', etc.). (Sept. 57)

588. A: The Quantum Theory has, by external application, led to the splitting of the physical atom—in other words to external concentration of energy. By an internal (application), why should it not lead to a splitting of the personal

atom (my self) — in other words to internal concentration of energy?

B: There now! (Sept. 57)

589. Is forms the basis of the syllogism: and so cannot be analyzed by logic.

Is forms the basis of any description: and so cannot be described.

For, to describe, I must stand outside the described: but being is universal and covers the positive and negative as well.

If I ask: What is this? An answer would be: a sheet of paper. If I ask: what is a sheet of paper? One of many answers (giving some quality or other) might be: it is white (and so one might go on for ever).

But here comes the important point: I can equally well say: the paper has whiteness. So, I might say, too, it seems: The paper has being (making being a category). But common sense will not agree that anything is what it has. Consequently, if this paper has being, it is not. But that would be nonsense — at least to common sense.

590. Practically all that has been said about being is worthless. Its structure is that of positive and negative and requires the presence of consciousness for its structure.

Nirodha as vanishing of being/not-being (see atthitā/natthitā).

The voluminousness of Sartre is needed to undo the tangle of European ontology. (June 58)

591. The 'is' of logic is perfectly valid where being (and non-being) prevails. But the question raises itself:

does being (whether considered as a category and in both its positive and negative forms) exhaust every possibility without remainder? In other words, does cessation necessarily fall always under one or the other subordinately? This can only be established verbally by logic but it can be established in both ways — yes and no; and the dialectic cannot be solved. Consequently we can never say for certain that cessation is subordinate to being.

592. In contrast with the extreme subtlety and fluidity of consciousness and being, language is angular and bitty. To try to represent this with word patterns is like trying to draw the structure of an atom on the back of a postage stamp with a carpenter's pencil, or like trying to construct a circle with a dozen dominoes.

593. If you believe, you act in confidence and faith believing that what you believe is true. But if you know that you believe, you know ipso facto that you do not know. What happens then if you have no belief? The question has no meaning for to be conscious is to believe. Technically it is a "visualized" expectation of the direction of the actual "motion" which "is" consciousness. The belief expects the direction will be such: knowledge records it as memory that it was such: in between is the denial, the motion of view point that is called consciousness.

594. Starting from Consciousness (being without nouns of doing)

Without consciousness it is impossible to conceive at all: to conceive anything or nothing. Inevitably with the appearance of consciousness (in its widest sense) being/existence is, and is simultaneously (because of consciousness' presence), e.g. as existence/non-existence and as

existence/essence. This doubt can be taken as (in Freudian terms) the "conscious manifestation" of the "unconscious" conception of a thing's existence/being, which is then "consciously" either denied or asserted. Denied or asserted dialectically, the denial or assertion is then supported logically. The logical structure, if completed, leaves no room for consciousness whose dialectical decision supports it.

Starting from being/existence (doing without verb 'to be')

Without being/existence consciousness cannot be, or not be, or both be and not be, or neither be nor not be. ("Being" essentially belongs to the (Freudian) unconscious where what is, is so without denial or assertion, without distinction of positive/negative. This must never be lost sight of though the Freudian hypothesis remains only a hypothesis). Consciousness therefore does/does not. The propositions "consciousness exists (is)" or the converse, have no meaning, and are each as self-contradictory as the propositions "being cognizes/does not cognize".

595. What I am (what I identify my self—myself—with) that I am for ever. But at another time I am similarly something else. There is no conscious transition. Moments of reflexion discover this contradiction, which is disconcerting and so covered up by forgetting it. I am this body when I leap back to avoid treading on a deadly venomous snake or when I am (or have the sensation of being) discovered by another in some discreditable act. I own this body of mine when I examine a pimple on it or take it to a dentist or a doctor for treatment. I disown it (i.e. its acts) when I am accused of some crime and

decide to lie it out. I am not it when sitting quiet face to face with what seems certain death. (Aug. 57)

596. As far as descriptions (and so philosophies) are concerned, it seems as if a System is ipso facto false, and that some sort of "complimentarity" (in the atom-physicists's sense) is nearer truth as fact. (Aug. 57)

597. Above the plane of facts all that Science has done, is to screen phenomenological certainty by a cloud of statistical and historical probability. (Aug. 57)

598. Taking, in the phenomenological sense, probability as the characteristic of the purely objective constituent of the world (the world of science) and certainty as that of subjectivity (the Cogito, etc.), then outwarad change will be change in my probabilities (alteration) and inward change will be change in my certainties (forgetting, which is, in its extreme sense, death, a change in my being). (Sept. 57)

599.
Motion

I cannot discover any simple fact that corresponds to the word "motion". First to take the facts objectively. Suppose (on paper) that A and B are approaching each other in a straight line with a constant speed. Then there is relative approach-speed without angular velocity as the AB relation. The situation is inherently unstable because, assuming that the distance between them is finite, A and B must meet and the instant after their meeting (there is something contradictory about two points "meeting") their approach speed must be transformed into recession speed.

Suppose again that C is on a line at right angles to AB and not too far from B. Then A and C are approaching each other with a speed that is gradually reducing with increasing deceleration. The speed is combined with angular velocity which is gradually increasing in the ratio of a variable function proportionate to the decrease of the speed of approach. When A reaches B, then A and C have no relative speed and maximum angular velocity, after which the speed increases and the angular velocity decreases. This is the description in objective terms. Such a description conceals the assumption of a describer (I) who is observing these happenings on (let us say) the inner surface of a large sphere at whose centre he stands. For him the happenings are all experienced in terms of angular velocity only. He can "identify himself" with any of the three, A, B, or C.

Still at this point we can say that the word "motion" has no simple referent but is referred to (a) speed of approach or recession without angular velocity, (b) angular velocity without speed of approach or recession, and (c) a proportionate mixture of the two.

It is only the description in terms of subjective experience that makes this difference quite clear. My experience of the direct approach of a body and me is absence of angular velocity at some point of the visual-object body that otherwise "grows" (? Ed.) in a specifically proportionate manner. Such an experience is inherently unstable. Either angular velocity must be introduced into all parts of the object, or a "collision" will take place, which will either break up the flow of experience or transform the approach speed into recession speed. The last is also inherently unstable because it must

end in "vanishing". This corresponds to the AB relation above where "I" = B.

1. I experience a visual pattern, which grows in a certain constant proportion (expands), and some point in that expanding pattern has no angular velocity, then this "I" call "approach". If that continues unchanged there must be a "collision" followed by a break-up of that train of experience, or a reversal of it ending in "vanishing".

In the "objective" description we spoke of the decreasing approach speed mixed with angular velocity as the AC relation. But in the "subjective" description, if "I" am identified with C then my experience of A will be that of an expanding pattern no part of which is without angular velocity. There will be no "collision". A moment of maximum angular velocity will coincide with a moment of no-expansion — no-contraction, followed by a train of diminishing traction and diminishing angular velocity, ending also in "vanishing".

2. I experience a visual pattern, which expands in a constant proportion, and all points in that expanding pattern have angular velocity relative to me. This "I" call "motion". Or I experience a visual pattern which remains constant in size, and all points in which have angular velocity. This too "I" call "motion".

But here something curious has happened. The objective "speed of approach" AB has been replaced by the subjective experienced proportional expansion of a pattern that contains a point without angular velocity. (To take it one step further, the objective angular velocity is replaced by what I shall call angular kinaesthesis, to distinguish it from accelerant kinaesthesis = "I am moving" — but this may be left for the moment). While the objective speed of approach AC has been replaced by

a subjectively experienced expansion of a pattern containing no point without angular velocity. Instead of the two components of objectivized "motion", approach-speed and objective angular velocity, we have only (*a*) partial ordered angular velocity (expansion excluding one point) and (*b*) total ordered angular velocity, of a given pattern. There are in fact here not two different components but only one (expansion = ordered angular velocity differently organized). Now we said that the "objective" description concealed an assumed observer not in the special plane ABC of the happenings described. Similarly the "subjective" description conceals an assumed observer later in time than the "I" of the "experience" described. The second is therefore correctly, an objectivized subjective description. It is perhaps nearer to completeness but it is not complete because the "later I" has escaped through a hole in it and continues to do so.

(From the second Note book: July 54)

600.

The function of

Physics	is to produce and collate data on behaviour of inanimate 'matter'	
Biology	is to produce and collate data on behaviour of animate 'matter'	
Psychology	is to produce and collate data on behaviour of mind	
Logic	is to produce and collate data on rules for coherent speech	
Philosophy	is to produce and collate data on values to guide choice:	(includes or should include ethics and training directed towards the good of this world, by considering birth and death)

Religion is to produce and collate data values to guide choice:

(includes or should include ethics and training directed towards the good of 'not-this-world' by considering the 'before-birth-and-after-death').

• • •

The following two items are from a sheaf of loose leaves labelled ONTOLOGY, containing chiefly definitions and analysis of words and terms, extracts from books, etc. They were probably meant as material for essays planned by the author under the title BUDDHISM AND ONTOLOGY, on which see the end of the next section "Notes on Dhamma".

601. Ontology cannot be discussed without the use of words. So something will have to be said with words about words. But so much has already been done in this way that there seems to be no end to it all. The whole subject seems to have long since got quite out of hand. Nevertheless something can still be done by confining oneself to certain aspects of the use of words, say to their inherent ambiguity, and to their field of reference, in general.

A word refers both to the speaker and the hearer, to something other than it. What they refer to may be either other words or what is not words. In the first case, words can refer to words which refer to words and so on indefinitely. Some have claimed this and no more

is what words do and that even the logical proper name ('this') simply refers to some word or proposition. Words are then a closed world, which there is no getting into and no getting out of.

602. Difficulties on ontology—

The difficulties arising from a badly chosen notation are well known in Mathematics (i.e. Newton's and Leibnitz's notations for the calculus). Language is notoriously ambiguous (vide Freud), metaphorical, utraquistic, punning and vague.

2. Any definition is always ad hoc, never of universal validity (see Wunter)

3. It is in the nature of description that the terms of the description are parallel to what is described (the illumination of the unknown by the known), and that nothing can be described successfully in terms of itself, not even in terms that include itself (this touches on the Theory of Types). But Being is posited as universal. Consequently it is indescribable and can only be pointed to in one of its instances by a demonstrative: a logical proper name = "that". Being therefore is indicatable, but not describable as "whatever is common to a 'that' or 'this'". It is then being opposed to the being of non-being. In its general aspect, it is being, but in particular aspect it is the existence (of a being).

603. Dhamma has no conflict with Science proper. Its methods are much the same (i. e. investigation of experience, remembering what has been investigated and forming a true view to accord with the factuality of experience investigated); but the material is different. Reputable science (Physics) confines itself to the outside world and all science restricts itself (or should do) to publicly observable behaviour. Dhamma is concerned with investigating subjective mind, recognizing the outside material sphere, but leaving it to those who are interested in it. The purposes are different. Science is or should be guided by curiosity only and has no ethics; any ethics it employs are unfounded in it or borrowed from religions or philosophies which it rejects. It has no techniques for handling the subjective (pain, etc.) and can only handle behaviour illegitimately equated with pain (illegitimately because a scientist only knows of the existence of pain (in himself) by taking an unauthorized look into his own subjective unscientific experience). Dhamma is concerned solely with the elimination of pain, to which all else is subordinated. (Sept. 56)

604. Amata in the Dhamma is 'absence of death because of non-arising' (all that arises is subject to decay and death). It is not the non-dying, i. e. eternal duration of what has arisen (= western idea of immortality).

605. *Sankhāras* have the characteristic as action of putting (states) together (into an order) or as state of a collection of states put together in an order.

The first listed of the Sankhāras is touching, which implies that the order, whether (1) in succession of time (action) or (2) simultaneous arrangement (state) is that the states must touch (1) either by temporal succession or (2) simultaneous co-presence.

Touching is an aspect of every consciousness (tiṇṇaṁ saṅgati phasso).

606. Group kamma

What is a group? Racial, regional, linguistic, geographical, political, occupational, etc., etc.? These cut across each other and to say that each has its own kamma is like saying that the torso, the arms, the lungs, the guts, the head, the nose etc., each has its own kamma which is nonsense.

Also kamma implies (a) "continuity" in one life and (b) "continuous continuity", i. e. succession of lives — not the inheritance by one continuity of the result of kamma performed by another continuity (i. e. Jātaka) etc. This view is hammered at by the commentaries but is merely implied by the suttas — should it be taken as an exclusive generalization or as "the normal thing" only?

No "kamma" as such in the Abhidhamma bar "kamma-paccaya".

607. Nutriment is nothing more than a term for material used in creating. Also it is the process of impermanence regarded teleologically. The process not so regarded is either entropy or bare change. It is axiomatic that where there is consciousness there must be

change ordered teleologically, which is the parent of nutrition. Nutrition therefore is primarily an essential to life and living bodies, secondarily to creation of works of art or to utensils, and tertiarily to thought processes (?). It is conversion, in the sense of conversion to a use.

608. The concept of nutriment depends (a) upon association and (b) upon impermanence and (c) upon hunger. Hunger, seeking for satisfaction, devours x, which is associated with y that gives it satisfaction; but the satisfaction given is impermanent and thereby renews the hunger. "I" hungering for satisfaction, devour (x) food (eye object, taste, smell, touch object), the contact of which is associated with (y) pleasant feeling that gives satisfaction; but the satisfaction given by pleasant feeling is impermanent and by changing renews the pain of hunger.

609. For *nāma-rūpa*, mentality-materiality, too, is a makeshift and 'name-and-form' in some ways preferable. 'Name' (see Path of Purification; ch. XVIII, n. 4) still suggests the function of *nāma* as 'naming'; and 'form' for the *rūpa* of the *rūpakkhandha* ('materaility-aggregate') can preserve the link with that of the *rūpāyatana* (there 'visible-form base' instead of 'visible-object base'). Especially 'materiality' (or 'matter'), too, as used in this translation needs to be treated to start with rather as an algebraical sign till contexts and definitions make it evident that any metaphysical Matter as a 'substance behind apparent forms' is quite excluded. For instance, Matter is taken to be an inherently unknowable substance only inferable by modern science from the appearance of its qualities. But an inherently unknowable and unverifiable objective substance has no more place in Buddhism than its subjective counterpart ......

610. The concept Materiality is based on three elements (mahābhūta; no-upādā, Dhs 647) comprising the object touchable by the bodily sensitivity (phoṭṭhabba), which elements are the three primary data categorical of hardness, temperature and distention-cum-movement (see Dhs 663). That primitive matter is reinforced (upāda) by all the subordinate data-categories furnished by the primitive objects of the other 4 sensitivities (visible form, sound, smell, taste) and the five internal 'material' sense bases. These make up the crude 5 - sense object. This is again reinforced (upāda) by the secondary data supplied only by the mind's object (the five internal and the four external bases), (?) sex, life, intimation, space, (water — cohesion), material lightness, wieldiness, malleability, material setting up, continuity, ageing, impermanence, and physical nutriment.

611. Sati—sampajañña ("Mindfulness and clear comprehension") should be examined carefully from the point of view of the centipede who could not walk when she thought about how she moved her limbs. And also from the point of view of absorption in, say artistic creation and detached observation of it. Absorption in piano playing or painting seems to be "successful" but detached observation or enjoyment of "my playing" or "my painting" seems to have the centipede effect. What are the facts here and what is the lesson to be drawn?

612. Sketch for a system of description of the saḷāyatana (the six sense bases).

My eye (1) ajjhattaṁ (a) subjective (negative): the organization of visibility, (b) objective (positive); (2) by hearing: nil, (3-4) by smelling and tasting: nil,

(5) by body: the 'eye ball' as touch, say by a finger; (6) by mind: various concepts.

613. *Saḷāyatana*

(1) *ajjhāttikāyatana* = the organization of experience.
(the internal sense-bases, i.e. sense organs.)

(2) *bahiddhāyatana* = the experience as organized.
(the external sense-bases, i.e. the sense objects)

Experience as a cleavage between organization and the organized (which are inseparable but distinguishable).

(1) is distinct from (2) in that (with ignorance) the organization appears "pointing" to a "centre" which is the "I", while (2) has the character of the inert, the resistant, what hides or screens (and so suggests "substance" behind it).

The cleavage is the necessary basis for Phassa (the "contact between" the two sides of the cleavage and between them and the "negation" constituted by consciousness (viññāṇa).

614. Presumably the Unconscious (or Subconscious), if assimilated to the Dhamma, should be assimilated under *nāma* and not under viññāṇa. Unless the U. is defined as materiality (which is, I think, not usual) it must be regarded as mental: a mental fiction needed to explain certain behaviour patterns. As described it consists of memories repressed beyond the horizon of consciousness but still active. Therefore it is ipso facto

not consciousness. The behaviour explained by it is *nāmarūpa*. As memory (sati), it is a *sankhāra*. As repressed it is a fiction (even if useful and productive of practical results) it still remains under sankhāra as a complex associated with ignorance.

Identification of the U. with *bhavanga citta* is, on this assumption, if not wrong, at least in need of elucidation, on the lines that in the Abhidhamma *citta*, strictly, is not on all fours with viññāṇa, the latter being bare awareness (with a minimum of memory) but the former being viññāṇa regarded in the affective light of its concomitant *cetasikas*.

Citta affected by the unconscious (memories) can be regarded as (a) a *cittuppāda* with the repressed object as its object and with a minimum of memory, followed by (b) another *cittuppāda* with a black — out of that memory; (a) is then regardable perhaps as a *bhavanga citta* and (b) as some other appropriate kind of manoviññāṇadhātu.

615. The following verbal pattern will reflect something of this sort:

If we take individualization (uppâda)[1] as the characteristics of being (bhava) displayed in the formula of Dependent Origination (paṭiccasamuppâda), then in the counter formula (paṭicca-nirodha) we have absence of structure (nirodha), such structure (rodha) appearing in the form of construction (anurodha), obstruction (paṭivirodha), and destruction (virodha).

616. In the Round (i.e. Paṭicca-samuppâda) as arising, ignorance must function, on the pre-logical level as forgetting and as infinite transcendence, and on the

1. literally: arising

logical level as forgetting and the presence of the Assumption (i.e., the impersonal God/Godlessness or the personal Absolutism/Relativism).

In the pre-logical, ignorance is omnipresent, i.e. as transcendence and as change (= forgetting); but in the logical, it can be pushed aside partly, because the possibility of right view appearing partially and intellectually and patchily, though what the realization of cessation of craving is, is a cataclysm.

617. Suffering is made to cease by the cessation of its paccaya (taṇhā);[1] but that is not said of the paccaya (taṇhā), or else the regression would be infinite. Consequently this particular paccaya is controllable. In other words, dukkha is a structure or a function (dependent variable) of taṇhā.

618. **Feeling** as the ruins of past actions, and **Craving** as the jungle that overgrows them—clear the jungle and the 3 feelings will become clearer.

619. **Feeling** (*vedanā*)

(1) Bodily and mental feeling do not by any means always coincide. Painful bodily feeling may be accompanied by pleasant mental feeling (as in masochism). And each has a number of levels.

(2) One's fundamental choice (investigate this further) is that of least affliction. This is the overall choice. This overall choice comprises many different levels of pleasure and pain and neutrality both bodily and mental.

620. *Idappaccayatā*[2] is represented by 'imasmiṅ sati'[3] etc. The principle invoved is contingent association in two

1. – condition (craving) 2. – conditionality 3. "if this is......"

forms: (I) that no 'this' can arise alone without conditions, (II) this contingency is both temporal and special. By the latter is meant that any 'this' to appear at all (whether as a principle (dhātu), idea (dhamma), thing (sankhāra) or act (kamma) must do so in association with conditions different from itself spacially, and differeet from itself in time (the preceding moment and subsequent moment.) (A) The 'spacial' contingency is a contingency upon other things and ideas at one moment. (B) The temporal contingency is a contingency of the 'present' moment upon (an immediate) past and (an immediate) future.

(A) (With consciousness) nāmarūpa, saḷāyatana, phassa constitute the spacial contingency (vedanā the affective aspect).

(B) Ignorance and craving/clinging constitute (with consciousness) the purely temporal contingency. They are influenceable by will. Consciousness is the absolute negation in virtue of which ignorance and craving can pose the positive 'world'.

Bhava which is positive, describes the constitution of the moving spacio-temporal contingnncy which is (a) possible in virtue of the negation consisting in consciousness, and is (b) factual in virtue of the limitations of viewing things imposed by ignorance, and limitations of time/action imposed by craving/clinging.

(Pencilled note at the end of page:)

621. Craving (Taṇhā): Subjective aspect (2nd Truth); my craving as felt

Fuel (Upādāna): Objective aspect (1st Truth); (a mode of craving's behaviour) my or others as seen objectively in the form of a mode (i.e.. the four kinds).

622. I find I am now inclined to use, for myself only, the following equivalents for Paṭiccasamuppāda terms (in addition to those mentioned earlier):

5. *saḷāyatana* = the sixfold facticity (of self in the world).
6. *phassa* = presence
7. *taṇhā* = need
8. *upādāna* = consumption (on physical level) and assumption (mental and other levels). To assume (adsumere) is "to take upon oneself".

Also *uppāda* = arising (appearance, phenomenality)
anurodha = construction (favouring modes in *uppāda*).

paṭivirodha = obstruction (opposing)

nirodha = destruct (—ura—) tion

Further, the following vague notion about the P/S crossed my mind: the full formula of *uppāda*, starting with *avijjā* and ending with *jarā-maraṇaṁ*, describes the state of the *puthujjana* (and *nirodha* that of the Arahant); but in the form used by the Buddha in the Saṁyutta to describe his discovery, as the Bodhisatta, of the "ancient way", on the point of his attaining full enlightenment, he proceeds backwards from *jara marona* as far as *viññāṇa*, and then turns back to *nāma-rūpa*. The point of interest here might be (in the formula as used in this special context, i. e. to describe the attaining of enlightenment and abandonment of *avijjā*) the replacement of *avijjā* and of *sankhārā* by an infinite reflexive regression of *viññāṇa — nāmarūpa*, *viññāṇā — nāmarūpa . . . Avijjā* has no place in enlightenment, and *sankhārā* as *kammapatha*, are only performable in the

world of things, actions and persons which is held together by *avijjā* and *taṇhā*. Arahants do not "act" in that way, by *kammapatha*.

One other point in this connection. I have been seeking three convenient compendious terms for the three sections of the Paticca-samuppâda formula, and I toy with the following words, unsatisfactory though they are: the blocks are (a) = 1—2, (b) = 3—9, or 10, (c) = 11—12. So (c) I call the Historical-Temporal (past and future, simultaneously mutually incompatible), (b) I call the Personal-individual (simultaneously mutually indispensible), and (a) I call the Impersonal General (simultaneously compatible). (a) is the least satisfactory.

(From a letter to Ven. Ñāṇavīra, 3/7/59)

623. Ideas: put very crudely the situation is this: in so far as anything is an object of five-sense consciousness only, it is not an idea, but a visible form, sound, odour, flavour, or tangible. But "of these 5 sense faculties mind is their 'home'" (Majjh. 43) and the mind's object is an idea. Experience is always a fusion of mind and 5-sense-faculty. That is, in terms of the Sixfold Base. Otherwise it can be expressed in the form of the twofold description of *sankhāra* (determinations) and *dhammā* (ideas) when the opposition is between ideas and action-cum-action-results. An idea (dhamma) is in itself neutral (as an essence, *sabhāvato dhammo*), but if 'cathetectic' by choice (*cetanā*), moved by lust, hate or delusion and given effect to *samādinna*, then it becomes an action (by body, speech or mind) according to the way of organizing association of the *indriyas*. Action is not in itself a Dhamma except in so far as it is object of mind-consciousness.

624. **Explanation and Rebirth**

What is one trying to do in explaining rebirth? This consciously organized life is like a home garden in an endless jungle the edge of which is like death. To explain death and rebirth is like trying to explain the jungle in terms of the house and garden. Or again, the house is built of bricks and tiles made of clay, and beams made of jungle trees. Explaining rebirth is like trying to explain clay and trees in terms of the familiar made-up bricks and fashioned beams. (July 56)

625. It is important to remember that if the notion of motion is described as *desantaruppatti* then also stationariness should be *samānadesuppatti*. Nothing continues. Consequently the argument based on *tadagamma* for the existence of nibbāna is false.

626. *Mettā*

In English one is used to the one word love (= *amour*, *amore*, *amor*), which has to serve for all. Greek discriminates *eros* & *agape*, which duality is very hard to render in Latin or English. English inherits much of its crude matter-of-factness and empiricism from the vulgar Latins who had only the one word, *amor*, (and Latins of today make do with only *l'amour* and *l'amore*).

In Pali one finds there are three: kāmacchanda, sineha and mettā (physical lust or desire for sensuality; sentimental affection or attachment to individual persons; and lovingkindness or benevolence extendable as a universal attitude to all beings).

Lust is selfish desire seeking satisfaction mainly through the sense of touch and is not interested in the well-being of its object at all. Selfish in the first degree.

Affection can be accompanied by physical lust or not and seeks satisfaction in association with the object (physical nearness, though not necessarily contact). It is interested in the welfare of the object, though unconcerned about anyone else, and does not exclude the harming of others for the benefit of its object. Thus it is selfish in the second degree.

Mettā starts from *sineha*, but by generalizing becomes unselfish and chooses welfare of all.

627. The P/S (paṭicca-samuppāda) is not so much a description as a group or sets of descriptive terms. The sets have certain features: (1) each member is recognizable in ourselves by introspection, (2) each pair of the sets of terms is so connected that (for reasons which vary in each case) one of the pair is evidently necessary for the others, much in the way that the cogito is linked (to the sum). (3) It has several forms. In its long form we find that this linkage takes us through 3 principal levels of generality. Ignorance and determinations are both general and always present. With Consciousness and the rest down to Clinging we have in each a particular (non-general) aspect always present. Being (bhava) is again general and always present. Birth, Ageing and Death are general necessarily, but not always present since they are mutually exclusive in temporal succession. This is the reason why in some Discourses the formula at Consciousness "turns round on itself" to Name-and-Form again, at one end (Samy. XII; Digha 15), while at the other it sometimes begins with Craving or Clinging, working backwards to Ignorance by the question, at each instance, 'What gives this its being?' (Majjh. No. 11;38). The long form may perhaps be taken as emphasizing the aspect of action, that turning back with Consciousness as empha-

sizing consciousness, and that applying being in each from Clinging backwards, as emphasizing being (bhava). The 'vulnerable point' is always where the process is attackable: where Craving meets Feeling since Craving is an element that can be brought under control. Descriptions that end here emphasize how the process can be broken.

One only of the middle members (saḷāyatana) can be omitted, or rather not omitted but absorbed into Name-and-Form.

It (the P/S) is not a temporal cause/effect chain. It is not symbolic since, if we look, we can find each member in ourselves by introspection. Its various presentations have no historical significance. It is not handlable by Aristotelian logic any more than the Cogito.

To the question: what are these sets of terms intended to describe?, we may answer tentatively that they are intended to describe experience of any possible kind where ignorance (that is lack of personal realization of the Truths) is present. It is in the nature of both such experience, and of descriptions that no simple description can be complete. Experience itself contains paradoxes which no philosophical system has succeeded in solving, and it is in the nature of any description that what it describes does not include its own terms: if we then want to describe those terms we must leave them and take up a position in what has just been described, in order to do so.

Disregarding the numerous and strange European interpretations, logical, symbolic, historical, etc.. of the P/S the best approach to it from the European position is probably from Descartes' Cogito ergo sum. That famous formula, which still guides European Ontology, is

not a logical (syllogistic) proposition; nor is the P/S. But there is more than that. Ignoring Descartes' synthetic reasoning on the matter of substance imposed on the cogito, one can hardly fail to notice the parallel between cogito and viññāṇa on the one hand and sum and bhava on the other. What is common to both is the interdependence of the terms. In stead of falling back upon unverifiable hypostasis to support the formula, the P/S pursues the element of interdependence by successive links between the two, each pair being open to introspection. At each end, too, we pass by a link from the particular to the general.

628. 'All creatures subsist by nutriment' (*sabbe-sattāhāra-ṭṭhitikā*). Extraordinary as it may seem the philosophical implications of the necessity for nutriment as a condition for conscious existence have never been faced by European philosophers.

629. Religion is derived by the Concise Oxford Dictionary from re-ligo, to bind (esp. to God). Consequently, Religion (which under the question "Is the Dhamma a Religion or a Philosophy"[1] I had equated provisionally with *silabbataparāmāsa*, 'adherence to rites and rituals') should rightly be translated by *yoga* (=bondage), but the Dhamma is the way to the *anuttarayoga-kkhema*, 'the incomparable safety from bondage'.

Phassa[2]

630. The in-oneself and external are a duality expressed as "that in the world by which one observes the world". In their simplest elementary form they constitute

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1. Published in "pathways of Buddhist Thought", The Wheel Series No. 52-53 (Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy.)
2. 'Contact', i.e. five-sense contact and mental contact.

a spatial duality expressed as" a line of two points" (adjacent).

For this duality to appear as a phenomenon at all it must be observed from some position in a line at right-angles to the line of the two points (adjacent too).

This being-at-right-angles on the part of the (self-unobserved) observer to his observed duality can be called perpendicularity.

This perpendicularity of the (self-unobserved) observer to the fundamental duality of his observed (field) is, in fact, the triple relation of phassa. (It is not representable as a triangle, since that is an "objectivised" observer observed by a second (self-unobserved) observer himself perpendicular to the lines in the (perpendicularity contained as objectivised) in the triangle.)

Phassa is thus the fundamental perpendicularity of consciousness to the duality (the in-oneself and the external) of the observed field.

External (*bahiddhā*) = + 1; in-oneself (*ajjhatta*) = —1; observer =0.[1]

The 4 Mahābhūtas[2] and 5 Khandhas[3]

631. The simplest solid is (disregarding the sphere) a tetragon:



1. See in this volume, the treatise "The Fundamental Relation in Observing".
2. The four great Primaries, or basic constituents (elements) of matter.
3. The five Categories, or Aggregates, of personalized existence.

Let us provisionally equate as follows:

(a) *rūpa* (form) = space enclosed and occupied by the tetragon.

(b) *vedana* (feeling) = affective appropriation inseparable from any perceiving.

(c) *saññā* (perception) = the outline (and contained divisions if any) appearing at any moment as a phenomenon (transcendence accompanies perception).

(d) *sankhārā* (formations) = changes in a, b, or c.

(e) *viññāṇa* (consciousness) = primarily that which is not the observed tetrahedron phenomenon and not the observed not-tetrahedron-phenomenon, not a, b, c or d, and "time now" (This is unreflexive; *viññāṇa* might reflexively, be objectified as an "observed observer observing the tetrad," but it would then be perpendicular to the primary "observer-now".)

1. *Rūpa* is describable on the basis of the 4 mahābhūtas;

2. *vedanā saññā sankhārā* are describable on the basis of *phassa;*

3. *viññāṇa* is describable in terms of *nāma-rūpa*, or on the bases of in-oneself/external (M. 109; M. 38).

The four Mahābhūtas can probably best be equated with (a) the spatial rigidity (tangible or mental), (b) cohesion, (c) componibility, and (d) dislodgeability (or rigidity, cohesion, temperature and movement).

In the tetragon they are present respectively in:

(a) its resistence to deformation (rigidity),

(b) its endurance and susceptibility to "phases" (cohesion) when moved,

(c) its creatibility, i. e. that it can be brought into being and made-up (componibility),

(d) its mobility, the fact that it is always in a state of motion either as "uniform in a straight line" or as "accelerated" (dislodgeability).

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Ontology and Buddhism

Editor's Note:— All the following Notes have been taken from a sheaf of loose leaves topped by our first item (No. 632) which gives the table of contents of the planned book of essays on "Ontology and Buddhism". What follows are the only pieces of connected writing in that facicule; the other leaves contain chiefly a large number of quotations from the Pali texts, lists of Pali words, terms and phrases, with source references, which the author intended to utilize for the planned book of essays.

632. Ontology and Buddhism

It has been said by someone that the weakness of Buddhism is that it has no Ontology. But it can be asked, Is it a weakness or a strength? The object of these essays is to inquire into that.

I. Sketch of classical Ontology *ā la* Lavelle

II. Sketch of Existential Ontology *āl a* Sartre

III. The syllogism and its constants ALL and IS (*sabbaṁ* and *bhava*). — Dialectic.

IV. IS and ALL in the Suttas.

V. Ontology, its origin, cessation, and the Path to its cessation.

VI. Dependent Arising.

VII. Cessation — is, is not, both-is-and-is-not, neither-is-nor-is-not: all are and are not nibbāna.

633. My point simply hinges on the question of translating *bhava* by 'becoming' as is usually done. It is generally argued against translating *bhava* by 'being' that 'being is static'; but while admitting that, 'becoming' (1) offers no solution since in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 'to become' means 'to begin to be', (2) it completely severs the *hoti* of the (incipient) syllogisms, e.g. 'hoti Tathâgato parammaraṇaṁ?...' and other vaguer uses of *hoti* (*bhavati*) and, indirectly, *atthi* from connexion with the Paṭicca-samuppāda, tending to make the P/S subordinate to syllogistic logic rather tgan the other way about; (3) it is incompatible with S....and Itiv. (and also with M. 131-4). 'Becoming' (and still more 'werden') suggests a flux where the future 'becomes' by 'flowing' through the present into the past, or 'future things' 'become' present and then past, while what is meant or implied by the constant and unavoidable use of the verb 'to be' is left unaccounted for. Hence, I argue, to translate (even to interpret to oneself) *bhava* by 'becoming' is an opiate that leaves the illusion of 'being' untreated. I doubt if that is what the Buddha intended.

As I see it, the Buddha's treatment of Ontology is most clearly set out, according to right view, in M. 38, which, *yathā-bhūtaṁ*, sets out how the illusion of 'being' (both in positive and negative forms — with the *bhava-taṇhā* and *vibhavataṇhā* of D. 9, 22, and the *anurodha* and *paṭivirodha* of M. 11), can and should be treated and

eliminated. M. 1. and M. 49 are complementary: M. 1 describes the modes of *asmi-māna* (which is pre-logical) and M. 49 presents the same situation in 'ontological' terms, i.e. in the functioning of a logically formulated wrong view (while M. 1 describes the prelogical and pre-reflaxive *asmimāna* — the mānānusaya, the fundamental wrong attitude), M. 44 & 109 describe the logically formulated views which arise out of and are built upon the prelogical tendency — the connexion between these is shown briefly in M. 1 and forms the subject matter of M. 49.

634. As I see it at present, the importance of the paṭicca-samuppāda lies not so much in the twelve (or less or more) members as in the relationship *imasmiṁ sati*...(and its undoing *imasmiṁ asati*) which is underlined in D. 15. This firstly implies complexity in experience (no complexity: no experience). The choice of the "12 members" is less philosophical than psychological, which is why it is variable. The undoing, as I see it, is the "detail of voidness", which is the ethical key to the Dhamma, since it is the "Abschattung" (shading off. - Ed.) of voidness in saṁsāra itself that renders it impossible in the Dhamma to ascribe absolutiveness to any particular value (such as divine grace, justice, etc.) and so enter upon the "War of philosophical systems of the absolute". The formula *Imasmiṁ sati*...' (applied psychologically by a choice of interrelated instances) is used as an instrument in D. 15 to describe and analyse the mental process of naming (function of *nāma-rūpa*) and language (*nirutti*, etc.), and in M. 38 to describe and analyse the peculiar nature of consciousness (viññāṇa) in its constitutive relationship (through mediate states) to being. But both can only be

studied in the Pali with careful discrimination of roots...
....

635. The ironical and amusing story of the *Brahmanimantanika Sutta* conceals a profound meaning, which is ontological. That is, it presents the Buddha's treatment of the verbs *hoti, bhavati* ('to be') and the noun *bhava* ('being'), both from the root *bhu.* Some prelate, I forgot who, said that 'Buddhism's weakness lay in the fact that it had no ontology,' which, in simpler language presumably meant that no attempt had been made to prove that nibbāna, the goal, **was**, or that it **had being**, with the latent objection that if this was not proved, then *nibbāna* was just 'an abyss of nothingness'.

Now the Buddha has described the world (that is not just the external world but the consciousness that cognizes it, and not only other peoples' consciousness objectified, but mine, too, and not only mine (of) past and future objectified but mine committed to it now — no matter who 'I' am). His description of the way it works is the first two truths, while the last two deal with the escape from it. If we are interested in 'being' we must look to the Dependent Orgination (D/O), of which 'being' (*bhava*) is the 10th member.

I purposely avoid rendering *bhava* by 'becoming' because that word has a limited meaning in normal English usage, which would most nearly apply to the flux process which the D/O describes as a whole, and not to *bhava*, which is part of it. The point is extremely important, because if *bhava* is rendered by 'becoming', then the word 'becoming', which everyone from dukes to dustmen use all day and everyday, escapes our

net entirely and we are in difficulties when we are perhaps told that the Buddha's Absolute is Pure Being and so he merely taught diluted *Vedanta*. If we are in difficulties, they are due to our handling of English; they are not there in the Pâli. 'Being', 'existence', and 'becoming', all represent in Pāli the roots '*bhu*' (is, exists) and '*as*' (is, there is, exists). We have no right to introduce the European mediaeval dichotomy of essence' versus 'existence', which the Pāli word *dhamma* makes superfluous. It is sometimes argued that 'being' implies permanence; even if that is so, outside the philosopher's study it does not affect the issue: and that is only an additional reason why the word must be dealt with.

'Being', we said, is a member of the D/O, in other words, to be is to be dependent, or contingent upon something else. Whatever is, has being only in virtue of something else that lends it its being. *Kiṁ pabhava.*

Now let us consider the structure of the D/O for a moment. Firstly, it is not a logical proposition, nor is it a temporal cause-result chain. Such an approach makes an understanding of it impossible. If we stop to consider each of its components, they will be found to vary so enormously in scope from the particular to the general that it is hard to get a clear picture of the whole. The interpretations of European scholars have been, perhaps without exception, wild and bad guesses.

The Buddha's purpose is to describe enough of the world to be able to show how suffering can be ended, not to produce full and detailed elaborations, which would be endless and arrive nowhere. But this particular description is aimed at including everything. And here a difficulty arises. A description must be made in

terms of something other than what it describes, or it is not a description. It has to reproduce in other material certain structures that are in what it describes. This fact makes it impossible for a description to be a description and complete at the same time. How is the D/O complete, then? Or is it not a description after all?

It is in fact both, but it attains that in a rather peculiar way. The best way to approach it from a European background is from Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum" (I think therefore I am). That is not a logical proposition; it is a description of interconditionality between consciousness and being. Ignoring Descartes' theories of substance and taking only that bare formulation, we can compare it with the fact that 'consciousness' (viññāṇa) and 'being' (*bhava*) are two of the most obvious members of the D/O formulation, which also is not a logical proposition.

But now let us return for a moment to the 'enormous scope from the particular to the general', which we noted earlier in the D/O. The right way of treating this fact is to take the D/O, not as an individual description, but as an integrated set of descriptions. Each member provides in fact a set of terms to describe the rest of the world. Together they cover the whole subjective-objective, positive negative world. But when taken together, becoming and being, impermanence and (illusory) permanence come within its net. This seeming paradox represents what we actually live, but what we never face up to as a whole. 'Being' is applicable to the first 9 members (see M. 38 & 11) though not to the last three (they perhaps constitute 'becoming' if we use that term philosophically).

Any concept of Pure Being is always open to the objection that, if absoluteness is claimed for it, then it cannot be known; for if it is known it is accessible to consciousness and consequently no longer pure; consequently Pure Being and non-being cannot be distinguished. If absoluteness is claimed for any concept of Pure Consciousness (the Yogācāra opposition to the Vedanta), a similar objection arises; for if consciousness is pure it must not be, or it will be adulterated by being. Consequently pure consciousness has to have no being, which is tantamount to saying that it is not.

By making both consciousness and being, in whatever form, subject to the D/O, the Buddha both closes the entry into this logical maze and offers us a picture which, if we only bother to observe, rather than malobserve, we shall find corresponds with our experience as we actually live it. Only we keep forgetting what we learn. And forgetting is ignorance. And ignorance, 'the most reprehensible of all', heads the D/O. It is one of the three 'taints' (*āsava*)—and so is being.

So it is not that 'Buddhism has no ontology', but that the Buddha has seen through what a modern writer has called the 'ontological mirage' and set being into its true position.

Nibbāna is the cessation of ontology: *bhava-nirodho nibbānaṁ*. It is not, however, the 'abyss of non-being', since that requires consciousness to cognize it as such. It is 'absolute cessation', which includes the non-ascription of either being or non-being: *nāpahosiṁ*.

Now while the D/O has the appearance of, and is, a complete description of the world (as we have defined it,) nevertheless, when nibbāna is treated of positi-

vely in any of its terms instead of, as its cessation, a paradox will appear. *Atthi...abhūtaṁ* ..., or *sabbato pabhaṁ*, describes as cognized, to be (by consciousness) in terms of being. What nibbāna is cognized by in terms of consciousness is *anidassanaṁ:* the act of cognizing without 'showing', 'making seen', any positive determined (sankhata) object. That this opposing of being and consciousness seems possible and not nonsense (the paradox) also indicates the 'incompleteness' of the 'complete' description.

636. (1) *citta* = to know; (2) *cetasaka* = to do; (3) rūpa = to be.

'Rūpa' appears as some definite form and as such is entirely positive. To the question, 'What is this?' the answer can be given at once: 'It is what it is'. But to be what it is it has to be determined as such, and this determining is the function of *saṅkhārā* (including *vedanā* and *saññā* as two special instances of *saṅkhāra*, which we are entitled to do). To the question 'What is a determination?', we define it as an act of showing or determining an appearance that a form perceived 'is this form, not that form'. The negation in determining is only implied by, or employed by, determination but does not constitute an element of its being. Of that determination too it can be replied to the question 'what is I?,' that 'it is what it is' (saññā, vedanā, sankhārā phassasamudayā). That form can be and be determined is only possible in the presence of consciousness.

A peculiarity of consciousness at once appears introspectively in that it does not in itself appear positively as *rūpa* (form) and *cetasikā* do. Quote M. 109 & 38 ......The capacity of negation appears to reside in consci-

ousness which provides the "empty space" in which questions can be asked and "forms" (things) determined. If with the other two it constituted a plenum, there would be no questions and no acts of determining possible. Consciousness, then, begins to appear as the questioning element and it can turn the questioning on itself: 'If I am what I am'.

637. Medieval European thought evolved the dichotomy of existence and essence, on which the ontological proof of the existence of God was built. It might be tempting to render the expression *Sabbe sankhārā anicca*............ *sabbe dhammā anattā* in those terms on such lines as these: 'All determined things, existing in themselves (*sankhārā*) are impermanent, all essences (dhammā; equated by the commentaries with *sabhāva*) are non-existent in themselves. But such an equation would be risky because the ontological appearance is largely a verbal one due to the peculiarities of European languages, but still more so because the clarity of medieval synthesis has been lost so that today in English the boundaries between 'essence', 'being' and 'existence' are no longer definite in ordinary usage, and any definitiveness that they are made to assume in individual philosophies is largely an arbitrary one imposed on them. Consequently we must beware of importing into the Pāli any specious clarity or any vagueness that rests solely on foreign linguistic habits, and thus have only regional value.

638. To be is to be contingent: nothing, of which it can be said that 'it is', can be said to be alone and independent.

But being is a member of the paticca-samuppāda as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

The destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, then consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all; for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no more ignorance then it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M. Sutta 38).

639. If precognition is a fact (Rhine, etc.) then the psychologists' complexes due to suppression can equally well be due to suppressed precognitions as to suppressed memories. Then the death trauma is as important as the birth trauma. (13th Dec. 54)

640. I shall postulate that certain aspects of character always form part of a human character but may be present in either a mainly "positive" or mainly "negative" form. They tend to fall into unequal-opposite pairs. If one is exaggerated in conscious life, the other will find an outlet somewhere. Viz., take a person who is exaggeratedly sensitive to domination by others (usually called "weak and obstinate"). Without going into an elaborate analysis it may be found that the felt need for independence and fear of being trapped governs the major part of life and relations with other people in all ordinary activities. This leaves unsatisfied the opposite need for selfsacrifice or need to be guided and dominated and so get rid of the burden of responsibility and loneliness. So such persons may often be found to show exaggerated trust in doctors, and to take delight in treatment in a world of medical relationships where he can indulge the slave-master instinct by entirely subordinating himself to the doctor. This is thus done in a water-tight world, and with a satisfactory doctor this can provide a release for the tension that otherwise might burst out in psychosomatic ailments.

641. **The Unconscious.**— Theories of the unconscious are "justified" by their ability to predict and control certain behaviour. They seem, however, to be a necessary fiction, as phlogiston was a necessary fiction in its time, necessitated in predictive calculation by the then inability to gather enough data about the process of burning to account for the new distribution of weight. Phlogiston, in fact, filled the gap left by those components of matter (steam etc.) which escaped the net of observation of the process of burning up matter. The Unconscious does the psychologists a somewhat similar service today. The technique for describing the behaviour of "conscious matter" is incomplete. Between the patches of observed behaviour "things have happened" unobservably and that is stated to have taken place "in the unconscious", as the loss of weight in burning was said to be due to the "addition of the minus weight of phlogiston." The Unconscious is thus a necessary fiction at present, but none the less a fiction.

In the last century and a half of physiology, neurology has succeeded in tying up invariable relationships between material organs and nerves on the one hand and conscious experiences (pains etc.) on the other. Investigation of the brain, though, is still in its infancy. It seems more than possible that much if not all the so-called "Unconscious" may not eventually become much more conveniently describable in terms of material brain-changes, materially (i. e. visibly) measured and tied up with certain feelings and experiences.

Two things, however, remain: (1) just as physics has got to a point where it has reached an incompatibility, namely the behaviour of electrons as either waves or particles, so much brain investigation may lead to a mutually

incompatible double vision, though how this may manifest itself it is not yet possible to say. (2) Consciousness, i. e. the purely subjective and unique experience of awareness (with some degree of memory) will remain unapproached and unapproachable by such methods. Expressed in physical or material terms, consciousness must always be describable as "nothing". That "nothing" has one kind of relationship to the world of physics and another to the world of physiology. (Jan. 56)

642. It is said that animals (even chimpanzees) have a very short conscious memory (I do not mean conditioned reflexes, learnt habits, etc.). It is one of the radical differences between man and all animals that man is ashamed of sex. The reason probably lies in conscious memory. The change in values between lustful consciousness and non-lustful is profound (more than that with hate, probably). In man (1) non-lusting consciousness is scarcely or not at all remembered when lusting consciousness is present, because the latter over-rides all the former's values absolutely. But it does not last. When it has switched back to non-lusting consciousness, it is the memory of how destructive the lusting values are to the non-lusting that makes the intrusion of the memory into the open public intolerable; hence shame, which keeps the memory tidily in oneself. Were there no memory of it (as probably it is with animals), as women are said to forget the pains of labour, and as one tends to forget sea sickness, then there would be no objection to going naked. (Sept. 56)

643. Practically all inquiries into death, immortality, existence, being and consciousness are stultified at the outset by a presumption that they are desirable (or the

reverse). The only reasonable approach is to observe what facts there are to be observed and make one's choice on the basis of these — afterwards, not before.

644. Bodily pain is a component of waking life, but not, apparently, of dream life. The advent of bodily pain destroys (breaks up or kills) a dream and transforms existence into waking life. Bodily pain in others seems when increased to a certain amount (not measurable because it is only inferred) to result in "lapse of consciousness" (i. e. interruption of the life-process) or destruction (i. e. breaks up the waking life or kills it). That can only be inferred of others and cannot be a waking experience in myself (without a radical development or alteration in conscious continuity as we ordinary people know it).

The (desirable) stability of waking life is gained, it seems, at the expense of (undesirable) bodily pain. Give up the pain, and with it the stability and I return to the instability of dreams.

Death in others is the break up of the bodily stability in an observed body with the cutting off of a relationship with an inferred other's consciousness. That particular looking-glass in which I see the "face" of my own consciousness has become corroded and no longer reflects it; it only shows the shadow of my "conscious body" as a stone or earth shows the shadow, but not the reflection, of my material body.

By "my conscious body" I mean here no more than the "shape of the inside of a hole" — consciousness being taken here as equatable with nothing in terms of matter, and the "conscious body" as the aspects of the "surface of the hole" (— the contact of "matter" with "nothing").

645. Can one take an experience to have up to five essential dimensions — 3 dimensions of space (i.e. right-left, front-back, up-down) and time (before-after) and consciousness (attraction-repulsion)?

There are two independent ways of describing experience and manipulating knowledge:

1. By conceiving experience in terms of things or interaction between things ("chosisme" — Aristotelian logic). "Things" are all impermanent. Knowledge of their relationships is always out of date.

2. By conceiving it in terms of structure (mathematics — other logical systems?). Structure is 'permanent' and knowledge of it is cumulative.

646. All thought hitherto has been stultified by the failure to know what the verb "to be" [signifies — *added by Ed.*] ("this" "is" "that"; "there-is" "nothing-there"; "he" "is" "not-here").

647. In a syllogism (1. All men are mortal, 2. Socrates is a man, 3. Therefore Socrates is mortal), the generalization (all men are mortal) must have been arrived at by induction. No inductive process is ever absolutely certain. There is always the leap, the assumption, of generalizing and therefore one of the premises of a syllogism must have an element of uncertainty. So it cannot prove anything with certainty.

A syllogism is therefore a signpost pointing where to look for direct experience, but can inherently never give information that is 100% certain. But a syllogism (on metaphysical subjects) can also point to what can, inherently, never be experienced; then it is an anomaly.

648. Is there something wrong somewhere in the claim that all mental objects are only five-sense-experiences or rearrangement of memories of them?

649. Physicists accept the inseparability of time and space. They are concerned with 'what happens in space', The inseparability works out as plainly true (i.e. consistent) as far as any thing to do with space is concerned — no time, no space, in fact. But does the converse apply, i.e. is time (i.e. consciousness 'of' change) impossible with a coordinate experience 'of' space?

650. Descriptions etc.— To the question 'What is description?' (or better perhaps: 'how is description described?') a convenient answer might be that it is the application of sieves. This implies: (A) distinguishing by a fixed pattern of, say, (a) holes of a certain size in an otherwise impenetrable medium, (b) an amorphous mass of particles, and (c) an act of sieving. Sieving for size in this way will have no power to discriminate between different-coloured particles either below or above the critical size of the sieve. — (B) For distinguishing colour an entirely different sieve and sieving act must be applied, with two or more independent discriminating acts. In this way a description can be made of classes. The step to the description of an individual seems to consist in the application of a varying number of different acts of sieving followed by a decision "This number of acts of sieving (this list of characteristics) is enough. By it the individual is described." Objectively, and without the sujective "I"-sense, this is the nearest that one can get. The list judged adequate is always liable to be proved inadequate in new circumstances (uncertainty principle) and a new sieve must be applied and a new "adequate"

judgement made — but there is no limit to this. (Jan. 58)

651. Treatment according to strictly objective scientific technique absolutely precludes the possibility of ascertaining the "identity" of an "individual" at two different time-places. Events can only be sieved and sieved by new sieving processes; but the judgement "This is the same person" or "This is the same thing" is supplied from the subjective observer and is consequently unscientific though a necessary component of experience.

652. The space-time relationship of relativity is based on the observed fact of the speed of light. The 5th dimension (see Eddington) might lie in the element of negation or nothingness, which is pure subjectivity and which cannot be demonstrated in the objective world, which is perhaps rightly argued to be a 'plenum'. Things (which are multiple) and even space and time (which equivocally claim unity; but what about dreams?), are what they are (are themselves), are positive in their own right. Consciousness, however, considered separately, is only describable as different, or positive, in terms of what it is not. It is what is not. It is one. Multiplicity appears to be imposed on it by its association with what it is not. It is the lack, the flight, the incompleteness, the hunger, the negation, the nothing. The ego is the particular behaviour line of the surface of a given positivity against nothing.

653. All such dogmas or deductions as (1) "The spacetime world is a plenum", (2) "The physical material universe is orderly", etc., are only understandable if the words plenum and orderly are distinguished against (a) their opposites vacuum and random as well as (b) against their undifferentiated matrix (the unconscious categories plenum-vacuum, order-randomness, etc. — see Freud).

Consequently if all these definite (or positive) attributes are projected onto the external objective world, their shadows (or negative opposites) will lie in the internal subjective observer of that world. The external world thus conceived becomes positive, replete, lifeless and rigid and is only animatable by the element of hungry negation in the internal consciousness element (itself nothing and only observable by introspection of its emotional modes).

(Jan. 58)

654. "Actual Matter" is any actual experience involving excitation of one or more of the 5 senses (a 'hallucination' is only a badly-organized five-sense experience, and a 'real experience' is only a well-organized one). 'Matter' is that and also all imaginings, ideas and memories of now, of past or future five-sense experience ('imagination' is only a badly or insufficiently organized one).

655. 1. Words (like paints) reproduce or reflect a structural pattern in reduced dimensions.

2. "Omnis determinatio est negatio" (Spinoza): no determination can be made unless from a viewpoint. Any viewpoint has horizons. The negated lies beyond the horizons. Horizons are an essential component of any determination (or any conscious experience).

3. An action is a changing (transitive). Actions' result is memory (a. conscious memory, and b. unconscious memory, including learning). "We are what we have thought and done".

4. A division of the world (I and my universe) is: (1) 'I' (absolutely unique subjectively; but not objectively, which includes 'my body'); (2) 'other people'

(their bodies — their 'consciousness' being only an inference); (3) inanimate things.

5. Action (see 3) as (my) thought changes thought and my behaviour; action as speech changes (my) thought and 'other people's behaviour'. Action as bodily action changes my thought and other people's behaviour (sometimes) and inanimate things (sometimes).

6. All bodies are incomplete from any one point of view, but my body is so in a unique way (I 'see it from through my own face as it were, inside my head'— but that is a construct).

7. Can plurality be ascribed to consciousness except through plurality of bodies? What are the consequences of this?

8. 'I' is one conceit (the 'internal' one), 'matter' one form of the external one, which every set of appearances (sense or mind) points to be.....

(Here the Manuscript ends; a few interlinear additions are incomplete)

656. **Cause and Effect.**— Is the question of "cause and effect" any different in essentials from that of "shape',? "A shape" is a succession of plane sections seen simultaneously. If they were seen serially, then we should have the experience of certain series of plane sections (say those of a man or a tree) repeating themselves in experience and we might then say that the "previous" plane section of 2 ankles was the "cause" of the "subsequent" plane section of the waist. The notion of "cause and effect" seems to come from the inability to see a "world line" simultaneously, but the ability to see it as a temporal series of 3-dimensional sections. The point of this is to suggest that the "law of cause" is not

essentially different from the "law of shape". "Spacial objects" "are" "certain shapes" which we see simultaneously. "Cause and effect" groups are temporal (or space-time) shapes which we see as a series of 3-dimensional sections. The law (if any) which holds cause and effect together, therefore, should be of the same kind which holds a shape together, i. e. makes it a "unit". What this is needs investigating.

This apart, "cause" and "effect" seem misleading shorthand words for the "principal (i. e. most noticeable) condition" (out of the many conditions) that is concerned in the production of an emergent new state. That these series repeat themselves seems to be due rather to the arbitrary nature of the world: just as the plane section of the two ankles is arbitrarily followed later by the plane section of two knees, a waist, etc., — given humans in the world and a fixed order of series. (This is a description in terms of an external world existing independently of an observer).

If the universe is expanding, the nebulas getting apart, is everything expanding? Are we getting larger, and the earth on which we stand? If we and the earth are getting larger in proportion we should not notice our change in size because there would be nothing to make the comparison with. But if the expansion were accelerating we should find the earth pressing against our feet, which is just what we experience through gravity. What are the constants? The speed of light? the relative increase in rapidity of expansion in proportion to the distance?

(Jan. 52)

657. **Solalterism versus Solipsism — Dialectic**

The solalterist description of the world, as used

openly by the Behaviourists, and as used covertly by such scientists as Ross Ashly, contains a hidden 'dishonesty principle' (i. e. active functioning of ignorance as self-deception) when it claims and believes its description to be subjectively adequate and altogether complete. The difficulty of the 'Theory of Types' which questions the validity of any 'complete' description of 'all' because it cannot include itself, need not be brought in here. The 'dishonesty principle' is evident in Ross Ashly in his, on the one hand, admitting that he is not dealing with consciousness and, on the other, claiming that pain 'is' a certain physical behaviour pattern. Association (whether absolutely co-essential or not, is not known) of purely subjective pain is identified with that behaviour pattern, which, unlike the pain aspect, is describable in purely physicists' terms. That includes the two principles of Adaptation and Feed-back. Resting on that identification, which is false, the conclusion that conscious man is only an elaborate machine follows, and it proves that he has no soul. This proof has nothing to do with the Budhist proof of *anattā*.

The illusion created by the apparent completeness of behaviourist-physicist description is reinforced by the absence of any strict solipsistic (correspondingly inversely false) description to oppose to it. All solipsistic theories so far have been badly self-deceptive on the point that they have never been pursued with scientific and logical ruthlessness and have always contained a large element of properly solalteristic material mixed up. They are thus easily shown to be absurd and consequently solipsistic thought has been bullied and frightened off the subject.

The difficulty lies in re-stating and purifying the true solipsistic from injected solalteristic material and in finding a set of terms in which to describe it.

What is essential therefore is (a) to show clearly where the solalterist treatment (absolutely necessary as it is) must necessarily end in incompleteness (which can only be glossed over by false identification with the purely subjective) and where it deceives itself and others by covertly smuggling in (properly) solipsistic material (pain) and (b) to make a correspondingly adequate solipsistic description showing where the deception and the 'smuggling-in' (injection) of solalterist material lies. (Sept. 56)

658. ...And this is so not only with technicalities as these but also with theories of importance current in Western thought, about Perception, Causality, Consciousness and Being. It is said that the (strictly objective and so most respectable) sciences have abandoned speaking in terms of 'causes' and 'effects'; and Hume remains unrefuted where Causes (as usually conceived) are upheld. There is no agreed theory of Perception. That, perhaps most fashionable now, which (tacitly treating consciousness as an 'epiphenomenon') looks for its justification to the laws of Physics, to Neurology and to Protoplasm, is an admitted makeshift at best and ultimately vitiated by its failure to take proper account of the subjective side of experience (to deal with 'I'); for it remains awkwardly incontestible that all data are ultimately private. Should Consciousness be taken to include, or not, also the 'Unconscious' of the Psychoanalysts, which Existentialists deny? Fear of solipsism seems to have shepherded the main body of thinkers towards the opposite, perhaps more insiduous, fallacy of solalterism. Schopenhauer described

the Solipsist as 'a madman shut up in an impregnable blockhouse'. But the Solalterist, who ignores the observer — the Behaviourist who only admits the existence of 'the Other' — may perhaps be considered scarcely more sane and to have shut himself out of his house, slamming the door with the latchkey inside: 'the philosophy of the subject leaving himself out of his calculations', to quote Schopenhauer again. Then the indispensable words being and existence (there are and is — as copula or as absolute), with their ambiguity and the homeless family of fundamental assumptions that they are often made to shelter, are normally taken for granted (the otherwise critical authors of The Meaning of Meaning, for example, are strangely content not to examine them at all), or they are left to the more inaccessible of the post-Hegelian ontologists. It has even been complained that there is no longer in European philosophy any agreement on what these words stand for. Such conditions have made of European Ethics, as it were, a displaced person: she has to take shelter where she can.

(The above fragment is the contents of a single typed sheet paginated as 25, seemingly part of a larger philosophical manuscript which the author may have discarded as no other pages belonging to it, were founnd among the posthumous papers.)

659. Animism leads logically to the Gods of Olympus. From there to Jewish or Hindu monotheism, with its impersonal counterpart of pure substance such as the Matter of scientists, Hegel's History, the Hindu Brahman, etc. The obsessive solipsistic claim of the unique 'I' is held in check by the uniqueness of God, or of the external substance. But if that is denied, as non-existent, then the Kirillov[1] Idea takes over. God is the theistic

1. See Dostoyevski, The possessed — Ed.

safeguard against this and Substance the Atheistic safeguard. Psychology (Behaviourist) plays an equivocal part, and while denying god and not affirming substance, it refuses recognition to solipsism by hiding in the solalterism of "the Other". Buddhism is unique in avoiding all these pitfalls and makeshifts by exposure and analysis of the illusion of 'I' (asmi-māna) and personality (puggala) and the contingency of being (paṭicca-samuppāda, 'Dependent Arising').

670. If the Absurd is the proper object of faith, and Understanding (=knowledge) is to be mortified and excluded (vide Tertullian), then any form of absurdity is a fit object for faith, and no discrimination between forms of absurdity can be made whatever by faith alone, but only by understanding (knowledge) that is ruled out.

671. *"There is little of the true philosophic spirit in Aquinas. He does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is impossible to know in advance. Before he begins to philosophize, he already knows the truth; it is declared in the Chatholic faith. If he can find apparently rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better; if he cannot, he need only fall back on revelation."*

Bertrand Russel, "History of Western Philosophy" (p. 463)

This criticism is excellent — while enquiry remains enquiry only in the realm of ideas and has either no counterpart in action or while any such counterpart action can always be abandoned before it has

unpleasant consequences. The end may be either interresting or boring but will not destroy the enquirer. But the course of action flows on like a river and there is no stopping it for a second. If its course is directed, it is hard or impossible to get it back again. We think we know its average course and we think it might be made worse than it is, so we mainly tolerate it as it is. We have our system of contexts built up by experience, for dealing with situations as they arise (assisted by the automatic reactions of self-preservation). While this physical "safety" endures it is possible, pleasant and "safe" to embark on mental enquiries whose end cannot be foreseen and apply to physical existence and action what attracts us therein. But will anyone argue from that we should embark on an experimental course of action whose end connot be foreseen? And yet this is exactly what science as evolution seems to be doing. Science does not admit the pleasure-pain element which is "personal" and therefore "unscientific" because it is outside the capacity of its measuring instruments. This is alright; and when it says, "What is contrary to science is false", it seems partially sound. But it is when Science begins to exert a claim on the mind to be the sole source, point of reference, measure and limit of truth, (saying) "What is not capable of being dealt with by Science is non-existent", then it is certainly unsound.

672. The importance of an orthodoxy is that it is essential to any ordered thinking. By that I mean not orthodox thinking but any ordered thinking; for that implies either approval of or rejection of (in whole or in part) some orthodoxy. Unorthodoxy is impossible without some orthodoxy against which it is unorthodox. (For revolutions see Note Book, §258) Any orthodoxy has constantly

to be maintained and combatted in order to survive. A judicious measure of the two is called progressive development. If the mixture is unjudicious it may manifest itself as tyrannous bigotry or as constant abortive rebellion. A rebellion, to be successful must destroy the orthodoxy which it rebels against, whereupon it is automatically transformed into a new orthodoxy. A period of anarchy or seeming anarchy may intervene, but (if true anarchy has any actuality) it seems naturally impossible to sustain anarchy for long against a tendency to crystallize, and once that happens, orthodoxy has set in again. Whether orthodoxy can be universalized without or with oppression and suppression is not the point here. (Sept. 56)

673. If we say that "happiness" (as the "greatest good") consists in things then the only standard by which we may know which things bring happiness is according to the reaction of a majority (the "greatest number") or of an aristocracy (the "best") to those things. This (a) takes no account of the fact that canons of taste may and do change, and that respectively the "minority" ('enemies of the people') or the inferior (the 'masses') risk being crushed and oppressed and prevented from fulfilling their needs.

If we say that happiness consists in any person's attitude, then the only standard is the state of happiness or otherwise of any given person. But this criterion will not indicate what things may be expected to make any person happy and the result is anarchy among things and a process of continued trial and error.

It is now held tacitly or openly that (a) all people should (must) like what the majority likes; the minority

should be educated to this — by a combination of encouragement and neglect (if liberal-socialist) or by emotional propaganda and forced labour camps (if totalitarian); and (b) that the canons of what should be liked must be laid down and their development guided. The need for a "party" and a system of politico-philosophical myths (aims that cannot be realized now) such as "the next world" or the fading away of the state (this world as Utopia).

The whole of this edifice with all its facades has no place for death.

The "next world" as a means of coercing people in this, is one attempt of getting round the problem death sets the exponents of this world. People are mostly more useful to society alive than dead, so it is mostly a crime to die unless you do so "for society". For society regards itself (rightly) as cheated by death unless it profits by it.

But to go back to "happiness": suppose a man finds firstly that of all the things it is possible to do he does not want to do anything more than he is doing now — this would seem to be the nearest one can get to the definition of a state of "happiness". He can then educate himself so that that does not obstruct others enjoying the same and they might increase their happiness mutually by cooperation and by eliminating needs which entail obstructing others. This might be possible — at least it does not seem inherently impossible.

But again a man who looks at the world and at himself critically, finds that while the world of his circumstances may be such that it can maintain his needs, yet it can, inherently, never satisfy them: that he and

his world are so constituted that no set of circumstances can ever give more than a temporary relief and can never fully satisfy him. Every meal he eats ensures that his ability to be hungry again is maintained.

One can forgive the politicians (the bishops of today) anything except their claim to answer all needs.

674. *"The sole evidence it is possible to produce that any thing is desirable is that people actually desire it ..... This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but which it is possible to require that happiness is good, that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness therefore a good to the aggregate of all persons."*

J. S. Mill — "Utilitarianism" (p. 52)

Is "happiness" here separate from or combined with "pleasure"? In either case it is not disputed that the majority are capable of it and that they desire it and that the attainment of it is largely (some say entirely) dependent on outside circumstances. But the step to the "general happiness" seems to be made without reckoning on (or at least accounting for) the fact that once an adequate living has been provided for all, there is no set of circumstances which will bring happiness to all—or even which will bring happiness to the majority always. The individuals who make up the majority are both all the time being replaced and all the time themselves changing in the pattern of their appetencies. The important thing is that each individual is satisfied only by the set of circumstances that fit the pattern of his appetencies at any particular stage of his development. The point is there-

fore that if the "general happiness" is to be brought about, the method of doing so will never be by determining by some method or other a set of circumstances which will give "happiness to all normal beings". The only way to set about it would be to maintain a bureau for maintaining a continual flow of information concerning the present state of the changing average pattern of appetencies of the majority. The first will only lead to strife, the second seems impracticable.

675. All the following "good" things are entirely dependent on "bad" things for their existence:

A		B
rescue liberation	is dependent on	oppression
heroism	„ „ „	great odds
good judgement	„ „ „	the possibility of making errors
charity	„ „ „	poverty of others
endurance	„ „ „	suffering in oneself
pity	„ „ „	suffering in others
love (desire for union)	„ „ „	separation
energy, striving	„ „ „	privation (not having what one needs)
hero worship	„ „ „	inability to be oneself what one wants; or frustration
patience	„ „ „	the presence of unsurmountable obstruction
thrift	„ „ „	insecurity (among other things)
temperance	„ „ „	temptation..

If this world is "improved" so that all those things in column B are eliminated there wil be no opportunity for the exercise of the "virtues" in column A.

676. Eating is surely an entirely repellent and utterly unjustified process. The enjoyment of the senses of taste and smell and the satisfying of hunger are, in fact, enjoyable and "innocent" only if one shuts one's eyes to all those things that eating necessitates, such as killing of animals etc. To become a vegetarian is no escape at all, for then one's eating still involves the killing of millions of animals in the cultivation of vegetables and the killing of vegetables themselves, which are alive in their own way. The vegetarian has nothing to do with meat, but by his eating he still destroys life on a huge scale. Not to eat is to suffer and to cut one's life short, for no kind of existence is possible without eating. When I eat I think of the people who haven't got enough to eat, and then my eating cannot be justified except by my arbitrary choice and decision that I and not they shall eat, for which I alone am responsible, and for which I have no ultimate justification. But if the world were better organized, which it could well be, and everyone had enough to eat, and if I lived on vegetables alone, still I am not justified, except by my own arbitrary choice, for that destruction of animals and plants that is necessitated. I have chosen to live and to take part in this destruction simply because I want to — because to live is to destroy, just as to create is to destroy; it is only a process of change to which I can equally well apply the word "creation" or "destruction", according as I choose to feel about it. I know all the arguments used to justify such things. They stand, but the opposite standpoint remains unaffected by them. It is, in the end, I who am responsible

for this state of things, for this eating and for the destruction that it necessitates. Then why not stop eating and die? What, and be at once be reborn again, having forgotten what I have learned in this life, and start eating again? There is no way out there. The choice is not between eating (and living) and not eating (and dying and being reborn).

Questions raised

677. 1. Is not Buddhism selfish?—No, because no personal end, such as heavenly bliss, is sought.

2. Is the withdrawal from the world with the purpose of self-development compatible at all with the English social and public school tradition of self denial by team-spirit?—(1) Self-denial by team spirit, if developed for competition is an enlargement of the selfish end from the individual to the team; each individual hopes to gain more personally by the limited sacrifice of some personal ends to the team. The subordination of self-will is compatible, but the aim of competition for worldly gain is not.—(2) The now classical English liberal education incorporating the teaching of the 'humanities' contains two radically opposed basic principles: team spirit and the inviolable sanctity of the individual person and his conscience; only the English genius for compromise seems to weave these two together successfully. That education is a code, like the stoics' code of behaviour, which takes a philosophical system or a religion (it is not important what) for its ultimate justifications. In England both Christianity and Greek philosophy serve this end, but the code could attach itself to the Dhamma equally well, with some adjustments.

3. Is not the position of the Christian clergy and of the Sangha to the laity radically opposed since the clergy are devoted to social service?

This is a narrow estimate of the Christian clergy based on that of the C of E in England, and perhaps the

C of R in England, U. S. A. and other countries where it works on a missionary basis, but it ignores the history of Christian monasticism, and the status, for example, of the Trappists and Poor Claires, — monasteries in, say, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and Mount Athos.

4. Does not the Buddhist conception of heaven and hell amount in the end to much the same thing as the Christian one? — No, because they are not penitentiaries and places of reward set up by a Lord Creator for the punishing and recompensing of his creatures who sin against or believe in him. (In Buddhism) the pattern of existence works itself out through kamma into the hells and heavens and the world we know, just as social life works itself out into prisons, jobs, public honours, etc.

5. Suppose the Dhamma were successfully spread over the world, would it be a lasting benefit? — It would be a temporary benefit, but not a lasting one. The world is comparable to a hotal or a station waiting room, it can be made better or worse by the people who pass through.

6. What do the laity get out of Buddhism? — See the story of Visākhā (Vinaya Mahâvagga Kh. 8 & S. LV, 53). — The sangha is open to any layman to join who wants to practise renunciation. It maintains the Buddha's teaching and that opportunity for him. What does a layman get out of a hospital?

7. Still the precepts seem to me negative — instead of refraining from taking life why not say that one should preserve life? — Would that not involve favouring one against another, in the case of those who prey upon each other? - - But isn't there a hierarchy of importance of life? If I see a tiger attacking a man, should I

not shoot the tiger to save the man's life? — If that is admitted then one is justified in stealing and lying to save another's life; "bon père de famille est capable de tout"; "the end justifies the means". The negative precept 'Do not take life' is restraint (comparable to the ploughing of a field) and renunciation. The positive precept 'preserve live' sets life as the highest positive good (whether my own or others' makes no difference) and supports attachment and clinging to specific lives. And what if, instead of a tiger it is a man who attacks another man. But why is the question put in that form? Why not ask first at least, 'Am I justified in killing, to save my own life, a tiger (or a man) attacking me? Do I expect my neighbour to kill to preserve my life?'

8. Is Buddhism simply intellectualism? - No, intellectual knowledge is like teaching how to swim or reading a cookery book. The Dhamma is to be lived, like swimming or cooking.

9. If the Buddha's teachings require faith in the development of faculties, then a Christian is justified in arguing that it is merely a matter of developing faculties to be able to perceive the revealed dogmas, and so the Buddhist cannot vanquish him in debate on that point.

The Buddha's teaching does not require belief in the development of new faculties to perceive outward worlds hitherto unperceived. It is not concerned with new outward worlds but with the clear vision of the world of experience as instable and unsatisfactory, and that this is due to craving. The assertion made is that a line of conduct will reduce the craving and the suffering consequent on it (which can be tested) and the belief required is that that line of action can be carried to the point at which craving ends and suffering ends.

What is self (attā)?	Wrong view of personality.
What is eternal (nicca)?	Only non-arising, non-passing-away, non-changing of what is present.
What is altogether pleasant (sukha)?	Nibbana and the Path.
What is beautiful? (subha)	Mettā, the Brahma world, the Path.
What is Truth (sacca)?	The four Truths.
What is a person?	A chain of deeds and the result of deeds.
What is a soul?	Wrong view of personality.
What is a god?	An impermanent consciousness or personality with a body less grossly material than the human and less subject to pain or not subject to pain, or one with no material body at all: or a fine-material body with no consciousness. None is omnipotent or a world creator.

MISCELLANEA

Poems

•

Tale

•

Story

•

Dialogues

•

Words
and
Fallacies

•

Impressions

•

Canticle

LOOK

Look at the world they make that can be made
To shake and shiver and shift as if
It were a raft adrift
Dragged by each draft
Towards a rift as by a drasm
In wrong enthusiasm reft.

(Author's Note) 'drasm' is the noun from 'drastic' that is, something between a 'flap' and a 'drastic' spring-cleaning (as seem from a spider's angle).

"A drasm is a dreadful thing, I wot."

(Oct 56)

In a letter to Rev. Ñāṇavīra:

The (above) verse, entitled "Look", will perhaps express something of my sentiments on motion. "Drasm" is an old friend, whom you may remember. Rule for this verse is that it must be full of rhymes but none must appear at the end of any two lines".

LOOK AGAIN

When I look in a looking-glass
How is it that it comes to pass,
What is it, too, that there I see,
The looking-glass, myself or me?

If caged alone, the turtle dies:
But if he in reflection spies
His image in a glass, he lives:
Such is the food illusion gives.

So when I see you face to face,
Seeming your person there to trace,
What do I see there — which is true? —
The world, part of myself, or you?

You see yourself and I see you,
Only through me do you see you;
While you see me, I myself see,
Only through you do I see me.

Of all the points of vanishing
In the perspective of the world,
That opposite to me is present
And I am that which isn't there.

SONG

My song is simply what it seems:
A tangle of too many themes
That never whispers but it screams,
Fusing reality with dreams —
As't were a swirl of counter-streams
that with a school of clashes teems
Whereon the froth of fancy creams
The rippling of bubble-beams,
Of crystal-flaws, of leaden gleams
And winking dust of carbon-seams —
What then if there is none esteems
This tapestry of enthymemes
All ragged with unfinished schemes
To bleed the wits with lancet-fleams,
And what if none but scandal deems
This word-play of raw verbal teams
Brawling across the paper reams?
Yet furze-flame a boat's bottom breams:
My song is surely what it seems,

Come, let Philosophy now crack her whip:
And by her thumping the Grammatic Drum
The Infinite and Absolute shall come
With All and Nothing at her will to skip.

Condemn Disorder to detentive slum
To lie in chains with Ignorance; declare
The roll complete. 'Tis fatal to despair
To give a name to each; for can the dumb

Command? or the unnamed obey? Beware!
O find a name — to save her leadership —
For the unnamed, which ever gives the slip,
Whose naming kills and has it born elsewhere.

(Will not this naming the unnamed ensure
Work for Philosophy for evermore?)

In a letter to Rev. Ñāṇavīra:

> "I rediscovered a sonnet I made a few months ago & had forgotten; while not quite a propos, I shall nevertheless quote this bit of pastiche, ...I think the distribution of rhymes is quite neat and the thought nicely rounded—but I am no judge of verse."

SELF - MASTERY*

A Palinode

The lowly stowick Epictetise
Wouldn't write a single treatise:
The utterances of the man
Were copied down by Arrian.

Imperial Mark Aureliorse
His bibliophobia was worse:
He wrote a book himself instead,
Where 'Throw away your books!' he said.

*Editor's Note: The Title refers to an essay in which Mark Aurel's advice to throw one's books away, had been echoed.

TALE

There is a village in which a postman and a scientist are living. The postman has a rule (his own, made arbitrarily by himself, but invariably kept) which is to ring the bell twice on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, and four times on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays, once a day when he brings the post; and even when there are no letters to deliver, he still rings in the same way to ask if there were any letters for the outward mail. On Sundays he takes a day off and does not ring at all. For a long time, for many years, the scientist used to answer the door when he heard the bell ring twice or four times, doing so himself because he lived alone. One day, however, he received a letter from some important source asking some questions about the application of averages and interpretation of statistics. The subject tickled his scientific mind and so absorbed him that he began to work out the averages of everything he could think of. He actually nursed a secret hope that he might at length discover the average of All Things, though he realized the difficulty of such a task, and he contented himself meanwhile with a sound basis of simple classified statistics drawn from his own personal observations. In thus applying averages to his own life, he one day hit upon the matter of the postman's rings. First he reckoned that each two days the postman rang a total of six times (he knew this for certain since he counted the rings himself) and so, in order to minimize the hazards of arbitrary judgement of the moment, he worked out the average rings for each day at 3; and he wrote it down in a book. Since hitherto he had been listening for 4 or 2 rings, he now concluded that it would be more accurate to listen for three, and

that the 2 and the 4 could not have been really correct (rather as the atomic physicists tell us that the solid table off which we dine and which hurts us so much when we bump into it, is not really solid but is all space or whirling electrons, or something like that). He thought "I shall not allow myself to be deceived by 2 or 4 rings anymore, the senses are notoriously untrustworthy. Only three rings can be right. I must have been missing a lot of letters". He was the more convinced of this since other people always rang once, and he had worked out the average for each: the number of callers per day (excluding the postman) divided into the number of rings gave the figure and so he was certain of this through verification by experiment. So he began to ignore 2 and 4 rings and listened only for 3 rings for his post. After a week during which he received no letters, and the letters he wrote piled up, he wondered if he had miscalculated. Then he remembered Sundays: 7 days with a total of 18 rings made a daily average of, not 3 rings, but of 2.571428 rings. This, he realized, would be rather difficult to hear accurately, so he sat in his drafty hall all day, with a plate of sandwiches and a flask of laced tea, hurriedly made before sunrise, but he never heard the bell ring like that: and he still got no post, and still the letters he wrote piled up. He would not discuss his troubles with visitors who called; for after all he was a scientist and they were not. Then he remembered the public holidays such as Easter-Monday, Christmas Day, and so on, and he revised his calculations again, making them still more accurate; but still he never heard the kind of ring he was expecting. And so it goes on with his taking into account leap-years and Holy Years, and what not. And all the while he gets no post and the letters he writes and cannot post pile up so much that

he will soon be pushed out of his house. But now the postman no more rings the bell since no one has answered his 2 and 4 rings for so long, and so he takes home the letters addressed to the scientist (they are very few by now) and makes some of them into spills to light his pipe in the evening when he sits by the fire, working out on the back of others the foot-ball pool averages by which he hopes to win a fortune one day (Nov. 57)

STORY

The door to the dark empty room (cave) containing nothing. The darkness makes the ignorant fill it with fancies. A Church is made to lock the door and guard against entry, which church points to the other door, that of the tomb, which leads to heaven, but can only be entered by dying (in voluntary ignorance of what is behind the forbidden door).

Rival churches, since the doors are profitable, spring up and paint forbidden doors on walls (rocks) and guard them.

The secret known perhaps to some of the first Churchmen, is that behind the forbidden door there is nothing. That known to the second Church men is that there is no door in their church (which comes to the same).

A man enters the Church as a churchman. Perhaps he discovers that secret, but it is not worth his while divulging it, and no one would be better off if he did.

A. Does life justify death (for without death there would be no room for new life)? Does death condemn life (for death comes to all that live)? —
B. Who knows? Who can say?
A. Everyone knows, everyone says. (Dec. 53)

•

A. I gave him a piece of my mind, I did; and I sent him away with a flea in his ear.
B. How is that — is your mind full of vermin?

•

Fra me e me

I: I shall turn over a new leaf.
Me: Why not close the book?
I: Because I don't know how — because it doesn't seem to have an outside. (Mar. 54)

•

Fra me e me

I: Do you approve of what is right?
My Conscience: Of course.
I: Do you believe right will triumph at the end?
My Conscience: Yes.
I: So you want to be on the winning side? (April 56)

•

A: Is a starfish five or one?
B: How do you mean?
A: Give me an answer.
B: It is both.
A: How can what is one be five, or what is five be one?
B: I give you an example: a starfish. (June 56)

My Conscience: You can't eat the cake and have it, you know.

I: Should I have it? Should I eat it?

Me: The proverb says: eat or be eaten.

I: Then I should eat my cake before it eats me?

My Conscience: That is not what I meant at all.

(Mar. 56)

•

A: One can't be too particular about these things.

B: No, one can't, can one?

A: If one is too careful and choosy, one'll never get anything done.

B: But still, one can't be too particular about these things.

A: Can't one then?

B: If one is not careful enough, one never knows what one may have let oneself in for. (June 56)

•

A: Eternity is that whose beginning can be indefinitely pushed back and whose end can be indefinitely postponed.

B: Eternity is all time.

A: Eternity is the opposite of time. (July 57)

•

A: 'Take what you will', says Emerson, 'but pay the price.'

B: How can I? I have no money.

A: Oh money; that is only for material things.

B: What then?

A: Pleasures of the mind, for instance: see what Schopenhauer says!

B: How are they paid for?

A: By paying attention, of course! You give attention to them, don't you?

B: Yes, but where did I get this from?

A: (Silence)

B: Have I borrowed it from pain? Are pleasures paid for by attention demanded back by pain?

A: (Silence) (Sept. 56)

•

A: Is there a next life?

B: Of course.

A: How, then?

B: Why, you are living it now.

A: Now?

B: Yes, this is the next life after the last one. (Sept. 56)

•

A: I have the seeds of an incurable sickness in me.

B: Good gracious, what is that?

A: Ageing and death. (Aug. 57)

•

A: I am the victim of an incurable drug habit.

B: What habit?

A: Eating. (Aug. 57)

•

A: Wouldn't it be far simpler to regard myself as a machine — as purely mechanical?

B: You can't. You have free will and you must exercise your will and choose.

A: I said 'myself' I did not mean 'me'.

B: Are you not yourself today?

A Let it be. As the Existentialists say 'I am condemned to be free'? Is that what you mean?

B: If you put it like that, yes.

A: But then surely that suggests the view regarding myself as a purely mechanical machine, and the very statement that I (who am free) must exercise my will, must choose, must change world history (as the Marxists say), am condemned to be free (as the Existentialists say) shows that myself is a purely mechanical machine.

B: So that's what you believe.

A: Did I say that?

B: What then?

A: My point was that whether you (or I) argue that there is free will or that there is none the result is the same: determinism or mechanicalism.

B: But didn't I just say: "So that's what you believe?".

A: Did I ever say that? I said that that is what any argument about freedom and will must come to. But what has that to do with belief?

B: I don't follow you.

A: No. (Nov. 57)

•

A: What don't you believe in?

B: This world.

A: Why not.

B: Because I know it.

(Words)

Intertwangled
errorious
immortalitarian
professor of myopics
Ceremoniac
a drasm (n. fr. drastic)
a coefficient (one good at team work)
embrambled = caught up
erminous = furry
a reverberose type
oppositious
moralysis (fr. moralising)
sacrilegion
Anthropomorphia

Today's fallacies and half-truths

That it is possible to ascertain with certainty what is the happiness of the greatest number.

Give everyone the necessities of life and all discontent will automaticaly vanish.

The independent witness who is not committed to a side.

The reality behind appearances.

That every man knows what he wants and you have only to give it to him and he will live happily.

That all men are equal in all respects.

Tuat all men are different in all respects.

1 I go out on a grey day in the rain. The rain beats on the body and soft clouds cover the sky. The eye cannot see into the clouds and the mind is busy with the bodily sensation of dropping rain. This I call the world.

2 I go ont on a cloudless midday. The overhead sun beams and shines and glares and burns in a pure hard blue enamel sky (the blue of heaven). The eye cannot see past the blue and the mind is busy with the bodily sensation of burning heat. (Hateful is the dark blue sky vaulted over the dark blue sea — said Tennyson.) This I call the lower heaven.

3 I go out on a clear night at full-moon. The trees milk the white light from the air letting it drip and lie in pools on the ground. The moon hangs a curtain of half-light behind the biggest stars. Though the eye cannot see through the curtain, the mind is half quiet. This I call the higher heaven.

4 I go out late on a clear moonless night, long after even the zodiacal light has sunk down. The sun is directly underfoot. There are only stars in the sky. The stars hard and sharp as spears, but have NO size (I know that even with the hugest telescope they subtent NO angle): and between the stars I see what is not there. It is quite plainly visible extended space: no feature neither with nor without atoms. The positive stars have no size at all; the negative void has infinite size. Neither upside down nor right way up I hang in that void neither in the middle nor near the edge. This I shall call the external vertigo.

1 I sit down in a room and consider a fugue. This I call the lower inner heaven.

2 I sit down in a room and consider that in me there is that which can recognize a fugue and its structure. This I call the higher inner heaven.

3 I sit down in a room, quiet and half dark and watch the act of breathing — the bodily sensation of air touching the tip of the nose: I experience sensing the bodily sensation at an interval of space. I can place the bodily sensation in space as sensed from the direction in which I am. But when I follow that direction back and look for the "I", then I am no longer there but in another place. I have no place in space. I see and sense space and the "things" in it from a place where I am not. Space is complete without "I" and there is no room for "I" in space at all. This I call the inner vertigo.

The only one is the many; and many the ones:
The only one that is the many is only one of the many.

The only infinity is finiteness; and finite the infinities: only the infinity which is finite is infinitely finite.

The only eternity is time; and temporal eternity: only the eternity which is temporal is temporarily eternal.

The only permanence is the impermanent; and impermanent the permanencies: only the permanence which is impermanent is impermanently permanent.

•

Only death lives for ever; and the life-everlasting is death.

Only life dies for ever; and the death-everlasting is life.

The lifeless has died for ever: the deathless will live for ever.

Is there another life? Of course, you are living it now.

•

The Absolute receives absolution only from consciousness and by that act its absoluteness is very particular.

The Incomprehensible is only incomprehensible when comprehended as such: uncomprehended, it is comprehendable as incomprehensible.

Do I know the ignorance of unknowledge, or am I ignorant of the knowledge of my ignorance?

•

The most illusory of all illusions is the illusion that there is no illusion.

What is certain? Probability. What is probable? Certainty. Can I doubt that I know with certainty my own doubt?

•

To exist is to be condemned to freedom and to be free for condemnation.

How to achieve in Christian Theism safety from the Sin Against the Holy Ghost? How to achieve in Marxist atheism the safety from becoming an Enemy of the People?

Who can say that he is free as long as he is not freed from freedom?

All religions are one: but which one?

From Letters to Ven Ñāṇavīra

I

3rd February 1959

About phenomena and being. I by no means disagree with your statement that what phenomena are is other phenomena. That description describes phenomena in terms of themselves (identified with being), which is, of course, perfectly correct — since there is nothing else in terms of which to describe them. Phenomena are being, being is phenomena. The two are one and the one are two (my description had the clause, if I remember rightly, that if they could be held to have a distinguishing peculiar characteristic it might be .... etc... The only thing I might alter now would be to say that "being is hidden" instead of "has nothing beyond it", thus when the hidden being ("capable of appearing") is disclosed it appears as a phenomenon. So while your description emphasizes the identity of the two, mine emphasizes the duality in the identity). But while phenomena and being — the two — are identically one (phenomena are) at the same time we cannot dispense in thought and speech with either of the two, replacing either one entirely by the other, which since they are identical, is absurd (but the world is absurd). What is an identity? It is the essential oneness of two entities whose difference, if any, does not count.

I underlined the words in "to be is to be phenomenal — i. e. "to appear or to be capable of appearing" (attributed by you to me as "my view") because this

raised the same difficulty as Whateley Carington's 'cognita and cognizables'. But that which is "capable of appearing", if it has not yet appeared, cannot be known to be either capable of appearing or incapable of appearing; or, if it is known as "capable of appearing" it is because it has already appeared as "capable of appearing"; consequently the distinction as a class founders in both cases. The phenomenon called (I think misleadingly) "capable of appearing" or "cognizable" in this sense (which might suggest that it exists independently of our knowledge of it) is, I think, more simply termable as a phenomenon that appears (present) in the mode of absence (temporal or spatial, etc.). I see the "capability" as a mode arising from tensions due to patterns of presences and absences in the different fields of the saḷāyatana. But "phenomena capable of appearing" as a category opposed and extra to "appearing phenomena", I regard as bogus, even if specious. The Realist/Idealist controversy by-passes this point.

I love logicians and mathematicians. Also I regard Irrationalism (often called "Rationalism") as no alternative to, or escape from, logic, but only a (futile) defiance of it in its own valid field, which is that of "*bhavâ*-[1] assumed" (like Satanism before god, perhaps), and it (the irrationality) falls entirely within logic's own domain. Neither Logic nor Irrationality, as rational—or—irrational—anti-logic, are *niyyānika*.[2] But within the all-extensive *bhava*-assumed, logic rules unquestionably and irrationality keeps the logicians awake and angry.

A witticism (witty schism if you like) occurred to me yesterday about "necessity". While the proverb

1 Pali: 'being'

2 Pali: 'leading out', 'liberating'

speaks of "making a virtue of necessity". Kant (with his "Categorical Imperative") speaks of "making a necessity of virtue". Now this raises a point about descriptions and errors therein, and fictions: Kant (and others since) claimed that human personality has a special faculty, a "moral eye", which "sees" intuitively and directly (as the eye sees visually visible forms) what Ought to be Done. This I hold is not so since I find in myself no such faculty, only a certain sense of caution and expediency, which comes perhaps under judgment. This, then, I hold to be an outstanding example of a bogus description, and this kind of description I regard as potentially dangerous.

With phenomena and being in the air, the word "essence" knocks at the door. "Essence" (from the verb *esse*, to be): a medieval logician's concept, initiated by Aristotle (parallel to the Pali commentarial use of *bhāva*), is used by logicians and philosophers as a synonym for "characteristic" (particular phenomenon) peculiar to an individual or to a class by which that individual or class is recognized to be itself. This ontic metaphor from subjective-objective being to purely-objective characteristic is a pun-by-metaphor of fundamental importance, and indispensably useful for those (Religions, Doctors and scientists, say) who need to employ the "Utraquistic Subterfuge" (which is so valuable for verbal presti(di)g (itation) e — remove what is in the ( ) and see what remains). But a characteristic-phenomenon, called "essence" (le phenomene de l'etre), is then that of something which has that essence, and consequently, is not it (whether that "something" is regarded as a Kantian "Ding -an-sich" or as an Abhidhamma constellation-of-dhammas -with-no-self-subatance, or what you will, makes no difference here): it is that special phenomenon by which I recog-

nize what this which has it, is, and believe this to be what it itself is. Now this characteristic, by the utraquistic ontic metaphor of "essence" applied to it, renders it possible to appear to verbally externalized Being and so to objectivize it entirely. So it is now easier (apparently) to handle "existence" (that same thing's Being) as just another external attribute, namely that thing's ("quality-of-existence") predicatable of it. The fraud is now nearly complete; and if the logical copula is (the being assumed and agreed on as one of the basic assumptions of logic, and a logical constant) can only be passed off as quite divorced from being or existence with the mediation of the metaphor of "essence" externalized, as a characteristic and attribute, then we can forget about it, forget that it is the true verbal symbol for existential being, and forget that it contains the (hateful subjective) element of self-identification. This play with the "essence"-metaphor is possible precisely because of the actual existential miragic identity-relation of ambivalence between consciousness-and-being and between being-and-phenomena. This ambivalence which remains in the copula, is anathema to logicians, and they seek any means to hide it away. So, now we have split being into two, tried to drain being away from the copula by means of the "essence"-metaphor, and now we can make believe that the copula is not really being at all (which is quite untrue) since it remains being on the verbal plane; and if it did not, statements would not correspond at all to life, and logic could not possibly ever have any connection with existence at all), and so the copula can be exempted from all questions and analysis when we are investigating being and its structure, and what is more, this investigation can be handed over entirely to logic, which, since the copula (its constant) exhibits this most serious and crippling error: cogito ergo sum / "if cogitatio is, then esse".

(3) The Form of the Statement: I believe it is legitimate to paraphrase "AB implies A" by "If AB, then A", and to take them as equivalent. If that is correct, then, in their second form, the statement looks superficially to be similar in form to *"imasmiṁ sati idaṁ hoti"* expressed in the form "If this is, then that is" or the cogito expressed in the form "If I think then I am". But it seems to me there are these most important differences: (1) In "AB implies A" (or "If AB, then A") the individual natures of A and B are completely unimportant so long as they are merely different and suitably combinable and they are thus level one with the other. But on the contrary, in the cogito (where the 1st person is unique) and in *imasmiṁ sati idaṁ hoti* (which is only legitimately expandable into the Paṭiccasamuppâda formula) the natures of the concepts employed are of fundamental importance; for the cogito would be valueless if it did not specifically employ the unique 1st person, and consciousness and being; and likewise *imasmiṁ sati idam hoti* whose expanded from (it is not like a Law of Thought a quelconque generalization) the concepts' particular natures are of absolutely fundamental importance; for it includes the constituents necessary for *asmi-māno* (the 1st person singular "I"), and consciousness, and being. So while "AB implies A" is, in its form, quite general and impersonal, both the cogito and *imasmiṁ sati* are inseparable from the special unique concepts they incorporate.

(4) Self-Identification within the Cogito and the Statement. The ontological act-of-self-identifying is quite differently treated in the Cogito and the Statement. The Cogito implies "When I think, then I am self-identifying self identical on return "(making be)" while the Statement implies "When A and B are combined then A remains

unchanged on return to, or repetition of, A". Or the Cogito says "I am conscious whenever I am my self-identity" but the Statement says "Self-identity is always valid", which is something quite different. The Cogito shows my self-identity of being as contingent upon consciousness as subjectivity; but the Statement only declares that the self-identity of A does not change on a return to self (A). (And here I remember that the "invariant of a transformation" on "Invariance in transformation", as the third characteristic of the *samkhata*, is, such as it is described, subject to its relation within the wider description "*Avijjā-paccayā sankhārā; ... upādāna-paccaya bhavo*). I certainly agree with you that it is dangerous rationalist *mauvaise-foi* to doubt what is certain (just as it is dangerous religious irrationalist *mauvaise foi* to believe what is uncertain), and I think we agree in regarding the Cogito as a true description and as unquestionably certain and verifiable by reflexion; and likewise the Paticca-samuppāda formula. But I do not, for the reason stated, accept "AB implies A" on this footing at all. That I, when I cognize, identify I do not doubt; but that an identification made can never be doubted I do most certainly non admit. *Il est dans mon être question de mon être.*

(5) Certainty. I do not know how far we agree on this matter. "AB implies A" assumes that A remains unchanged in the repetition, in the return to it by self-identification; but how can I be certain that it has not changed meanwhile (ṭhitassa aññathattaṁ paññāyati)? And if it has, then "AB does not imply A" is appropriate. For myself, I am certain that I cognize and that I am, but I am not certain what it is that I cognize, or what it is that I am. Whether I am myself or not is quite open to doubt even in ordinary usage, since I can on one day

be "quite myself", on another "not quite myself", and on another "Quite beside myself". I am certain that when I see, that I see; but though I identify what I see (recognize it), I am not certain what it is that I see; hence the constant question "What is this that I see?", which is always liable to be reopened however well answered. I am certain that "I am doing" but my identification of what I am doing is uncertain. True it (the other cases too) is, or seems, in pure immediacy, certain what I am doing; but any pure immediacy is only part of a wider immediacy, and so on in infinite hierarchy; so that what I am doing now, namely (certainly) writing this letter in one immediacy, is part of spending-a-day-at-Polgasduva,* which is part of living-at-the-Hermitage, and so on, but ad infinitum — but N. B., the "infinite here" is "indifinite", so while I am unquestionably certain that "I am doing", I am only relatively certain what I am doing in any immediacy, and I am quite uncertain what it is that I am doing (in its self-identity), since that recedes always into the infinitely indefinite.

(6) Infinity: While the recourse to infinity gives maximum freedom of movement in proportion to the number of facts of a situation relegated to infinity and thus made indefinite, yet this infinity, owing to its indefiniteness, renders what is infinitized absolutely ineffectual existentially. Existence partakes of both finite and infinite, being the synthesis of both. Now grammar, though so greatly despised, is sometimes instructive: and here we find the verb has its infinite mood, in which it is depersonalized, relegated to a position not even admitting potentiality, and consequently quite neutralized as regards

* The Sinhalese name for the "Island Hermitage" where the author lived. (Ed)

any effective (verbal) action on its part. It is perhaps one of the weaknesses of Berkeley's formula *"esse est percipi"* that it is stated in grammatical infinitives (*esse*, *percipi*,) and so is depersonalized and abstracted from existence. If he had, like Descartes, worked in the finite form, the indicative, he might have noticed some of its deficiencies "I am, therefore I am perceived" does not claim the unquestioned recognition as an adequate valid description of reflexion that cogito ergo sum does: it then appears as *être vu*, which invites completion, owing to its onesided passivity, by involving, say God, by whom I am perceived in order that I can be. Infinity enters at once with double reflexion, and I think that conscious reflexion is not reducible below double reflexion. But *esse est percipi* forgets the finite percipiens in my difinite finity. "AB implies A", if considered in this light, can only belong to (side with) the infinite type of expression, and never to the finite, and so is abstract and ineffectual, though, of course, invaluably useful within the limits of infinity.

(7) Law: If the Statement is regarded as a Law of Thought, then it is not a description: then the whole Legal Mode (derived as it is from the manner of formulating laws from cases (as in English Common Law) is implied; for the mental machinery is the same, wherever laws are formulated. A court case, with the evidence and verdict or judgment, is comparable to a description, and any law formulated from it is comparable to a law abstracted from a description (or set of descriptions). Much more might be said on this, but I refrain I only remark that I regard the Cogito as a valid description free from errors (even if a little incomplete) I regard "AB implies A" as a statement of a law abstracted from (some description or descriptions not recorded). As such,

it is on a different footing, and in a different mode: it is abstract (and in the legal sense arbitrary). If the two are confused (I do not say they are), it seems to me a mistake.

In conclusion, if you mean (as I take it you do) that the Laws of Thought and "AB implies A" are objectively valuable witnesses to how being is maintained (rather as instruments of torture are valuable witnesses to the methods of the Holy Inquisition by which the Catholic Church maintains itself on occasion) then I agree with you. But if it is suggested (and I am not supposing that you suggest this at all) that they are subjectively acceptable as instruments for use in analysing being and, as such, are themselves subjectively *niyyānika*, then I dissent. What I am not clear about is what you mean when you say that a reflecting logician sees "AB implies A" on reflexion and no error can arise beyoud error of description.

II

26th June 1959

The trouble about discussing mind, I find (I here refer to discussions on this subject 'fra me e me') is that (a) they always ramify fantastically and (b) one always finds that one has not been talking about mind (either *mano* or *viññāṇa*) but only about *nāma-rūpa*. The committee called Buddhaghosa Thera made a parallel most grave and fundamental error in their Visuddhi Magga's 14th Chapter when they set out to describe the *Viññāṇakkhandha* second, next to the *Rūpakkhandha*, and before *vedanā, saññā* and *sankhārā* (that is why the description of the last two is so thin there, because it is these two, not *viññāṇa*, that has been described second under *viññāṇa*, and so there is nothing intelligible left to say about them beyond mere repetition). This is quite contrary to the Suttas, which never change the order for the vital reason that it is only after you have exhausted everything positive by the first four that *viññāṇa* remains (M. 140);* and that is indescribable except on the basis of that due to which it arises (M. 38), or on the basis of *nāma-rūpa* (M. 109), which it is-not (in the mode of not-being-what-it-is-and-being-what-it-is-not), and unlike the other four, it is the only infiniteness among them (*ānañca* - see the 4 āruppas) and so, phenomenologically it is the pure negative ("purer" than the first negation, *ākāsa* —

* simply, perhaps, because one finds that when everything has been exhausted something seems still left and nothing can be found.

the 4 āruppas are Absolute Negations). From this you may safely infer that I quite agree with your earlier "glass-shelves" theory, with the reservation that an infinite hierarchy of infinitely extensive glass shelves is (are) indistinguishable from nothing except dialectically (what, by the way, does ∞^2 signify mathematically, if anything?). This latter I regard as important. For if the pañcakkhandhā are assumed (upādiṇṇa) — and if they are absolutely not assumed there is no talking and no talked-about — then the assumption (consumption on the physical-material level) must, by its nature, be a dialectical assumption. But since, fundamentally all dialectic (which = in decision = anxiety = fear = pain) is unpleasant, one side of the basic dialectics has to be closed, more compulsively so in proportion to their existential importance (the consumption of food being one of the basic aspects), and is closed unilaterally by *taṇhā* and *avijjā*. The other side, being left open, then becomes the object of faith, which, when pure, believes absolutely it is not open to dialectic.

Here a further train of thought is, I find, waiting at the station with steam up ready to depart. Whereto? Let us see. You know my view of the necessary organic relation of faith-ignorance (*saddhā-avijjā*) in the puthujjana, when faith supplements, in action, the deficiency in knowledge (*ñāṇa*) truncated by ignorance, and so makes action (kamma) not only possible but inescapable: Well, my train now seems to be heading in the following direction: Given faith's intimacy with ignorance (take this in the worst sense, if you like), faith only functions well (as 'bonne foi') when ignored (perhaps the mythico-psychological term for this would be "in the Unconscious", which, otherwise translated, would mean "in overlooked behaviour patterns as regards the Other" — but subjecti-

vely, it means "in pure, unreflective action", I think). But in proportion as faith is brought up by reflexion into full ignorance governed cognizance (i. e. knowledge of the limited, I-positional, kind that must accompany the basically still unbroken-up faith-ignorance menage) it either dies and turns into honest doubt, or it lives on as *mauvaise foi.* I say "it dies and becomes doubt" because it is an easily verifiable fact that if one knows (in this way) that one is acting on faith alone, one thereby becomes inhibited (simultaneous knowledge of this type is destructive of faith) and the action collapses (e. g., miracles (?), or Ogden & Richards' "Centipede" or stage-fright or ordinary straight-forward doubt, as, for example, one's first real attempt at swimming, etc.) This, I take it, is because action is only an aspect or a function of faith-ignorance. (When action is analyzed into *paticcasamuppāda-nirodha, saddhā* vanishes and *avijjā* ceases). The first three paths are then necessarily paradoxical and represent the opening of fundamental dialectics, of which two recognizably basic ones are consciousness/unconsciousness and being/non-being. It is these that indicate *nirodha,* I take it. The sotāpanna's *aveccappasāda* as "confidence due to undergoing" (*adhigama-saddhā*) is thus properly faith which is no more faith (M 47) and owing to his loss of a measure of ignorance, his knowledge (ñāṇa) is no more knowledge as the simple opposite of ignorance. Confidence and understanding (paññā) are now both one and two until the Arahant's revolution terminates the absurdity (see also M. 95). The train of thought has now stopped. Where are we now? Where are the station name-boards? What does it mean?

I think you are quite right to bring out the fact that the Buddha while giving definitions, never gives a single definition as absolute, and all really basic ideas, like the *saccāni* are most delicately balanced, too, in the matter of negation. If any single definition were absolutely valid determinism must result, and then no brahmacariya is possible for the ending of suffering.

III

10th September 1957

......There are no absolute opposites. Complexity denies the possibility of anything arising alone, since an event is always complex. If any thing or quality (is) discriminated (as) the opposite of another, each will be associated with other qualities that are not opposites, thus apparent-oppositeness is only partial Perhaps if a complete opposite is not an impossibility, and were found, something frightful would happen.

......What is said and thought about anything is always reflexion. Without reflexion nothing comes to light. The moment I say 'I am doing this', I am reflecting, not 'doing this'.

......Complementarity (a la Bohr), i. e. any description that claims complete coherence is incomplete by omitting to deal with incoherence. This appears in the "complementarity" of wave/particle descriptions of the percept-bodies called electrons, and again in the *ajjhatta-bahiddhā* aspects of the subjectively-experienced and objectively-perceived body. Perhaps this principle shadows every generalization, the more general, the closer.

......Continuity-discontinuity: There must be some recondite fundamental tie between the (as it were) step-function of the Quantum theory and the converse continuity, the flow, that is an undeniable experience

(giddiness and nausea). The simile that comes to mind is that of my walking up a down-going escalator: I proceed by steps (my step-function or quanta), which conforms to the shape of the flow, but the steps flow against me and, as it were, fuse my acts. By this means I have to step and flow simultaneously to stay put.

THE ESSENTIAL RELATION IN OBSERVING

(Fragment)

Preamble

The assertion is made here that the event of observing at its simplest must of necessity be complex. Without comparison (confrontation) no observation could be said to have been made at all. For (a) without simultaneous (as it were 'spatial') confrontation of difference in the observed ("This — not that") no observation could be said to happen at all since there would be no way of distinguishing the alleged observation from non-observation; and (b) without difference between observed and observer (observable by successive, as it were, 'temporal' comparison as "difference in the new observed") no observation could be happening either, since the alleged observer could not be distinguished from the observed. An "observed that is indistinguishable from the non-observed" will be regarded as unconstitutable as likewise an "observer with no observed", an "observed with no observers" and an "observer and observed indistinguishable inter se".

A. The Division

1. Unless there is division between observer and observed, no difference can be compared and no observation can take place.

2. Unless what is observed by the observer is itself divided (from what is not observed), no comparison can be made (and without comparison in the observed, no difference can be found between the observed and not-observed).

3. The simplest, minimum, elementary division in the observed can be called the "affirmed/denied", the "this/not that", "yes/no". Since each counterpart excludes the other (so regarded), they can be symbolized by the signs + and —. The two elements of the observed, so divided I shall call adjacent (to each other), and observed as such.

4. Division thus appears as a necessary factor (sine qua non) of observation: division (a) between observer and observed, and (b) in the observed. The observer, so divided from the observed, I shall call also adjacent (to the observed), but unobserved. Since observer and observed are also mutually exclusive (but not in the same way as the two divisions of the observed) they can be respectively symbolized by o and 1. Each is, in fact, 'o' in terms of the other — the 'divided' and the 'undivided' and my equating 'o' with the observer is an arbitrary, if convenient, decision of a choice, which cannot be eescaped if a statement is to be made — (it could be made conversely).

5. The observed, therefore, in order to be observable at all, must appear to the potential observer at least as a duality. (N. B.: a "potential observer without any observed" and an "as-yet-unobserved observable" are convenient fictions at this stage, but will vanish). The two divisions of the observed I shall call the elements of the observable, and these together with the potential observer I shall call the elements of observation.

6. The division in the observable allows the differentiation of "this/not-that" = +/—. The division between the observer and the observable is expressible either as the difference of nature, namely, undividedness/dividedness, or as the observability of the observable and the unobservability of the observer: the observer can observe the observable but cannot observe himself. (The objection will be made that all this 'observer-cum-observed' is being observed by some other observer, e.g. the writer of this paragraph. That is legitimate, but it must wait for treatment till later (§20).)

Here only a mental note need be made that in symbolizing the observer by 'o' I have intended to signify also an essential incompleteness, which the unavoidable introduction of the observer (with his comparing) brings automatically with him. The description of the situation is thus structurally (skeletally) "completed" by the addition of "nothing" (the obsesver = o), but is nevertheless still incomplete since it still "lacks nothing" (an observer of the observer = o×o×.....); the mere ramification by division/confrontation in the observed 'completes nothing' in this sense. The apposition o:1 is asymmetrical. Observation is originally asymmetrical.

B. The Constitution of the Observed as a field or Unity

7. The 'observable' (+1; —1), which, to be so, must be divided (§2), is only constituted as a unity when the confrontation of the divisions is constituted by the presence of the observer ('o') in the Event of Observation (in which Event also the potential observer is constituted *qua* observer). This divided unity thus constituted I shall call the observed field (+1×—1).

8. But, for this constitution to be effective, it is necessary (*sine qua non,*) that the observer should be unmistakably different by nature from the observed (i. e. unobserved) and that the two divisions of the observed should be unmistakably different by nature from each other and, in a different way, from the observer $(+1 \times -1, 0)$. This can be stated, for convenience, spatially as follows the constituted duality $+ \longleftrightarrow -$ cannot be so constituted as a line (of two points) except from a standpoint not in the same line (expressible as 'o' in terms of that line). This "linearity" of the observed field constituted from outside I shall call Rectangularity (the "Rectangularity of a straight line").

9. But in order that what is essentially different in the Event of Observation may not absolutely fly apart, it is also equally necessary (*sine qua non*) that all three constituents of the Event have something in common to bind them. That, in fact, is 'nothing'. The 'nothing' that the divisions of the observed have in common is their not being the observer ('o'), who while observing that they have 'nothing' in common with each other, has 'nothing' in common with them. This state of being bound together (......?) in the divided observed field as a unity I shall call Conjunctive Adjacency.

10. The constitutive power of the observer in binding the observed from a (rectangular) standpoint outside it (in virtue of which he is 'nothing' in terms of it) I shall call Disjunctive Adjacency.

11. The Event of Observation, with its three elements, so minimally constituted (by divisions and binding) I shall call the Relation. (There is no relation unless the

two observed elements are constituted as a unity by the third element, the observer, who is 'nothing to them'. Therefore Relation has a minimum of three elements *sine qua non*).

12. That the three elements of the Relation 'have nothing in common' makes it incorrect to say that any one has an 'absolute opposite' within the Relation.

13. At this point I shall note that there are four possible confrontations (neither less nor more) to be made by the observer in the observed field. They can be symbolized as follows:

$$+\times+,\quad +\times-,\quad -\times+,\quad -\times-.$$

These can be regarded as four unoriented pairs, four "states of the observed field" (spatially simultaneous). Their stated order — an order of simultaneous pattern not in succession — is arbitrary (being only one of the possible permutations). But without this arbitrariness no order can be stated. It is not possible to invert any of them since they (as yet) lack the orientation between themselves that would make any inversion observable by comparison ($+\times+$ inverted is undistinguishable from $+\times+$, not inverted). "Change" and "alternative" have not so far emerged; only "and" and "difference" have emerged (space is implied, but not time). Observation, as the Event (but not an event), has now been constituted.

(The balance of the manuscript page has been left blank (for addition?), with the following pencilled note:)

Asymmetrical observer and observed are not "equal and opposite".

C. Change in the Constituted Observed Field

14. But a calamity occurs. If this Event, so carefully constituted is expressed symbolically in the terms I took care to choose, it must appear as follows: $(+1 \times -1) \times 0$. (But, as everyone knows, the result of that is '0'! How absurd! My sums must be wrong or else there is No Event).

15. The sums are not wrong, and there is an Event. But the act of the constitution of the Event is also the act of its annihilation. While there is, it seems, no constituting it otherwise, the constitution automatically reduces it (the Event) again to nothing. Now 'nothing' is '0', and '0' is the observer. But the observer cannot be an observer without an observed field. Consequently the act of annihilation must be, cannot help being, an act of reconstitution. And so on..... (in retrospect as, it seems also, in prospect). (This "reconstitution" from '0' cannot be expressed in mathematical terms; for mathematically a specific proposition, once reduced to zero by multiplication with '0' cannot be resurrected). This "...constitution/annihilation/reconstitution..." (can it be conceived as a flow?) I shall call **Successive Adjacency**. (Time as well as space is now implied: and what cannot happen in time $\times$ space?).

16. This is another way of saying that "space without time is impossible", since, by its being observed, it is simultaneously asserted and denied. Another decision is necessary. And, consequently, it follows that time has no nature of its own beyond that of the division between and succession of adjacent space.

17. With simple constitution (up to § 13 end) the observational Relation I have described was only a generality, as The event, and no alternative comparison was possible. This could only be effected by another division, namely, by the introduction of succession (§ 14) expressible as 'change or difference in time'. By this means, the four pairs (see § 13) become oriented with regard to each other. This has rectangularity to the 'conjunctive adjacency' (§ 9) since it is expressible as 0 in terms of them.

18. The introduction of succession transforms the generality of The Event into a plurality of events, and adds to 'simultaneity' also alternativity, adds 'or' to 'and'. Consequently, while (in §§ 7-12) only simultaneity was possible as, for instance, "yes/no" (yes and no), now the alternative "yes", "no" (yes or no) is possible.

19. At this point the four confrontations earlier stated as unoriented pairs (§ 12) can be stated as successively oriented pairs as follows:

$$\begin{array}{c} + \\ \downarrow \\ + \end{array} \; . \; \begin{array}{c} + \\ \downarrow \\ - \end{array} \; . \; \begin{array}{c} - \\ \downarrow \\ + \end{array} \; . \; \begin{array}{c} - \\ \downarrow \\ - \end{array} \; .$$

(The 'pairs' are now oriented, or, as it were, 'charged'.) But whereas earlier (§ 12) the event was 'fixed' arbitrarily as to the order of the four pairs though inversion made no difference, now, while the order can be changed, inversion makes a difference.

$$\begin{array}{c} + \\ \downarrow \\ + \end{array} \neq \begin{array}{c} + \\ \uparrow \\ + \end{array} \text{ etc.,}$$

Consequently any statement of an event must, further, be an arbitrary instance of (one of the permutations of) the Event. This arbitrary element, which enters in as soon as the division comes about (§ 4) I shall call the dialectic.

20. However, conversely, whenever any arbitrary expression of the event is stated, the structure of the Event necessitates certain consequents and excludes others. This I shall call the logic.

The Dialectic and the Logic imply one another (they 'coincide' and are 'at war', but they are never 'congruent' and no 'final peace' is possible.). The Dialectic is the 'if' (if this statement of The Event is made) while the Logic is the 'then' (then it follows that the pattern of orientation will be this, not that); but the 'if' is arbitrary and 'precedes' the 'then'.

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arbitrariness (of mode)	=	the particular expression (which automatically excludes the alternative)
element	=	the two parts of the observed, and the observer
adjacency	=	conjunctive adjacency of the two parts of the observed, and disjunctive adjacency of observer and observed
Relation	=	the triple relation between the duality of the observed-field and the observer

Event of Observation	=	the mutual interconstitution of observer and observed
Division	=	(rectangularity)

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D. The Bracketting of the Observer 'o'

21. The four alternatives (§19) can be interchanged, and, being oriented, can also be turned upside down. With the constitution of the observed field (§§7-13) the confrontation of "and" takes place, while with the annihilation and reconstitution (§14) the succession of "or" becomes possible. With the possibility of alternative confrontations in Successive Observations the question arises, 'What of Successive Observers?' Now, while the basic division in the observed field as + :— leads to its ramification in the presence of the observer ('o'), no such ramification takes place in the observer, who is 'nothing' and, whatever is 'done to' nothing, may be − o, remains 'o'. (I shall leave aside for the moment the proposition $\frac{1}{0} = \infty$). The consequence of this is that, in order to multiply the observer I must describe him in terms of his observed, since no other way is possible, and this would seem to be a fiction.

22. The observer does not appear in his observed field in any way at all, which 'lacks nothing' (§7), which is why he is symbolized by 'o'. While he is everywhere, while he is absolutely essential, he 'does not count' at all. Whether he is one or many it is impossible to tell except from the field or fields that are being observed. But this anticipates. Consequently, while his singularity or plurality may be a matter for consideration in an inquiry

into his nature, in an inquiry into the nature of the observed he can be disregarded (so long as I remember that there I learn nothing about him). I shall therefore, for the moment at least, put him in brackets ('o') and forget him (remembering, of course, that I have forgotten him).

This is what all Objective Science claims to do (and often forgets to do) and for which admiration is commonly expected. (The results of this I shall call 'Solalterism' or the 'Science of the Subject leaving himself out of his calculations'). Since He counts for zero in the observed, which is not observed without him, he can easily be reintroduced. It is, of course, the converse of the opposite procedure, where results are usually condemned without trial as detestable and are commonly called 'Solipsism' or that of the 'madman who has shut himself up in an impenetrable blockhouse'.

[See Aphorism 373]

Here the manuscript ends with a blank page carrying only the chapter heading:

E. The Ramification of the Observed

(The following text, obviously belonging to the preceding treatise was found in a different file among the late Author's posthumous papers. The sheet was not paginated and had no paragraphing linking it with the above treatise)

Existence is an operation. Operation comes into being with a leap, and at once extends back to infinity and forward to infinity, yet with the personal horizon that conceals both infinities.

The necessity for the observed duality ($+1, -1$) to be in relation with an observer (o), in order to exist implies:

(i) that the observer (o) has perpendicularity to the observed ($+1, -1$),

(ii) that spatially the observer has no status ($=o$) in terms of the observed ($+1, -1$),

(iii) that temporally the observer ($=o$) is structurally related to ($=$ multiplied with $=$ added to) the observed ($+1 \; -1$) and so spatially annihilates it by introducing change as temporalization,

(iv) that existentially (consciously) that observer ($=o$), having annihilated the observed ($= +1, -1$) must reconstitute it (he, the observer, cannot exist as o — cannot 'non-exist' — except against the observed), immediately reconstitutes the observed (as thus reconstitutable $= \pm 1$ or ∓ 1),

(v) that in the reconstitution of the observable (± 1 or ∓ 1) by the observer (o), a choice must be exercised whether the observable is to be constituted as this or that alternative (i.e. + or —). N.B., the term "observable" refers to the just-annihilated observed, neither more nor less,

(vi) this unavoidable choice exercised in the reconstitution is arbitrary. Once exercised the world is determined logically, but subject to immediate annihiliation.

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Motion is spatial (change is temporal)

Motion existentially establishes space. Change existentially establishes time. In space-time, when no motion is observed there is no time, and where no change is observed there is no space.

Just as motion is relative i.e. it is impossible (purely existentially) to ascrice absolute motion (or stationariness) to any body (acceleration introduces features other than motion), so too change is relative, i.e. it is impossible to ascribe absolute change or stability to any state. The "absolutely motionless" and the "absolutely unchanging" (whether temporary or 'eternal') depend as such on consciousness functioning with the unique "I". (The consequence seems to be that all are relative.)

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